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The past decade has witnessed dramatic changes in public atti- 
tudes about and legal status for same-sex couples who wish to marry. 
These changes demonstrate that the legal conception of the family is no 
longer limited to traditional marriage. They also raise the possibility 
that other relationships - cohabiting couples and their children , volun- 
tary kin groups , multigenerational groups, and polygamists - might 
gain legal recognition as families. This Article probes the challenges 
faced by aspiring families and the means by which they could attain 
their goal. It builds on the premise that the state remains committed to 
social-welfare criteria for granting family status , recognizing as families 
only those categories of relationships that embody a long-term commit- 
ment to mutual care and interdependence and , on that basis , function 
well to satisfy members' dependency needs. Groups aspiring to legal 
recognition as families must overcome substantial uncertainties as to 
whether they meet these criteria if they are to obtain the rights and 
obligations of legally recognized families. Uncertainty contributes to a 
lack of confidence in the durability and effectiveness oftheir relation- 
ships on the part of the aspiring family members themselves , the larger 
social community, and, ultimately, the state. The Article develops an 
informal model to illustrate the nature of these uncertainties, as well as 
the solutions to the possible obstacles they create. Using a hypothetical 
group consisting of two adult men and two adult women in a poly- 
amorous relationship, we show how legal status for family groups can 
result from an evolutionary process for overcoming uncertainties that 
uses collaborative techniques to build trust and confidence. Collabora- 
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tive processes have been shown in other settings to be effective mecha- 
nisms for creating trust incrementally and thus appear to offer a way 
forward for novel families. The Article describes how the successful 
movement o achieve marriage rights for LGBT couples has roughly 
conformed to the collaborative processes we propose, and it identifies the 
absence of meaningful collaboration as one factor explaining the stasis 
that characterizes the status of unmarried cohabitants. This evidence 
supports the prediction that the future progress of other aspiring family 
groups toward attaining legal status may depend on how well they are 
able to engage the collaborative mechanisms that smooth the path from 
contract o status. 
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Introduction 
Many contemporary scholars and policy advocates challenge the 
privileged status of marriage, arguing that the state should recognize and 
support other family relationships.1 Historically, this challenge has been 
1. Often critics argue for the abolition of legal marriage. See, e.g., Martha Albertson 
Fineman, The Neutered Mother, the Sexual Family and Other Twentieth Century 
Tragedies 226-36 (1995) [hereinafter Fineman, Neutered Mother] (challenging privi- 
leged status of marriage and arguing marital privilege should be transferred to families 
based on caretaker and dependent); Nancy D. Polikoff, Beyond (Straight and Gay) Mar- 
riage: Valuing All Families Under the Law 98-109, 123-45 (2008) [hereinafter Polikoff, 
Beyond Marriage] (arguing privileging marriage harms other families); Judith Stacey, 
Unhitched: Love, Marriage, and Family Values from West Hollywood to Western China 
204-05 (2011) [hereinafter Stacey, Unhitched] (arguing marriage should be abolished 
and diverse range of families recognized because marriage is declining and family diversity 
dominates); see also Mark Goldfeder, It's Time to Reconsider Polygamy, CNN (Dec. 16, 
2013, 6:37 PM), http://cnn.com/2013/12/16/opinion/goldfeder-polygamy-laws (on file 
with the Columbia L w Review) (advocating legalization of polygamy) . A Canadian commis- 
sion argued for legal protection of a broad range of families. See Law Comm'n of Can., 
Beyond Conjugality: Recognizing and Supporting Close Personal Adult Relationships 1-7 
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based on a feminist critique of marriage as a patriarchal institution that 
oppresses women. But the trend toward greater gender equality in the 
formal status of husbands and wives has led recently to a more general- 
ized claim that the elevated status of marriage demeans and unfairly 
disadvantages other families.2 These arguments have been influential in 
the successful movement toward recognition of the marriage rights of 
same-sex couples. They apply as well to the (as yet unsatisfied) demands 
by scholars and advocates that other family categories based on adult 
relationships3 - cohabiting couples and their children, voluntary kin 
groups,4 polygamists, and multigenerational family groups raising 
children- deserve the legal recognition enjoyed by married couples.5 
The view that heterosexual marriage should be an exclusive legal sta- 
tus was grounded traditionally in conventional moral and religious 
norms. Cohabiting, polygamous, and same-sex unions were considered 
illicit and therefore undeserving of legal protection. As contemporary 
moral norms have evolved, however, the historical justification for this 
exclusive legal status has weakened.6 Recent surveys by the Pew 
Foundation and other polling organizations show growing public 
acceptance of cohabitation relationships as well as same-sex unions.7 
(2001) (describing growing diversity of family forms in Canada and arguing for extension 
of rights and obligations to those families) . 
2. See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Why Marriage?, in Marriage at the Crossroads: Law, 
Policy, and the Brave New World of Twenty-First-Century Families 224, 235 (Marsha 
Garrison & Elizabeth S. Scott eds., 2012) [hereinafter Marriage at the Crossroads] (argu- 
ing that argument against marriage as privileged legal status has shifted to one focused on 
harm to nonmarital families); see also Stacey, Unhitched, supra note 1, at 8-12, 142-51 
(advocating diversity and challenging feminist opposition to polygamy) . 
3. We assume that a parent raising a child alone constitutes a family that warrants 
societal support and resources, but our focus is on families based on adult relationships: 
For our purposes, "families" are relationships that warrant a special egal status based on 
their perceived social value in satisfying dependency needs. See infra text accompanying 
notes 37-43 (explaining how families fill dependency needs); infra notes 44-46 (discuss- 
ing qualities of family relationships). 
4. Voluntary kin groups are often described as families of choice - family relation- 
ships developed by parties without blood or legal ties. See Dawn O. Braithwaite et al., Con- 
structing Family: A Typology of Voluntary Kin, 27 J. Soc. & Pers. Relationships 388, 396- 
402 (2010) (describing types and functions of voluntary kin relationships); see also infra 
Part III.C.2.b (discussing legal challenges voluntary kin groups face). 
5. See supra note 1 (citing advocates who challenge privileged status of marriage). 
6. For a discussion of this trend, see Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 122 (Cal. 1976) 
(holding contracts between cohabitants enforceable); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 
558, 578-79 (2003) (striking down criminal sodomy law). However, moral norms against 
illicit sexual relationships do not explain why nonconjugal relationships failed to qualify as 
family relationships. See infra Part III.C.2 (describing how nonconjugal groups face 
unique challenges to legal recognition). 
7. See, e.g., Pew Research Ctr., The Decline of Marriage and Rise of New Families 7- 
8 (2010) [hereinafter Pew Research Ctr., The Decline of Marriage], available at 
http://www.pewsocialtrends.Org/files/2010/l l/pew-social-trends-2010-families.pdf (on file 
with the Columbia L w Review) (describing changes in social values regarding the family, 
including reater acceptance of same-sex marriage). 
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Some observers suggest that even polygamous relationships are becom- 
ing "normalized," pointing to the popularity of the television series Big 
Love and Sister Wives? Although social acceptance of a broader range of 
intimate relationships need not result in their recognition by the state as 
legal families, it is clear that religious and moral sanctioning of nontradi- 
tional families has diminished, lowering a barrier to societal recognition 
of novel9 family groups. 
The transformation in social attitudes creates the possibility of a 
legal regime that fosters pluralism, allowing individuals to pursue their 
own vision of the good life in forming family relationships. On this view, 
fundamental notions of autonomy and fairness support the claim that 
the liberal state should offer individuals the freedom to undertake what- 
ever family relationships maximize their utility and then should support 
those families equally.10 From a social-welfare perspective, however, per- 
sonal satisfaction is not the sole basis for conferring family status.11 Fami- 
lies serve the critically important functions of raising children, caring for 
elderly persons, and otherwise satisfying society's dependency needs. 
Only relationships that fulfill those functions adequately are likely to 
attain legal status as families. But a puzzle remains: Why, in an era of 
social tolerance, have novel family categories,12 with the exception of gays 
and lesbians seeking marriage rights, failed to attain legal recognition? 
The answer to this question turns on the effects of substantial uncertain- 
ties that impede the pathway to legal status for novel family forms. 
8. Adrienne D. Davis, Regulating Polygamy: Intimacy, Default Rules, and Bargaining 
for Equality, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 1955, 1979-80 (2010) (suggesting how regulation based 
on partnership model could normalize polygamous relationships); see Goldfeder, supra 
note 1 (discussing public attitudes toward plural marriage). Big Love , which ran for five 
seasons from 2006 to 2011, was nominated for Emmy and Golden Globe awards. Big Love: 
About the Show, HBO, http://www.hbo.eom/big-love#/big-love/about/index.html (on 
file with the Columbia L w Review) (last visited Feb. 4, 2015). For a discussion of polygamy, 
see infra Part III.C.l. 
9. We use the terms "aspiring" and "novel" interchangeably, recognizing that some 
groups, such as multigenerational families, are not new. By novel families, we mean to 
designate groups that lack (and might qualify for and aspire to) legal status. 
10. The autonomy norm suggests, for example, that the state might provide a menu 
of family forms from which individuals could choose the option best suited to their needs. 
See Shahar Lifshitz, Married Against Their Will? Toward a Pluralist Regulation of Spousal 
Relationships, 66 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1565, 1589-1601 (2009) (arguing enerally for fam- 
ily pluralism as intrinsic value and challenging imposition of mandatory obligations on 
cohabitants); ee also William N. Eskridge Jr., Family Law Pluralism: The Guided-Choice 
Regime of Menus, Default Rules and Override Rules, 100 Geo. L.J. 1881, 1890 (2012) 
[hereinafter Eskridge, Family Law Pluralism] (making similar argument). 
11. See infra Part I.B (discussing social value of family relationships). 
12. Our analysis of the path to legal recognition focuses on novel family categories 
(not individual novel families) primarily because we predict this is the course regulators 
are likely to take. As with marriage, once a category is recognized, individuals seeking to 
register their relationships may be subject to administrative requirements but not to 
inquiry about whether their relationship satisfies the criteria discussed in the text. 
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This Article develops an informal model to illustrate those uncer- 
tainties as well as solutions to the possible obstacles they create. The 
uncertainties begin with questions the parties themselves will have about 
the viability of their novel relationship, but they also include public 
ambivalence and the skepticism of lawmakers about the quality of the 
novel group's relationships. The discrete challenges facing an aspiring 
family are a function of three conditions that we label novelty, social 
isolation, and nonverifiability. We describe a hypothetical group consist- 
ing of two adult men and two adult women in a polyamorous relationship 
who are initially uncertain whether their family form can succeed in 
maintaining a long-term commitment to mutual care, interdependency, 
and formal equality. In addition, even as a few such successful families 
evolve, at first they are likely to be socially isolated, lacking the necessary 
affiliations with each other to form a mutually supportive normative com- 
munity and to pursue their goals of public acceptance and legal recogni- 
tion. Finally, these aspiring families face regulatory uncertainty: The state 
will lack the information needed to verify the acceptable functioning of 
the novel class as a precondition to licensing individual families. 
Uncertainty in each of these dimensions contributes to a lack of 
confidence (on the part of the aspiring family members themselves, the 
larger social community, and, ultimately, the state) in the durability and 
effectiveness of novel relationships to fulfill family functions adequately. 
Yet, high levels of uncertainty have been resolved successfully in other 
contexts through a process of collaboration in which trust in the relation- 
ship and confidence in a successful outcome develop incrementally. This 
raises the question whether collaborative processes can also address the 
conditions that impede the legal recognition of aspiring families. Here, 
we draw on successful collaborations in commercial settings to describe 
in a stylized manner an evolutionary, multistage process through which 
the novel group can obtain the rights and obligations of legally recog- 
nized families.13 Initially, by forming collaborative agreements, the parties 
can build trust and confidence in both the quality and durability of their 
relationships.14 Further, by affiliating in networks, isolated novel families 
can build a normative community that can provide support, facilitate 
social awareness and acceptance, and overcome political obstacles to 
attaining their legal objective.15 Finally, through an iterative process, the 
13. The stages are presented as distinct but, as discussed infra Part III. A, they are 
likely to overlap substantially. 
14. See Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Braiding: The Interac- 
tion of Formal and Informal Contracting in Theory, Practice, and Doctrine, 110 Colum. L. 
Rev. 1377, 1405-10 (2010) [hereinafter Gilson, Sabel & Scott, Braiding] (showing how 
collaborative agreements build trust); infra Part II.B.2 (suggesting hypothetical polyga- 
mous family could build trust through collaborative contracting) . 
15. See Walter W. Powell, Neither Market nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organiza- 
tion, 12 Res. Organizational Behav. 295, 323-26 (1990) [hereinafter Powell, Market nor 
Hierarchy] (explaining advantages of network formation); infra Part II.B.3 (discussing 
challenges polygamous families face in seeking integration into larger social community) . 
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state can develop confidence in the capacities of the novel family cate- 
gory to fulfill family functions.16 
The model sheds light on both the success and failure of two 
contemporary aspiring family groups in securing legal protection for 
their relationships. First, it illuminates the process through which same- 
sex couples have attained marriage rights.17 These couples seeking offi- 
cial recognition of their families faced the uncertainties we describe, and 
we argue that the movement toward marriage equality has roughly 
tracked the evolutionary process we model. In the early period, despite 
public opprobrium, same-sex couples entered committed relationships 
that were often maintained secretly.18 But the AIDS crisis and the lesbian 
baby boom clarified the vulnerability of these family relationships,19 spur- 
ring the formation of a powerful normative community and a network of 
advocacy groups aimed at gaining public acceptance and legal protec- 
tion.20 Legal recognition of family status has then proceeded through an 
iterative process as regulators and the public have gained confidence in 
the quality of committed same-sex relationships. Second, the model sug- 
gests why cohabitation relationships as a class have failed to attain 
protected family status.21 Here the sorting problem is acute because 
cohabiting couples are a heterogeneous category with diverse goals and 
expectations for their relationships. This heterogeneity, together with the 
defining decision not to marry, impedes the creation of networks and 
16. See Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel 8c Robert E. Scott, Contract and Innova- 
tion: The Limited Role of Generalist Courts in the Evolution of Novel Contractual Forms, 
88 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 170, 176-78 (2013) [hereinafter Gilson, Sabel & Scott, Contract and 
Innovation] (describing taxonomy of contract innovation); infra Part II.B.4 (discussing 
state's difficulties in verifying functionality of novel family groups). 
17. See infra Part III.A (discussing this process). 
18. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Democracy, Kulturkampf, and the Apartheid of the 
Closet, 50 Vand. L. Rev. 419, 440-41 (1997) (arguing laws discriminating a ainst 
homosexuals inthe early period "reinforce [d] a regime of the closet"). 
19. George Chauncey, Why Marriage? The History Shaping Today's Debate over Gay 
Equality 96-111 (2004) (arguing HIV/AIDS and assisted reproductive t chnology were 
key factors in push for same-sex marriage). 
20. This movement included an effective strategy of signaling to the broader society 
the marriage-like nature of gay and lesbian relationships. See infra Part III.A (describing 
strategies used in same-sex marriage movement toappeal to majority). 
21. See infra Part III.B (discussing incomplete legal protections for cohabitation 
relationships). Despite law-reform efforts, see, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 113-14, 
116, 122-23 (Cal. 1976) ("[A] contract between onmarital partners, even if expressly 
made in contemplation of a common living arrangement, is invalid only if sexual acts form 
an inseparable part of the consideration for the agreement."); Am. Law Inst., Principles of 
the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations §§ 6.01-.06 (2000) (creat- 
ing and enforcing financial obligations between unmarried cohabitants) , cohabitants have 
struggled to establish claims for support and property rights, see, e.g., Friedman v. 
Friedman, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 892, 901 (Ct. App. 1993) (rejecting support claim of cohabitant 
at end of twenty-one-year rel tionship) . 
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sends a confusing signal about the nature of cohabiting unions.22 More- 
over, the state has not found an effective means of distinguishing those 
cohabiting partners who are committed to assuming long-term family 
obligations from others who are not. 
Finally, the model predicts the course (though not the success) of 
other novel families seeking legal recognition. Individuals in polyamo- 
rous, multigenerational, and voluntary kin groups may perform family 
functions and aspire to the legal status of established families.23 In our 
society, these groups are truly novel in the sense that they are not dyadic 
unions modeled on marriage. They face the uncertainties of novelty, 
isolation, and nonverifiability to varying degrees, and, in order to suc- 
ceed, each group must overcome its own set of challenges. For example, 
like same-sex couples, polyamorous groups are likely to confront public 
hostility, but they also face the challenge of creating and enforcing 
understandings among multiple parties sufficient to sustain well- 
functioning families. Voluntary kin groups are diverse and face the chal- 
lenges created by heterogeneity. In each case, the model suggests the 
impediments to legal recognition and how they might be overcome 
through the various collaborative processes we describe. 
At the outset, it may be helpful to make a few clarifying points. This 
Article's approach is primarily descriptive and predictive, rather than 
normative. We recognize that American law places primary responsibility 
for satisfying dependency needs on private families and assume that this 
"neoliberal" approach is likely to continue.24 In our view, the assumption 
of greater responsibility for dependency by the state would enhance 
social welfare, but the Article does not directly address this important 
policy issue. We also assume that families based on marriage likely will 
continue to enjoy broad public support and a privileged legal status, and 
to be viewed as embodying qualities associated with satisfactory family 
functioning. The goal is to explore under what conditions and through 
what mechanisms other family categories that embody those qualities 
could attain a similar status. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes demographic 
changes in American families and in public attitudes over the past half 
22. Some cohabitants are in marriage-like unions while others cohabit specifically to 
avoid family obligations. See infra Part III.B (discussing differing functions of cohabita- 
tion). 
23. See infra Part III.C (exploring challenges nondyadic families ncounter). 
24. But see Anne L. Alstott, Neoliberalism inU.S. Family Law: Negative Liberty and 
Laissez-Faire Markets in the Minimal State 3, 24-26 (Yale Law Sch., Public Law Research 
Paper No. 511, 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2459972 (on file with the 
Columbia L w Review) (challenging neoliberal approach) . See generally Maxine Eichner, 
The Supportive State: Families, Government, and America's Political Ideals (2010) (argu- 
ing modern liberal theory discounts families and offers too narrow a conception of the 
government's responsibility for dependency) ; Martha Albertson Fineman, The Autonomy 
Myth: A Theory of Dependency 53-54 (2004) (arguing for collective responsibility for 
dependency) . 
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century that have created the possibility that other family forms could be 
accorded the legal status and resources that marriage enjoys. After 
describing the useful social functions of families, Part I argues that mar- 
riage is likely to continue to qualify for special treatment but that other 
groups successfully performing family functions can also aspire to similar 
recognition. 
Part II develops an informal model that describes predictable obsta- 
cles to legal recognition and a multistage collaborative process by which 
a hypothetical aspiring family might overcome these obstacles. Successful 
collaborations mature into contracts for mutual care and support with 
enforceable obligations that define relationships in terms of the mainte- 
nance of family functions. As these commitments become widely observa- 
ble, a collaborative network forms among aspiring families: A set of emer- 
ging social norms reinforces the stability of those relationships, and the 
families and their leaders signal the quality of their relationships to the 
larger society, increasing awareness and acceptance. Ultimately, the state 
verifies that family functions are performed adequately and extends for- 
mal recognition through a collaborative process that certifies the novel 
family category. 
Part III first shows that the still-evolving process that has led a grow- 
ing number of states to grant marriage rights to gays and lesbians is con- 
sistent with the predictions of the collaborative approach. It then turns to 
cohabitation and explains how the model developed in Part II sheds light 
on the failure of cohabitants to gain substantial legal protection. Finally, 
Part III examines the unique uncertainties facing other novel families, 
including polygamous and voluntary kin relationships, and briefly ad- 
dresses the question of legal recognition for groups assuming more lim- 
ited family obligations. Part III concludes that collaborative processes 
designed to build confidence and trust between the family members and 
with others (including the state) offer these and other aspiring families 
the means to resolve uncertainty and ultimately attain legal recognition. 
I. Marriage and the Special Legal Status of Families 
As the public has increasingly come to accept nonmarital families, 
the claim of marriage critics that the law should recognize and support a 
broader range of families has become more compelling. This Part briefly 
sketches these social changes. It then explores the key social functions of 
families, as well as the qualities of relationships that perform these func- 
tions well and are likely to qualify for legal recognition. It examines the 
privileges, benefits, and obligations that currently are assigned to mar- 
riage and predicts that, although many contemporary marriages fall 
short, marriage as a category is likely to continue to provide the template 
for well-functioning families for the public and lawmakers alike. The 
analysis also leads us to conclude that other relationship categories that 
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function satisfactorily to fulfill family functions qualify to receive the 
same level of support and societal resources. 
A. Family Change and the Evolution of Social Attitudes 
The question that this Article addresses - under what conditions and 
through what means might the law recognize novel families - is the sub- 
ject of serious discussion only because of dramatic changes in family 
demographics and social attitudes over the past half century. Until the 
1960s, both the law and entrenched social norms prescribed heterosex- 
ual marriage defined by ascribed gender roles as the only acceptable fam- 
ily form.25 Much has changed since that time. To begin, the proportion 
of families based on marriage has declined. A recent Pew survey found 
that barely fifty percent of American adults were married, the lowest rate 
ever reported.26 Meanwhile, the percentage of couples living together in 
nonmarital unions has increased steadily, as have the number of children 
born to unmarried mothers, often cohabiting (at birth) with their chil- 
dren's fathers.27 As a result of the increase in nonmarital families and 
their relative instability (as well as higher divorce rates among married 
couples than in earlier generations), more children live in families that 
include their mothers, new partners, and step and half siblings. Gay and 
lesbian couples also live together and raise children in a way that was 
uncommon fifty years ago. And as the traditional nuclear family has 
become less prevalent, multigenerational groups, in which grandparents 
assist with childcare and adult children care for their parents, have taken 
on new importance.28 Less often highlighted but also a part of the pic- 
ture of family diversity in the early twenty-first century are other noncon- 
jugal families made up of relatives or groups of unrelated adults, some- 
times called voluntary kin.29 
25. See generally Marsha Garrison 8c Elizabeth S. Scott, Legal Regulation of Twenty- 
First Century Families, in Marriage at the Crossroads, upra note 2, at 303 (describing 
initial prevalence and recent decline of families based on marriage). 
26. Pew Research Ctr., Barely Half of U.S. Adults Are Married - A New Low (2011), 
available at http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2011/12/Marriage-Decline.pdf (on file 
with the Columbia L w Review) . 
27. The most comprehensive research on children in unmarried families i the ongo- 
ing longitudinal Fragile Families Study, conducted by Sara McLanahan and her colleagues. 
See, e.g., Sara McLanahan 8c Christine Percheski, Family Structure and the Reproduction 
of Inequality, 34 Ann. Rev. Soc. 257, 258 (2008) (reporting fifty percent of nonmarital 
parents lived together at child's birth); Sara McLanahan 8c Irwin Garfinkel, Fragile Fami- 
lies: Debates, Facts and Solutions, in Marriage at the Crossroads, supra note 2, at 142, 151 
(describing study). 
28. The Supreme Court has acknowledged the importance of grandparents in chil- 
dren's lives as families have changed. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 70-73 (2000) 
(holding parents' objection to grandparent visitation must be given substantial weight but 
declining to hold grandparent-visitation statute unconstitutional) . 
29. See Natalie Angier, The Changing American Family, N.Y. Times (Nov. 25, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/ll/26/health/families.html (on file with the Columbia 
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The factors contributing to these demographic changes have been 
much discussed30 and are not of central importance to our analysis. What 
is important is the generally tolerant public response to these social 
developments. Recent polls indicate that most adults in this country have 
positive or at least neutral views about a broad range of families, express- 
ing accepting attitudes toward nonmarital couples with (and without) 
children and same-sex couples.31 In many states, a majority of citizens 
endorse same-sex marriage.32 Younger adults are more accepting of non- 
marital families than their elders,33 suggesting that attitudes may become 
increasingly tolerant over time. In a 2010 poll, only unmarried women 
having children without a partner met with respondents' disapproval.34 
This account oversimplifies somewhat how the public views novel 
intimate relationships. To be sure, tolerance does not extend to all rela- 
tionships. Polygamy, for example, continues to be subject to public cen- 
sure; fundamentalist Mormons and other religious groups practicing 
polygamy have generally been viewed as pathological, arousing public 
alarm about the sexual coercion of young girls.35 Certainly less controver- 
sial, but also less familiar, are nonconjugal voluntary kin groups, which 
Law Review) (discussing diversity of modern American families); see also Braithwaite et al., 
supra note 4, at 396-402 (studying voluntary kin) . 
30. See, e.g., Angier, supra note 29 (positing and discussing several factors). Contrib- 
uting factors to family change include the sexual revolution, the availability of birth con- 
trol, the decline in religious observance, the women's equality movement, etc. See id. 
31. See Pew Research Ctr., The Decline of Marriage, supra note 7, at 40-69 (present- 
ing results of several surveys demonstrating more positive response toward nonmarital 
couples). 
32. See Changing Attitudes on Gay Marriage, Pew Research Ctr. (Sept. 24, 2014), 
http://www.pewforum.org/2014/09/24/graphics-slideshow-changing-attitudes-on-gay-mar 
riage/ [hereinafter Pew Research Ctr., Changing Attitudes] (on file with the Columbia L w 
Review) (reporting results of poll showing that national average of those who support 
same-sex marriage is fifty-two percent). A large number of states recognize same-sex 
marriage. See Same Sex Marriage Laws, Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures, http:// 
www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/same-sex-marriage-laws.aspx (on file with the 
Columbia L w Review) (last updated Jan. 19, 2015) (listing thirty-six states and District of 
Columbia s recognizing same-sex marriage). 
33. Pew Research Ctr., Changing Attitudes, supra note 32. 
34. See Pew Research Ctr., The Decline of Marriage, supra note 7, at 56 (reporting 
results of poll showing Americans express most concern about rise in number of single 
women having children and "are far less concerned" about unmarried gay and lesbian 
couples raising children). 
35. A recent Gallup poll found that eighty-three p rcent of those surveyed found 
polygamy to be morally wrong. See Frank Newport & Igor Himelfarb, In U.S., Record- 
High Say Gay, Lesbian Relations Morally OK, Gallup (May 20, 2013), http://www.gallup. 
com/poll/ 162689/record-high-say-gay-lesbian-relations-morally.aspx (on file with the 
Columbia L w Review). Elizabeth Emens describes the hostility to polygamy generated by 
opponents to gay marriage. See Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy's Law: Compulsory 
Monogamy and Polyamorous Existence, 29 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 277, 277-84 
(2004) [hereinafter Emens, Monogamy's Law]. For discussion of public attitudes toward 
polygamy, see infra Part III.C.l. 
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thus far have attracted little public or political attention.36 Nonetheless, 
the recent demographic changes, together with more accepting public 
attitudes toward a range of families, raise the possibility that other groups 
besides married couples might gain legal recognition as families. 
B. The Qualities of Well-Functioning Families 
Given that our project is to explore whether novel family categories 
might attain legal recognition, we must answer a threshold question: Why 
are families so special, and what are the qualities of adult relationships 
that are likely to function adequately as families? 
In contemporary society, a broad public consensus supports the 
proposition that (at least some) family relationships have substantial 
social value and should enjoy a special legal status. The reasons for this 
consensus are straightforward. As many scholars have noted, families do 
the important work of satisfying society's dependency needs.37 Families 
care for dependent children, prepare them for citizenship, and educate 
them to be productive members of society.38 Families also assume 
responsibility for responding to members' physical and emotional needs 
created by illnesses, disabilities, old age, and the ordinary stresses of 
life.39 Not every family provides necessary or adequate care to its depend- 
ent members, of course, but collectively families perform extraordinarily 
valuable social functions. The state assists families in performing these 
functions by providing key services and financial subsidies,40 by recogniz- 
36. Scholars and law-reform groups have shown some interest. See Law Comm'n of 
Can., supra note 1, at 4-7 (discussing voluntary kin groups); see also infra Part III.C.2 
(describing nonconjugal spiring families) . 
37. See Fineman, Neutered Mother, supra note 1, at 161-64 ("The natural family is 
the social institution wedepend on to raise the children and care for the ill, the needy, the 
dependent in our culture."). 
38. See generally Elizabeth S. Scott, Parental Autonomy and Children's Welfare, 11 
Wm. 8c Mary Bill Rts. J. 1071 (2003) (discussing legal treatment ofintact and dissolving 
families). In an earlier article, we described the valuable societal service parents provide 
and argued that autonomy and state support of parenting is a quid pro quo for parents' 
assuming responsibilities for raising and educating their children - functions that would 
otherwise be borne collectively. See Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as 
Fiduciaries, 81 Va. L. Rev. 2401, 2453-56 (1995) [hereinafter Scott 8c Scott, Parents as 
Fiduciaries]; cf. Linda C. McClain, Care as a Public Value: Linking Responsibility, 
Resources, and Republicanism, 76 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1673, 1677 (2001) ("[G]overnment 
ought to support parents' efforts onurture and provide for their children, just as work- 
places ought to be more 'parent-friendly,' better to facilitate parents balancing the 
demands of 'work' and 'family.'"). 
39. In some families, of course, adult members may undertake specialized roles in 
performing these functions, with some performing direct caretaking services and others 
providing financial resources that indirectly support caretaking. 
40. Government services that assist families in raising children and caring for 
dependency include free public schools, subsidized day care, Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families ubsidies, nutrition programs, Medicaid, and social-security spousal and 
survivor benefits. See generally Janet M. Currie, The Invisible Safety Net: Protecting the 
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ing intimate family bonds, and by defining family rights and obliga- 
tions.41 Family members performing their roles responsibly save societal 
resources that otherwise would be expended in providing adequate care 
for children and for elderly and disabled persons.42 Even if the state were 
to assume a far greater responsibility for satisfying society's dependency 
needs as many reformers have advocated, families would continue to play 
a critical role.43 
Many individuals and groups may assume the burden of caring for 
others, but not all will attain legal recognition as families. Biological rela- 
tionship is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for protected 
legal status.44 The nephew who resides with his aunt and uncle while 
attending college and assists with babysitting is not in a "family" relation- 
ship that is acknowledged by law - though his co-residents are.45 What 
then are the qualities that identify adult affiliations as family relation- 
ships? In our view, a contemporary family that is based on adult relation- 
ships embodies several key attributes: a demonstrated commitment to a 
long-term emotionally intimate affiliation in which the parties usually live 
together in a relationship of relative equality; the assumption of responsi- 
bility for mutual care (and the care of children or other dependent fam- 
ily members); financial interdependence; and the understanding that 
members' welfare is prioritized above that of others.46 Family bonds are 
built on trust that enables each member to rely on others to fulfill their 
roles and to "be there" in good times and bad. The nephew in the exam- 
Nation's Poor Children and Families (2006) (discussing safety-net programs); Clare 
Huntington, Failure to Flourish: How Law Undermines Family Relationships 55-80 (2014) 
(critiquing current policy as inadequate and proposing how law could fully support 
families) . 
41. The state recognizes family bonds in guardianship law, in the duty to rescue chil- 
dren and spouses, and in laws governing intestacy. The regulation of property division and 
support during divorce defines financial spousal obligations. See infra notes 52-53 
(elaborating on role of divorce regulation). 
42. See Jennifer M. Collins, Ethan J. Leib & Dan Markel, Punishing Family Status, 88 
B.U. L. Rev. 1327, 1355-56 (2008) (describing how special egal protections of families are 
compensation for services families provide, thereby relieving state of their cost); cf. 
Fineman, Neutered Mother, supra note 1, at 230-33 (arguing overnment should support 
and compensate families for their critical role in caring for dependency needs); Scott & 
Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, supra note 38, at 2417-18 (describing quid pro quo of paren- 
tal rights as compensation for responsibility over dependents). 
43. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text (describing extent o which family 
members care for each other) . 
44. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123-27, 131-32 (1989) (upholding 
statute denying parental rights to unmarried biological father of child born to married 
couple). 
45. Similarly, three young-adult cousins would likely not be eligible to rent a house 
zoned for "single-family" residences. 
46. Some of these traits might be contested, but this description is consistent with 
conventional understandings. Courts evaluating whether de facto relationships constitute 
family relationships oint to these qualities. See infra notes 81, 326 (discussing de facto 
family relationships) . 
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pie is not in a family relationship with his aunt and uncle because the co- 
residency arrangement is time limited as are any mutual obligations of 
the parties. The core qualities we have identified - a demonstrated, long- 
term commitment and the assumption of mutual care and financial 
responsibility - increase the likelihood that family relationships will be 
stable and sustainable and can be relied on to fulfill the important func- 
tions of satisfying dependency needs. 
C. Marriage as an Enduring Family Form 
Although it would seem that other groups that embody the qualities 
of well-functioning families might qualify for legal recognition and 
protection, marriage continues to be the sole legal family accorded full 
legal protection. This section describes the legal attributes of marriage 
that aspiring families do not (but might wish to) enjoy. It then briefly 
reviews the critiques of contemporary law by scholars and advocates, 
many of whom challenge the continued utility of marriage. We conclude 
that despite its deficiencies, marriage seems likely to retain its protected 
status; this is so because lawmakers and the public continue to view mar- 
riage as a relatively well-functioning family form, a view with some empiri- 
cal support. 
1. Contemporary Marriage as a Privileged Status. - Marriage is a 
relationship defined by legal rights and obligations that do not apply to 
other families.47 Marriage confers tangible financial benefits and privi- 
leges, including social-security survivor benefits, estate-tax exclusions, 
and health-insurance benefits for government employees, as well as the 
opportunity to protect property from creditors.48 Married couples are 
also granted rights and privileges based on the presumed closeness of 
their relationship, such as surrogate decisionmaking authority and inher- 
47. The General Accounting Office famously reported more than one thousand 
references tomarital status in the United States Code, many of which conferred benefits 
on married couples that other families do not enjoy. See Letter from Barry R. Bedrick, 
Assoc. Gen. Counsel, U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, to Henry J. Hyde, Chairman, Comm. 
on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, Regarding Defense of Marriage Act 1-2 (Jan. 
31, 1997), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/230/223674.pdf (on file with the 
Columbia L w Review) . 
48. Perhaps the most comprehensive accounts have been offered by advocates seek- 
ing marriage rights for gay and lesbian couples and by courts holding that he exclusion of 
same-sex couples from marriage violates the principle of equal protection. See, e.g., 
Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 902 n.28 (Iowa 2009) (cataloguing marital rights and 
privileges under Iowa law); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 955-57 
(Mass. 2003) (listing same under Massachusetts law); see also Jesse Dukeminier et al., 
Property 391 (8th ed. 2014) (discussing creditor-protection dimensions of property 
acquired by spouses as tenants by entireties); Nicole C. Berg, Note, Designated Beneficiary 
Agreements: A Step in the Right Direction for Unmarried Couples, 2011 U. 111. L. Rev. 
267, 295-301 (discussing marital benefits). 
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itance rights.49 Further, as advocates for LGBT rights have argued, mar- 
riage as a legally privileged family form carries intangible value beyond 
its tangible benefits.50 Married couples also have legal obligations to one 
another that are not imposed on members of nonmarital families. By vir- 
tue of marital status spouses cannot unilaterally disinherit one another,51 
and under property-distribution laws applied at divorce52 each spouse has 
a right to share in earnings and property acquired by the other during 
the marriage.53 
To be sure, nonmarital families are not deprived of all legal and 
constitutional rights.54 But these groups are disadvantaged as compared 
to families based on marriage in many ways that can undermine their 
functioning. Adults in self-identified families can contractually assume 
financial obligations to one another, but otherwise no familial rights or 
49. See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 955-57 (listing rights granted by marriage under 
Massachusetts law) . 
50. In states that recognized civil-union status for gay couples (replicating most mari- 
tal rights), the emphasis shifted from tangible rights to the dignitary harm of exclusion. 
See, e.g., Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 993-94 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (finding 
Proposition 8 prohibiting same-sex marriage unconstitutional, despite availability of 
domestic partnerships), aff'd sub nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), 
vacated and remanded sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
51. See Dukeminier etal., supra note 48, at 407-10 (noting "all common law prop- 
erty states except Georgia have elective-share statutes," by which "surviving spouse can 
renounce the [decedent spouse's] will, if any, and elect to take a statutory share" of dece- 
dent spouse's property). 
52. For a discussion of marital-property rights and division on divorce, see generally 
Ira Ellman et al., Family Law: Cases, Texts, Problems 317-50 (5th ed. 2010). 
53. Wage-earning spouses may also be subject to a duty to pay alimony. Id. at 420. 
Spouses have a duty to rescue one another under tort law, whereas a nonmarital family 
member faces no liability for allowing his loved one to starve. See Collins, Leib & Markel, 
supra note 42, at 1335 (discussing special iability of parents and spouses for failure to 
rescue). 
54. Most importantly, the parent-child relationship receives substantial legal protec- 
tion, regardless of the marital status of the parents. See Wisconsin v.Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 
235-36 (1972) (finding state cannot apply mandatory-attendance law to Amish children); 
Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (holding parents have constitution- 
ally protected liberty interest to guide children's education); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 
390, 400 (1923) (same). The Court has also struck down laws discriminating against chil- 
dren born to unmarried mothers. See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 70, 72 (1969) (strik- 
ing down statute prohibiting children born to unmarried mothers from suing under 
state's wrongful-death statute). Unmarried parents receive less protection than their mar- 
ried counterparts. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 131-32 (1989) 
(upholding California statute creating presumption of legitimacy for child born to 
married mother against child's biological father seeking access). 
Courts, including the Supreme Court, sometimes have accorded legal protections 
to other nonmarital families. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-06 
(1977) (finding ordinance definition of family that prohibited grandson from living with 
grandparent unconstitutional under Due Process Clause); see also Eisenstadt v.Baird, 405 
U.S. 438, 443 (1972) (holding state law prohibiting unmarried persons from having access 
to contraceptives violated Fourteenth Amendment) . 
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duties inhere in their relationships.55 Moreover, these relationships 
receive little support or recognition from the state; they do not receive 
social-security spousal benefits, estate-tax advantages, inheritance rights, 
or (usually) health-insurance benefits.56 Further, although the parent- 
child relationship receives substantial legal protection,57 the relationship 
between unmarried parents does not.58 The dependent parent has no 
claim to alimony or a share of her partner's property if the relationship 
ends, even though these financial awards redound to the benefit of the 
children. Unmarried parents also have no inheritance rights; children in 
nonmarital families may have to share a parent's estate with a more dis- 
tant relative not living in the household. 
Scholars and law-reform advocates have sharply criticized the ele- 
vated legal status of traditional marriage and argued for legal protection 
of other family relationships. The LGBT marriage-equality movement has 
offered the most prominent and successful challenge, of course.59 But 
other reformers have argued that a broad range of nonmarital families - 
including single-parent families, unmarried couples and their children, 
and adults in nonconjugal relationships - should be accorded legal parity 
with marriage.60 Finally, a few scholars have explored the social and legal 
55. Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 116 (Cal. 1976) (holding contracts between 
cohabitants enforceable). 
56. It is not surprising that activists for same-sex couples' relationship rights mobi- 
lized in response to the AIDS crisis: The experience of exclusion from family health bene- 
fits, medical-proxy decisionmaking authority, and guardianship priority underscored that 
even long-term, committed gay and lesbian relationships received no legal protection. See 
infra Part III.A.2 (describing collective action motivated by AIDS crisis). Indeed, until 
recently, these unions were legally prohibited in many states. Cf. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003) (finding criminal antisodomy statute unconstitutional as violation 
of same-sex consenting adults' right of privacy). 
57. See supra note 54 (discussing protection of parent-child relationship). Further, 
many government programs aim to provide services to children of unmarried parents in 
poor families. Medicaid, the State Children's Health Insurance Program, and the Work 
Incentive program are federally funded. Many states also have child-care programs. For a 
comprehensive discussion of safety-net programs, see generally Currie, supra note 40. 
58. See Merle H. Weiner, Caregiver Payments and the Obligation to Give Care or 
Share, 59 Vili. L. Rev. 135, 142-52, 177-212 (2014) (explaining few financial obligations 
run between unmarried parents to detriment of caregivers and arguing for increasing 
those obligations for both unmarried and married parents) . 
59. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Case for Same-Sex Marriage 62-74 
(1996) (arguing marriage access is worth pursuing for same-sex couples); Thomas B. 
Stoddard, Why Gay People Should Seek the Right to Marry, Out/Look, Fall 1989, at 9 
(arguing ay-rights movement should seek full legal recognition for same-sex marriage). 
But see Katherine M. Franke, Longing for Loving, , 76 Fordham L. Rev. 2685, 2689 (2008) 
[hereinafter F anke, Longing] (arguing, after Lawrence v.Texas , gays and lesbians hould 
fight to protect unregulated territory for relationships between marriage and criminality, 
an area endangered by marriage). For a breakdown of state laws, see Nat'l Conference of 
State Legislatures, supra note 32. 
60. See Nancy D. Polikoff, Making Marriage Matter Less: The ALI Domestic Partner 
Principles Are One Step in the Right Direction, 2004 U. Chi. Legal F. 353, 356, 367 
(expressing approval of ALI Principles on this ground). Martha Fineman and Judith 
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response to polyamory and tackled the challenge of designing a regula- 
tory regime for polygamous relationships.61 
The contemporary critique has shifted somewhat from the well- 
established feminist argument that marriage is a hierarchical, patriarchal 
institution that oppresses women to a broader challenge based on princi- 
ples of liberty, equity, and equality.62 Many critics today focus primarily on 
the deficiencies of marriage63 and on the harm to nonmarital families of 
privileging marriage and withholding its benefits from other groups that 
fulfill family functions.64 Other scholars argue that the liberal state 
should support a broad range of family options, allowing individuals to 
pursue their conception of the good life.65 
Stacey argue for the abolition of marriage. See supra note 1 (citing reformers who have 
called for abolition of marriage); see also Law Comm'n of Can., supra note 1, at 6-7 
(arguing Canada should provide greater ecognition of and support for nonmarital 
relationships). 
61. See generally Davis, supra note 8, at 1998-2032 (proposing partnership regula- 
tory model); Elizabeth Cannon Lesher, Comment, Protecting Poly: Applying the 
Fourteenth Amendment tothe Nonmonogamous, 22 Tul. J.L. & Sexuality 127, 140-44 
(2013) (developing substantive due process argument for legal protection of polyamorous 
relationships). Elizabeth Emens probes the hostility to polyamorous relationships and 
describes the nonpathological nature of these relationships. See Emens, Monogamy's Law, 
supra note 35, at 287-97, 300-20. 
62. Of course, some feminists continue to reject marriage as harmful to women, 
emphasizing that married women's caretaker-homemaker roleoften leaves them finan- 
cially vulnerable upon divorce. See Weiner, supra note 58, at 135-37 (discussing financial 
dangers of marriage and divorce). But see Goldberg, supra note 2, at 233-34 (pointing to 
legal reforms that have created formal gender equality in marriage to challenge argument 
that marriage by gays would transform the institution). 
63. Judith Stacey, for example, derides marriage as a flawed and obsolete institution 
in an era in which almost half of marriages dissolve and many spouses (mostly husbands 
on her account) fail to live up to their vows. See Judith Stacey, Forsaking No Others: Com- 
ing to Terms with Family Diversity, in Marriage at the Crossroads, upra note 2, at 201, 
201-08. 
64. See generally Fineman, Neutered Mother, supra note 1, at 226-30 (arguing mar- 
riage is key mechanism through which dependency is privatized in American law); 
Polikoff, Beyond Marriage, supra note 1, at 98-109 (arguing "focusing on solutions other 
than marriage . . . will improve the lives of same-sex couples as well as LGBT people not in 
coupled relationships, and their children"). Polikoff 's book comprehensively argues for 
protection of all families and documents he harms to nonmarital families under the cur- 
rent regime. See id. at 83-109, 123-45. Professor Polikoff argues elsewhere that the legal 
benefits a sociated with marriage, such as family health insurance, social-security survivor 
benefits, and inheritance rights, are just as important to the welfare of unmarried gay and 
straight couples, siblings, adult children living with elderly parents, and other groups liv- 
ing in long-term relationships. See Nancy D. Polikoff, Ending Marriage as We Know It, 32 
Hofstra L. Rev. 201, 225-32 (2003) (arguing undue focus on marriage excludes other 
deserving relationships from important legal protections) . 
65. See Eskridge, Family Law Pluralism, supra note 10, at 1898-1901 (arguing for 
utilitarian approach of guided choice to family formation that supports individual f ourish- 
ing and value to family members); see also Lifshitz, supra note 10, at 1589-95 (arguing for 
family pluralism as intrinsic value and challenging imposition of mandatory obligations on 
cohabitants) . 
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A general theme emerges from these critiques: A wide range of 
diverse families function (at least) as well as different-sex marriage, and 
the exclusive legal privileging of marriage can no longer be justified. The 
various critiques accept the social value of families but challenge the 
notion that traditional marriage warrants the special status that it has 
long enjoyed.66 
2. The Durability of Marriage as a Family Form. - Even though fewer 
couples choose marriage today,67 and many contemporary marriages do 
not embody qualities of stability and mutual care,68 substantial evidence 
supports that marriage continues to be widely regarded as a well- 
functioning family form. Public attitudes toward marriage are positive; 
most individuals, even in nonmarital families, aspire to marriage.69 More- 
66. A few scholars have questioned the law's deferential treatment offamilies. Mary 
Anne Case, for example, challenges the assumption that employers, employees, and 
taxpayers should be responsible for substantially subsidizing parents in their ole of raising 
their children. See Mary Anne Case, How High the Apple Pie? A Few Troubling Questions 
About Where, Why, and How the Burden of Care for Children Should Be Shifted, 76 Chi.- 
Kent L. Rev 1753, 1754-57 (2001). Other scholars have challenged the benefits of family 
status in the criminal-justice system, criticizing testimonial privilege, sentence reductions, 
and effective immunity from prosecution for harboring a family member. See, e.g., Dan 
Markel, Jennifer M. Collins 8c Ethan J. Leib, Criminal Justice and the Challenge of Family 
Ties, 2007 U. 111. L. Rev. 1147, 1190-1200 (raising this challenge). 
67. A 2013 survey reported that for the first ime fewer than fifty percent of house- 
holds are based on marriage. Sabrina Tavernise, Married Couples Are No Longer a Major- 
ity, Census Finds, N.Y. Times (May 26, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/26/us/ 
26marry.html (on file with the Columbia L w Review) (reporting results of survey). 
68. The relatively high divorce rate in this country varies substantially on the basis of 
class; it has declined substantially since the mid-1980s for educated couples but remains 
high for working-class couples. See June Carbone 8c Naomi Cahn, Marriage Markets: How 
Inequality Is Remaking the American Family 15-16 (2014) ("[B]y 2004, the divorce rates 
of college graduates were back down to what they were in 1965 .... In the meantime, the 
divorce rates of the less well educated reached all-time highs."). Spouses can avoid finan- 
cial interdependence through separate bank accounts and (in many states) property 
ownership and premarital greements. See infra note 76 (discussing marital-property 
ownership in equitable distribution (versus community property) jurisdictions) . 
69. According to a 2013 Gallup poll, seventy-eight percent of respondents who had 
never been married wanted to get married. Marriage, Gallup, http://www.gallup.com/ 
poll/117328/marriage.aspx (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Feb. 4, 
2015). When asked why they were not married at the present ime, most respondents 
indicated they had not found the right person, they were too young or not ready, or they 
were waiting because of financial considerations. Id. Social scientists find that marriage has 
become idealized as a marker of financial nd personal success and is viewed as out of 
reach by many poor and working-class individuals. Kathryn Edin has found that both 
women and men hold this view. See Kathryn Edin & Timothy J.Nelson, Doing the Best I 
Can: Fatherhood inthe Inner City 90-98 (2013) (noting desires of inner-city men to marry 
only after their lives meet certain conditions); Kathryn Edin 8c Maria Kefalas, Promises I 
Can Keep: Why Poor Women Put Motherhood Before Marriage 104-37 (2005) (discussing 
working-class parents who aspire to fulfill unlikely economic and educational goals before 
marrying). For additional discussion of the idealization of marriage, see Andrew J. 
Cherlin, The Growing Diversity of Two-Parent Families: Challenges for Family Law, in 
Marriage at the Crossroads, supra note 2, at 290 (" [RJomantically involved couples who do 
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over, courts and legislatures have often invoked marriage as the template 
for evaluating the claims of parties in nonmarital family relationships 
that their affiliations should qualify for legal benefits.70 It is not surpris- 
ing perhaps that advocates seeking legal protection for these relation- 
ships emphasize their similarity to marriage.71 
The empirical evidence also indicates that families based on mar- 
riage, even today, tend to embody the qualities earlier identified as con- 
tributing to satisfactory family functioning. In general, spouses are much 
more likely to share income and property than are cohabiting couples.72 
Moreover, despite the relatively high divorce rate, marriages tend to be 
more stable than informal family relationships; that stability translates 
into advantages for children in educational attainment, social adjust- 
not see the possibility of a strong financial footing are more likely to decide to have a child 
or accept an unplanned pregnancy than to postpone having children until they have the 
means to marry."); McLanahan & Garfinkel, supra note 27, at 151 (noting doubts among 
low-income women regarding ability to maintain stable marriages) . 
70. For a discussion of the use of marriage as a template for family relationships both 
by lawmakers and advocates in the marriage-equality movement, see infra Part III.A. 
Courts have also compared relationships to marriage in evaluating whether they qualify as 
"family" relationships. See Braschi v. Stahl Assoes. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 53-54 (N.Y. 1989) 
(describing same-sex relationship with marital traits of duration, commitment, and 
interdependence as family relationship). 
71. The priority assigned by LGBT-rights advocates to attaining marriage rights for 
same-sex couples suggests the continued importance of marriage. See infra Part III.A 
(discussing marriage-equality movement and advocacy strategy). This priority has been 
controversial n the gay community. Paula Ettelbrick and Thomas Stoddard famously 
debated whether marriage should be a key political goal of the gay community. Compare 
Paula L. Ettelbrick, Since When Is Marriage a Path to Liberation?, Out/Look, Fall 1989, at 
9, 14 (" [Mļaking legal marriage for lesbian and gay couples a priority would set an agenda 
of gaining rights for a few, but would do nothing to correct he power imbalances between 
those who are married (whether gay or straight) and those who are not."), with Stoddard, 
supra note 59, at 10 ("[T]he gay rights movement should aggressively seek full legal 
recognition for same-sex marriages."). For additional discussion of the effects of prioritiz- 
ing marriage rights, see Katherine M. Franke, The Politics of Same-Sex Marriage Politics, 
15 Colum. J. Gender & L. 236, 246-48 (2006) [hereinafter F anke, Marriage Politics] 
(challenging efforts ogain marriage equality through arguments that same-sex relation- 
ships are marriage-like). 
72. See Michael S. Pollard 8c Kathleen Mullan Harris, Cohabitation and Marriage 
Intensity: Consolidation, Intimacy and Commitment 13 (RAND Labor 8c Population, 
Working Paper No. WR-1001, 2013), available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/ 
rand/ pubs/ working_papers/WRl 000/ WR1 00 1 /RAND_WR1 00 .pdf (on file with the 
Columbia L w Review). These researchers compared marriage and cohabitation, using a 
large data set of young adults. Id. at 1-2. They found that sixty-eight percent of women in 
marriages had joint checking accounts versus ixteen percent of women in cohabitations. 
Id. at 11. Marital property is shared on divorce unless the spouses affirmatively opt out 
through premarital agreements, an option chosen by only a small percentage of married 
couples. Heather Mahar, Why Are There So Few Prénuptial Agreements? 1 & n.l (Harvard 
John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., 8c Bus., Discussion Paper No. 436, 2003), available at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/436.pdf (on file with the 
Columbia L w Review) (describing studies finding 1.5%, 5%, and 5%-10% of marrying cou- 
ples have prénuptial greements) . 
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ment, and other measures of well-being.73 Although many factors contrib- 
ute to the differences, including substantial selection effects, some of the 
benefits accruing to marital families inhere simply in the stability of mar- 
riage itself.74 
Scholars have argued that the relative stability of marital families in 
part is a function of legal and normative influences on the behavior of 
spouses that support the bond between them. The formal commitment 
undertaken by couples entering marriage is not casual; it typically 
involves the ceremonious assumption of mutual obligations.75 Marriage 
can be set aside only through the formal legal process of divorce, which 
even today carries high social and legal costs.76 But beyond its formal 
73. The recent National Survey of Family Growth found that almost half of those 
cohabitation u ions that do not transition tomarriage dissolved within three years. "Forty 
percent of first premarital cohabitations among women transitioned tomarriage by 3 
years, 32% remained intact, and 27% dissolved." Casey E. Copen, Kimberly Daniels 8c 
William D. Mosher, Nat'l Ctr. for Health Statistics, Ctrs. for Disease Control and Preven- 
tion, National Health Statistics Reports No. 64, First Premarital Cohabitation i the United 
States: 2006-2010 National Survey of Family Growth 5 (2013), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhsr/nhsr064.pdf (on file with the Columbia L w Review). 
Pollard and Harris found substantially lower levels of commitment between cohabitants 
than between spouses. Pollard & Harris, supra note 72, at 12-13. 
Sara McLanahan and her colleagues, in their longitudinal Fragile Families and 
Child Well Being Study, have found that the relationships of unmarried parents are less 
stable than those of married parents; nearly two-thirds of unmarried parents' relationships 
have dissolved by their children's fifth birthday. See McLanahan 8c Garfinkel, supra note 
27, at 149-52; see also supra note 27 (discussing study). 
74. More highly educated and wealthier couples marry at far higher rates than 
poorer, less educated couples, and many of the differences in outcomes can be attributed 
to this election effect. See Carbone 8c Cahn, supra note 68, at 2-4 (explaining correlation 
between socioeconomic status, marriage rates, and partner selection). But not all differ- 
ences are due to selection effects. See Robert E. Emery, Erin E. Horn 8c Christopher R. 
Beam, Marriage and Improved Weil-Being: Using Twins to Parse the Correlation, Asking 
How Marriage Helps, and Wondering Why More People Don't Buy a Bargain, in Marriage 
at the Crossroads, supra note 2, at 126, 134 (using twin study to confirm arital benefits); 
see also Deborah Carr 8c Kristen W. Springer, Advances in Families and Health Research in 
the 21st Century, 72 J. Marriage 8c Fam. 743, 748-52 (2010) (reviewing research showing 
marital benefits on health). This does not mean, of course, that coercing unmarried cou- 
ples to marry would produce stability. 
75. For a discussion of the role of wedding ceremonies and traditions such as wed- 
ding rings in reinforcing marital commitment, seeElizabeth S. Scott, Social Norms and 
the Legal Regulation of Marriage, 86 Va. L. Rev. 1901, 1916-23 8c nn. 34-35 (2000) [here- 
inafter Scott, Social Norms] ; see also Elizabeth S. Scott, A World Without Marriage, 41 
Fam. L.Q. 537, 562-66 (2007) (arguing "ceremonies and traditions that surround mar- 
riage and ... the intricate web of social norms regulating spousal behavior contribute o
the stability of marriage"). 
76. Economists Shelly Lundberg and Robert Pollak argue that the high cost of di- 
vorce, including the internalized sense of personal failure, defines marriage as a relation- 
ship of intertemporal commitment and is a key distinction between marriage and 
cohabitation. Shelly Lundberg 8c Robert A. Pollak, Cohabitation a d the Uneven Retreat 
from Marriage in the U.S., 1950-2010, at 14 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 19413, 2013), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/wl9413 (on file with 
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legal structure, marriage is embedded in informal social norms that pre- 
scribe expectations for spousal behavior and underscore its nature as a 
family relationship defined by long-term commitment. These norms are 
internalized, thereby reinforcing trust, and are also enforced externally 
through informal sanctions.77 Although the norms regulating marriage 
function imperfectly in contemporary society,78 they tend to support mar- 
ital commitment by guiding spouses' behavior in ways that strengthen 
relationships and deter behavior that may have a destabilizing effect on 
the relationship. 
In sum, marriage occupies a secure status as a legally recognized 
family with broad public support. Moreover, although marriage has 
become both less common and less stable in modern times, the weight of 
the evidence is that marriage as a category continues to fulfill relatively 
well the functions that justify its protected legal status. 
D. Extending State Benefits to Other Families 
The fact that the law confers deference and societal resources on 
marriage does not mean that the privileged status of this traditional fam- 
ily form should be exclusive. In a liberal society, fundamental principles of 
autonomy support a state policy that promotes pluralism and provides 
opportunities for individuals to form family relationships that bring 
happiness and satisfy their needs.79 Moreover, the current social climate 
makes such a pluralist approach feasible. But while autonomy values 
argue for expanding choice beyond traditional legal boundaries, social- 
welfare concerns predictably will be invoked to justify restricting family 
status to those relationships that are likely to fulfill the legitimate state 
interest in reliably satisfying dependency needs. Legal privileging of fami- 
the Columbia L w Review). On their view, this commitment facilitates a long-term invest- 
ment in children, a goal that motivates contemporary marriage. Id. at 28-29. 
Upon dissolution, the financial obligations undertaken by the spouses usually are 
legally enforceable. See Elizabeth S. Scott 8c Robert E. Scott, Marriage as Relational Con- 
tract, 84 Va. L. Rev. 1225, 1308-09 (1998) [hereinafter Scott 8c Scott, Relational Contract] 
(describing property distribution divorce). In community-property sta es, property and 
income acquired uring marriage are community property. In other states, marital prop- 
erty is subject to equitable distribution divorce, unless the couple opts out through a 
prénuptial greement. See supra note 72 (discussing small portion of couples executing 
prénuptial greements). For a discussion of property distribution divorce, see Ellman 
et al., supra note 52, at 317-80. 
77. See Scott, Social Norms, supra note 75, at 1920-23, 1960-66 (arguing traditional 
marriage was regulated by commitment orms and gender norms, which became bun- 
dled, contributing to contemporary criticism ofmarriage). The couple's community sanc- 
tions violations through gossip and other expressions of disapproval. Id. at 1921 n.45. 
78. See id. at 1940 (providing examples of when marital norms have failed). This is 
so for two reasons: First, the norms themselves are weaker, and, second, the greater 
anonymity and mobility of urban society dilutes their effectiveness. 
79. A pluralist approach allows individuals to pursue their own conceptions of the 
good life, which for many people surely includes living in families that satisfy physical and 
emotional needs. See supra note 10 (citing articles arguing for pluralist approach). 
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lies absorbs resources that are not available for other social purposes: 
Estate taxes not paid by surviving spouses, for example, are lost to the 
federal treasury. Nonetheless, this allocation of resources is justified 
when an aspiring family group fulfills the socially valuable functions 
identified above, thereby relieving the state of part of its collective obliga- 
tion to care for dependency. In sum, while not all claimants warrant spe- 
cial family status, groups that care adequately for members' dependency 
needs and have the qualities of commitment, durability, and emotional 
and financial interdependence deserve legal recognition and support. 
On occasion, lawmakers have acknowledged this point. Legal bene- 
fits are sometimes extended to adult de facto relationships on the basis of 
their similarity to marriage.80 Courts have also recognized de facto 
parent-child relationships in situations in which an adult has functioned 
in a parental role for an extended period in a family setting.81 But despite 
general public tolerance of a diverse range of families, the success of gays 
and lesbians in gaining access to marriage represents the only discernible 
trend toward elevating the legal status of a category of nontraditional 
families. 
This presents a puzzle. In a society in which the public accepts family 
diversity and acknowledges the importance of families to individual and 
collective welfare, what explains the legal inertia? Are there particular 
conditions that impede legal recognition of nonmarital families? The 
answers to these questions can shed light on why some nonmarital fami- 
lies have failed to obtain legal protection despite more tolerant social 
attitudes. 
II. A Collaborative Model of the Evolution of Novel Family Forms 
This Part seeks to explain the legal inertia and to specify a process by 
which aspiring family groups might attain their goal. We develop an 
informal model that describes a multistage collaborative process by 
80. Courts assessing whether some nonmarital couples deserve recognition as "fami- 
lies" have evaluated their relationships against a metric of marital-family behavior and 
attributes - pointing to their durability, history of financial interdependence, care during 
illness, and intimate companionship. See Braschi v. Stahl Assoes. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 54-55 
(N.Y. 1989) (holding couple could qualify as "family" under rent-control ordinance based 
on marriage-like relationship); see also Connell v. Francisco, 898 P.2d 831, 836-37 (Wash. 
1995) (upholding equitable distribution fproperty between cohabitants on basis of 
marriage-like quality of relationship); Douglas Nejaime, Before Marriage: The Unex- 
plored History of Nonmarital Recognition and Its Relationship to Marriage, 102 Calif. L. 
Rev. 87, 113 (2014) (explaining advocates for domestic-partnership rights in California n
1990s argued gay unions were marriage-like). 
81. Many cases involve l sbian de facto parents living with the child and legal (usually 
birth) mother. Courts have allowed visitation rights when a petitioner can show she func- 
tioned as a parent with the agreement of the legal parent for an extended period of time. 
See, e.g., V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 548 (N.J. 2000) (holding de facto parent had stand- 
ing to seek visitation) . When the gay couple marries, the spouse becomes the legal parent 
to children born to the marriage. 
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which novel family forms can achieve legal status as families. The analysis 
begins with the premise that the state appropriately grants legal privi- 
leges and benefits to families because these groups supply important 
social goods for which the state would otherwise be responsible.82 Part 
II.A shows that, owing to the effects of uncertainty about whether novel 
family groups satisfy this criterion, the parties face challenging condi- 
tions that impede their progress toward gaining legal recognition as fami- 
lies. In Part II.B, the uncertainty is resolved in the model through three 
stages of an integrated process, each of which is defined by a form of col- 
laboration. Collaborative engagement in the development of novel com- 
mercial relationships provides exemplars of how these impediments have 
been overcome in other contexts. This analysis illuminates the mecha- 
nisms parties use to make credible commitments to each other, signal 
those commitments to others, and engage with the state in verifying their 
compliance with established norms. 
A. Conditions Impeding the Legal Recognition of Novel Family Relationships 
Consider a group composed of two men and two women who have 
developed close emotional and sexually intimate relationships with one 
another and wish to live together as a single family bound by a long-term 
commitment to mutual support, interdependency, and equality.83 The 
group plans to pool earnings and property, and to have children and 
care for them collectively. Will this group face conditions that impede 
their efforts to secure the rights and obligations currently bestowed on 
marital families? This thought experiment yields the prediction that an 
aspiring polygamous family84 will confront three significant obstacles on 
the path to legal recognition. 
The first challenge this group faces is relational uncertainty or nov- 
elty: Family relationships such as these are experimental, and even close 
emotional bonds are not predictive of whether the group will function 
well as a family. Lacking models of similar relationships that have suc- 
ceeded in forming families, the individual members of the polygamous 
82. This Article does not challenge that marital privilege may have historically had 
other justifications, but rather it assumes that, in contemporary society, the legitimacy of 
marital privilege is based on its social utility as a family form. 
83. The commitment ofour hypothetical polygamous family to formal equality, 
mutual support, and loyalty distinguishes this aspiring family from other polygamous 
groups, such as fundamentalist Mormons, that are organized hierarchically around a sin- 
gle dominant male figure. See Davis, supra note 8, at 1966 (observing polygamy is "over- 
whelmingly between a single husband married to multiple wives" and "male dominance is
a characteristic of polyandrous societies as well" (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
84. Polygamy is defined as plural marriage with multiple spouses regardless of the 
gender combination; polygyny is the familiar form of one man and multiple wives. See 
Emens, Monogamy's Law, supra note 35, at 300-03 (clarifying terms). Our group aspires 
to legal recognition of plural (or polygamous) marriage. Polyamorous relationships do not 
imply commitment, a quality of family relationships as we have defined them. See id. at 
303-09 (describing fluidity of term "polyamorous"). Thus our family is "polygamous." 
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family will be unsure whether their affiliation will be durable and 
whether the trust and confidence that support long-term commitment 
will develop. A second difficulty inheres in the fact that novelty also 
implies idiosyncrasy. In the initial stage, there are few other polygamous 
families with similar aspirations with whom to share experiences. Thus, 
even if they can develop the means to create the necessary trust in each 
other's capabilities, a polygamous family may be socially isolated, lacking 
a community of similar aspiring families. The nature of their relationship 
will also be unfamiliar to the public, which may view this novel family 
with suspicion - and perhaps hostility.85 This isolation quite obviously cre- 
ates a daunting obstacle to recognition at the level of practical politics,86 
but it also means that aspiring polygamous families are not (or are only 
weakly) integrated into the larger normative community that defines 
expectations for family behavior. 
A final problem stems from the need to persuade the state to extend 
legal recognition to polygamous families as a recognized family form in 
exchange for their readiness to assume family responsibilities. The state 
faces a serious information deficit in evaluating whether this new cate- 
gory of family has the qualities that justify special legal treatment. This is 
because family functioning is largely private, and the durability and ade- 
quacy of the novel group may be hard to assess. Thus, state actors face 
informational barriers in sorting groups deserving of family status from 
other groups that may seek the privileges and resources allocated to fami- 
lies but fail to create the welfare benefits the state requires.87 The 
discussion that follows argues that in combination these conditions 
impose significant obstacles to efforts by a hypothetical polygamous 
family to secure legal-family status. 
1. The Problem of Relational Novelty. - To some extent, the problem of 
novelty is almost universal when adults form family relationships. 
Individuals must establish trust in each other's character and have confi- 
85. The public reaction to polyamorous groups is very likely to be hostile. See 
Newport & Himelfarb, supra note 35 (finding eighty-three p rcent of respondents found 
polygamy to be morally wrong). Other novel families, uch as voluntary kin, may face 
skepticism but less animus. See infra Part III.C (discussing other nondyadic families) . 
86. We argue in Part II.B.3 that the formation ofinterest-group networks is likely to 
be an important means of pursuing the goal of legal recognition. 
87. A legal status (such as marriage) that grants benefits and privileges carries a
moral-hazard isk. Cf. Kerry Abrams, Marriage Fraud, 100 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 14-39 (2012) 
(describing government strategies to prevent fraudulent claims to various marriage bene- 
fits) . The risk will likely be (and has been) a concern when novel families seek recogni- 
tion. For example, when advocates sought domestic-partnership status for gay couples in 
California n the 1990s, insurance companies insisted the status be defined so that only 
marriage-like couples qualified. See Nejaime, supra note 80, at 115 (explaining insurance 
carriers "resisted adding domestic partnership coverage without assurances that this new 
relationship status would be characterized by a marriage-like level of commitment"). The 
companies feared that individuals with AIDS would register with sympathetic friends, 
thereby qualifying for health insurance. Id. at 141. 
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dence in their respective abilities before they can make credible commit- 
ments to undertake the demanding roles required. Although some 
people report having a love-at-first-sight experience when they met their 
future life partners, more typically the process of finding satisfactory and 
lasting family relationships is one of experimentation and adjustment. 
Commitment is usually tentative when relationships are new, and it grows 
over time unless or until one or both of the parties realizes that the rela- 
tionship is unsuccessful. Moreover, the parties may differ in their inten- 
tions and investment in the union. Each hopes that the prospective 
partner will be a trustworthy and competent caretaker and that 
emotional attachments will mature and endure. But only through experi- 
ence can parties evaluate accurately whether their relationships embody 
the qualities that define successful families.88 
The level of uncertainty is significantly greater when individuals, 
such as those forming a polygamous family, experiment with novel family 
forms. Aspiring families are by nature experimental: The parties lack 
exemplars to guide them in family behavior and must adapt and adjust 
their roles and interactions over time as they seek to fulfill family func- 
tions in uncharted settings.89 Some forms may work better than others to 
satisfy dependency needs reliably. The individuals forming a polygamous 
family, for example, will be uncertain whether multiple adults in a conju- 
gal group will function effectively to care for one another and their chil- 
dren in stable, committed relationships. Increasing the number of adults 
beyond a partnership of two individuals adds complexity to the relation- 
ship; with complexity may come a greater potential for exploitation, con- 
flict, or alliances within the group - all of which might contribute to 
instability.90 Even if these risks are never realized, the evidence of 
whether a novel family form is viable can only be acquired through 
extended experience. Only when the heightened level of uncertainty is 
substantially resolved can the parties determine that their polygamous 
family has the caring qualities and the enduring character that the social- 
welfare criterion requires. 
88. The evidence that, for women, almost half of first premarital cohabitations transi- 
tion to marriage in three years, Copen, Daniels & Mosher, supra note 73, at 5, suggests 
that many relationships gothrough the kind of experimentation we describe. 
89. For example, committed polygamous families cannot model their relationships 
on marriage. But because they are dedicated to formal equality among all adult members, 
they would not receive substantial normative support from those polygamist groups, such 
as fundamentalist Mormons, that function asmale-dominated hierarchies. 
90. Fundamentalist Mormon groups may maintain stability through a rigid hierar- 
chical structure, see infra note 290 and accompanying text (describing this structure), 
which this Article rejects as unacceptable in a modern family. Adrienne Davis identifies 
these challenges and argues they can largely be resolved through partnership regulation. 
See Davis, supra note 8, at 2002-17 (arguing commercial-partnership law addresses chal- 
lenges caused by plural marriage, including those related to formation, entrance, xit, 
dissolution, and property rights) . 
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2. Social Isolation : The Absence of Associational Bonds and Public Ac- 
ceptance. - Even if the adult members of a polygamous family gain confi- 
dence and trust in one another as a functioning family, other challenges 
remain. In the early period of its evolution, the isolated novel family typi- 
cally lacks a community of similar families; this creates two problems. 
First, the polygamous family must rely solely on its own members' 
commitment and resources for success. The absence of a broader social 
group leaves the polygamous family without the benefit of friends and 
neighbors who offer support and enforce behavioral norms,91 important 
sources of stability for marital families. Moreover, even as their numbers 
increase, success in the political arena is unlikely unless polygamous 
families affiliate and form an interest group (or groups) dedicated to 
achieving their shared political goal of attaining legal recognition. With- 
out such coordination, polygamous families might fulfill family functions 
well, but they would still be likely to retain their outsider status. In short, 
the novel family faces the challenge of overcoming isolation and creating 
a network of families capable of developing group norms and mobilizing 
political action to gain support for the group's legal recognition.92 
Successful mobilization poses daunting challenges for novel fami- 
lies.93 Due to polygamous families' separation from society, the public 
initially may be unaware of the group's existence and later may find their 
family relationships to be strange and unfamiliar. Public awareness is a 
necessary (but not sufficient) condition for legal recognition. But even in 
an era of more tolerant public attitudes, growing public awareness may 
engender skepticism or hostility based on assumptions that polygamous 
families will not function adequately as families, that they may harm 
91. As we discuss below, the creation of a network of aspiring families may be a key 
intermediate step in a norm-formation process between a period in which small numbers 
of families function i  isolation and one in which the novel family group attains some level 
of public acceptance. See infra Part II.B.3. 
92. Our description of this process is stylized, and real isolation likely exists only in 
the earliest stage. See Verta Taylor 8c Nancy E. Whittier, Collective Identity in Social Move- 
ment Communities: Lesbian Feminist Mobilization, in Frontiers in Social Movement 
Theory 104, 109-21 (Aldon D. Morris 8c Carol McClurg Mueller eds., 1992) ("[T]he 
purposeful and expressive disclosure to others of one's subjective feelings, desires, and 
experiences - or social identity - for the purpose of gaining recognition and influence is
collective action."). 
93. A substantial literature focuses on the role of social movements inadvancing legal 
and constitutional reforms. Some scholars have analyzed the mobilization a d impact of 
identity-based social movements. See, e.g., Lani Guinier 8c Gerald Torres, The Miner's 
Canary: Enlisting Race, Resisting Power, Transforming Democracy 74-82 (3d ed. 2003) 
(discussing mobilization fracial groups); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity- 
Based Social Movements and Public Law, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 419, 447-48, 456-57 (2001) 
[hereinafter Eskridge, Channeling] (describing mobilization fgay-rights movement) . For 
a discussion of social mobilization toattain family rights, see infra notes 149-152 and 
accompanying text. 
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dependent members, or that they are engaging in immoral behavior.94 
Thus, the aspiring family category faces the challenge of demonstrating 
to the larger community that they are faithfully performing family 
roles - a difficult task given that families function largely in the private 
sphere. Further, the anticipation of a hostile public response may inhibit 
the inclination of these families to publicize their family relationships.95 
But if they are "closeted," polygamous families will find it more difficult 
to gain public acceptance as well-functioning families. 
Public ignorance or skepticism about the qualities of an aspiring 
family category undermines the prospect of legal recognition.96 Although 
the relationship between public attitudes and legal reform in the realm 
of civil rights is complex,97 some level of public tolerance and receptive- 
ness is (and has been) a predicate to the willingness of political actors 
and courts to confer new family rights.98 Moreover, a community of 
94. The testimony in the congressional hearings for the Defense of Marriage Act in 
1995 was replete with allegations that gay relationships were immoral, promiscuous, and 
harmful to children. See, e.g., 142 Cong. Rec. 17,070 (1996) (statement of Rep. Barr) 
("The very foundations of our society are in danger of being burned. The flames of 
hedonism, the flames of narcissism, the flames of self-centered morality are licking at the 
very foundations ofour society: the family unit."). Today, polygamous families face a simi- 
lar response. See infra Part III.C.l (describing challenges polygamous families confront in
achieving recognition given traditionally skeptical attitudes to their family structure). 
95. Part III.A describes how gay couples living in family relationships faced not only 
public animus but also criminal sanctions and loss of employment, which not surprisingly 
led many to remain closeted. Most observers agree that the AIDS crisis and the lesbian 
baby boom were critically important in leading many gay couples to live openly and form 
networks inpursuit of the goal of legal protection of their family relationships. See infra 
notes 214-230 and accompanying text (describing nature and impact of both phenom- 
ena) . This in turn led to public familiarity. See infra notes 235-238 and accompanying text 
(discussing transformation of public attitudes towards ame-sex relationships resulting 
from gay community's political and social collaboration). 
96. For discussion of the relationship between public familiarity and acceptance in 
the marriage-equality movement, see Part III.A; see also Michael J. Klarman, From the 
Closet to the Altar: Courts, Backlash, and the Struggle for Same-Sex Marriage 196-202 
(2013) [hereinafter Klarman, Closet to Altar] (discussing relationship between changing 
public attitudes and legal reform). 
97. Michael Klarman has studied the relationship between public opinion and 
constitutional reform in other contexts. See Michael J. Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil 
Rights: The Supreme Court and the Struggle for Racial Equality 344-442 (2004) 
[hereinafter Klarman, Jim Crow] (discussing public backlash to Brown v. Board of 
Education ) . 
98. This does not mean that general acceptance is required. The early judicial opin- 
ions conferring marriage rights on gays and lesbians were criticized and not generally 
popular. See Klarman, Closet to Altar, supra note 96, at 166-69 (providing example of 
public and political backlash following Goodridge). In response to public criticism, the 
Massachusetts legislature moved to amend the state constitution post- Goodridge, but it re- 
considered a year later. Roderick L. Ireland, In Goodridge' s Wake: Reflections on the Poli- 
tical, Public, and Personal Repercussions of the Massachusetts Same-Sex Marriage Cases, 
85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1417, 1423 & n.25 (2010). However, itseems likely that the public was 
more receptive to recognizing the rights of gays and lesbians in the early twenty-first 
century than it would have been a generation earlier, when the possibility of legal mar- 
This content downloaded from 128.59.161.126 on Wed, 09 Dec 2015 15:06:51 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
320 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 1 15:293 
polygamous families that is separated from the larger society largely lacks 
the benefit of the normative framework regulating family behavior that 
generally stabilizes and supports those families that already enjoy social 
recognition." 
3. The Verifiability Problem . - Even after polygamous families develop 
the trust and confidence to sustain their mutual commitments and affili- 
ate with similar families in pursuit of public acceptance and legal 
recognition, the state confronts a severe information problem in verify- 
ing the petitioning groups' family functioning. Predictably, not all 
relationships will qualify for the legal subsidy that is conferred on tradi- 
tional families, and even groups that have attained social acceptance may 
have a relational form that imposes latent risks on vulnerable members. 
The state has an independent interest in determining whether novel fam- 
ily categories seeking recognition function safely and successfully for all 
family members, an interest that may require a greater depth of 
knowledge than is needed to attain public acceptance.100 Accurate infor- 
mation is particularly important because legal recognition, once con- 
ferred, may be difficult to withdraw. But the inherent privacy of family 
functioning poses a classic information problem: State actors making 
decisions about conferring family status may have difficulty discerning 
whether polygamous families as a category fulfill the functions and pos- 
sess the qualities that make family relationships socially valuable.101 Many 
of the tangible qualities that characterize successful family groups, such 
as financial interdependence and mutual care, involve behaviors that are 
riage between same-sex partners would have seemed fanciful to most people. See infra 
Part III A (tracing same-sex relationships' evolution from outsider status to full integration 
and legal recognition). 
99. See Scott 8c Scott, Relational Contract, supra note 76, at 1288-93 (describing role 
of informal social norms in enforcing terms of marriage contract and promoting coopera- 
tion and stability in intact marriage). There are clearly exceptions to the idea that a family 
group must integrate into the larger society to enjoy the benefits of a normative frame- 
work. The Amish live separately from the larger society in a community regulated by 
robust social norms. See Steven V. Mazie, Consenting Adults? Amish Rumspringa and the 
Quandary of Exit in Liberalism, 3 Persp. on Pol. 745, 748-49 (2005) (describing strict life- 
style norms among Amish communities) . But the basic norms that regulate Amish family 
behavior are modeled on those that regulate marriage generally. See Julia A. Ericksen et 
al., Fertility Patterns and Trends Among the Old Order Amish, 33 Population Stud. 255, 
256 (1979) (describing Amish marriages as "monogamous" and "in the Anabaptist- 
Christian tradition" ) . 
100. See infra text accompanying otes 170-173 (discussing fraud and jeopardizing 
dependent members a potential risks in polygamous families) . 
101. The problem of verifiability by third-party decisionmakers has been of great inter- 
est to contracts scholars. The problem arises when courts must evaluate contract perfor- 
mance that cannot be specifically described. See Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, 
Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 Yale L.J. 814, 825 (2006) ("Contract theo- 
rists identify verification costs as one of the principal obstacles to complete contracts."); 
see also Oliver Hart, Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure 35-38 & n.15 (1995) 
(discussing problems of verifying quality of book in royalties contract as example of 
"verifiability" problem). 
This content downloaded from 128.59.161.126 on Wed, 09 Dec 2015 15:06:51 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
2015] FROM CONTRACT TO STATUS 321 
not readily observable to third parties. Moreover, intangible qualities that 
define families, such as long-term commitment, loyalty, and equality, are 
difficult to evaluate in the absence of express promises or reliable prox- 
ies. Thus, distinguishing well-functioning family categories from exploita- 
tive or less stable affiliations poses a challenge for state actors, who may 
have difficulty getting reliable evidence about the nature of claimants' 
relationships. 
B. The Evolution Toward Legal Recognition Through Collaboration 
1 . The Elements of Collaborative Behavior. - Our social-welfare premise 
implies that the state will limit legal recognition to those categories of 
aspiring families that can overcome the impediments caused by rela- 
tional novelty, social isolation, and nonverifiability. While the possible 
means of coping with these conditions are overlapping and interrelated, 
for analytical purposes they can be separated into three highly stylized 
evolutionary stages: (1) individuals (exemplars of the novel family type) 
form and successfully maintain families, (2) the individual exemplars 
form associational bonds that foster durable group norms and enable the 
collective to pursue the acceptance and support of the community at 
large, and (3) the state acquires the information about the particular 
context in which a novel family type functions to certify its entitlement to 
legal-family status. 
Our model uses exemplars from commercial contexts to show how 
each of the uncertainties that impede the recognition of novel family 
forms can be resolved by processes that we loosely describe as collabora- 
tion. Collaboration refers to a set of behaviors designed to pursue a com- 
mon objective that can only be achieved through the combined efforts of 
more than one party when the prospect of success cannot be determined 
until after each party makes investments in the relationship. Parties who 
collaborate commit to sharing private information, adjusting iteratively 
to the new information acquired from others, and relying on informal 
norms as the means of motivating each party to invest in the relation- 
ship.102 This technique builds trust in each party's commitment to 
cooperate in pursuing substantive goals as well as confidence in the abil- 
ity of the other(s) to perform their undertakings competently.103 
Aspiring families, such as our polygamous family, can use collabora- 
tive techniques to respond to each of the three challenging conditions 
that we have identified. At the first stage, joint collaborations between (or 
among) individuals aspiring to form polygamous families build the trust 
102. Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel 8c Robert E. Scott, Contracting for Innovation: 
Vertical Disintegration a d Interfirm Collaboration, 109 Colum. L. Rev. 431, 446-48 
(2009) [hereinafter Gilson, Sabel & Scott, Contracting for Innovation]; Charles F. Sabel, A 
Real-Time Revolution i Routines, in The Firm as a Collaborative Community 106, 110-13 
(Charles Heckscher 8c Paul S. Adler eds., 2006). 
103. Gilson, Sabel 8c Scott, Braiding, supra note 14, at 1402-04. 
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and confidence needed to overcome the unique uncertainty caused by 
relational novelty. Collaborative agreements interweave formal commit- 
ments with informal norms in ways that respond to the uncertainty inher- 
ent in the process of experimentation. At the second stage, collaboration 
enables isolated polygamous families to overcome collective-action prob- 
lems and associate with other similar families in developing group norms 
and forming networks in pursuit of their goals of public acceptance. 
Finally, at the third stage, collaboration between an aspiring category and 
the state facilitates joint action to mitigate the risk of harms that other- 
wise may impede certification of the family class. At each of these evolu- 
tionary stages, the key collaborative behaviors of information sharing, 
iterative adjustment, and informal enforcement are common elements. 
The discussion that follows shows how collaboration in the world of 
commercial contracting has facilitated effective responses to the condi- 
tions of relational novelty, social isolation, and nonverifiability. These 
analogies contribute to an extended example of how a novel family form 
can evolve from individual aspiring families that successfully develop 
mechanisms to ensure mutual care and support for their members, to an 
associational network that signals its identity with the larger normative 
community, and finally to a legally recognized group through verification 
and certification by the state that members of the successful group are 
able reliably to fulfill family functions. 
2. Collaborative Contracting as a Means of Coping with Uncertainty . - We 
begin with this question: How can a polygamous family (of two men and 
two women) form a durable family without prior experience with one 
another or with the family form, and without normative guidance tai- 
lored to the form?104 The parties understand the functions of families 
and have general goals for their affiliation. But because of the novelty of 
their relationship and the dearth of similar family exemplars, the pros- 
pect of a durable commitment for ongoing support, care, and nurture is 
highly uncertain. At the outset, none of the aspiring family members 
knows whether making an enduring commitment is the best means of 
pursuing his or her best interests. For this reason, the parties cannot 
specify with any confidence a set of defined obligations that will achieve 
their goals for the relationship. In short, at the outset there is not only 
uncertainty about whether particular individuals can form these durable 
commitments but also uncertainty over whether the form itself is one in 
which the functions of families are fulfilled satisfactorily. 
a. A Commercial Analogue : Collaborative Contracting in an Uncertain 
World. - An analogue exists in the commercial realm to this vexing prob- 
104. Recall that our hypothetical polygamous family is committed toloyalty and equal- 
ity among all adult members. Thus, this aspiring family cannot use hierarchical, male- 
dominated polygamous groups as a template for their relationship. See supra notes 83-84 
and accompanying text (introducing key assumptions describing this Article's hypothetical 
polygamous family) . 
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lem of relational uncertainty. Because of the increasing pace of 
technological development in the contemporary global environment, 
commercial actors sometimes need to find partners to share capabilities 
in pursuing a project that can only be defined and ultimately developed 
through their joint efforts.105 Traditional modes of contracting often 
offer no solution to the contracting problems these parties confront. 
Facing these conditions of relational uncertainty, commercial actors 
innovate, searching for partners capable and willing to engage in 
ongoing collaborations.106 These innovative "collaborative agreements" 
have become an essential part of doing business in the contemporary 
commercial environment.107 
In a number of industries characterized by rapid technological 
development, conditions of high uncertainty have led to collaborations 
where both parties' skills and commitment to cooperate are necessary to 
achieve success.108 In settings as diverse as the pharmaceutical industry 
and manufacturing supply chains, parties have come to realize that the 
feasibility of many projects can only be determined by joint investment in 
the production of information to evaluate whether a project is profitable 
to pursue.109 An example is the research collaboration between a large 
pharmaceutical company with expertise in bringing new drugs to market 
and a smaller biotech firm with innovative technology. The collaborative 
agreement aims to explore the feasibility of jointly discovering and 
developing a novel pharmaceutical product.110 The common feature of 
these regimes is a commitment to joint exploration: The contract regu- 
lates only the commitment to collaborate and not the course or the out- 
105. See Francine Lafontaine & Margaret Slade, Vertical Integration and Firm 
Boundaries: The Evidence, 45 J. Econ. Literature 629, 649 (2007) (suggesting hold-up 
problem "clearly pose[s] problems for long-term contracting, and those problems are 
exacerbated involatile nvironments"). 
106. For discussion of the legal mechanisms that support the search for partners capa- 
ble and willing to engage in a collaboration, see Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, 
Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 661, 676-80 
(2007). 
107. The development of and increase in the use of this new form of commercial con- 
tracting is documented in Gilson, Sabei 8c Scott, Contracting for Innovation, supra note 
102, at 472-89. 
108. In previous work, one of us has identified what is loosely called "the information 
revolution" as the exogenous shock that marked the emergence of collaborative contract- 
ing. Id. at 441-42. 
109. These types of collaborative arrangements sometimes take the form of prelimi- 
nary agreements or "letters of intent." For discussion of the range of preliminary agree- 
ments, see Ralph B. Lake 8c Ugo Draetta, Letters of Intent and Other Precontractual 
Documents 10-18 (2d ed. 2006). For a discussion of preliminary agreements as a form of 
collaborative contracting, see Gilson, Sabei 8c Scott, Braiding, supra note 14, at 1439-44. 
110. See, e.g., Research, Development and License Agreement Between Warner- 
Lambert Co. and Ligand Pharm. Inc. 2 (Sept. 1, 1999) [hereinafter Warner- 
Lambert/Ligand Agreement], available at http://print.onecle.com/contracts/ligand/war 
ner.rd. 1999.09.01. shtml (on file with the Columbia L w Review) (detailing pharmaceutical 
research and development collaboration between "big pharma" and "little pharma"). 
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come of the collaboration, which is entirely unspecified. That means any 
effort to enforce this agreement in court is limited to protecting each 
party's promised investment in the collaborative process rather than 
directing a division of any surplus that might result if the collaboration 
succeeds.111 Thus, neither party has a right to demand the performance 
that the parties imagine may result from a successful collaboration. If the 
parties cannot ultimately agree on a final objective, they may abandon 
the collaboration.112 
b. Key Elements of Collaborative Agreements. - The ability of any party 
to exit the collaboration raises a central question: What knits the 
collaborators' efforts together? After all, unless the parties can make 
credible commitments to invest in the relationship, the project will never 
get off the ground. Studies of these commercial collaborations provide 
answers to this key question.113 In brief, the collaboration rests on a 
governance structure that, over time, creates confidence in the capabili- 
ties and trust in the character of the counterparty. Trust and confidence 
are extremely valuable commodities: Not only do they motivate each 
party to invest in the relationship, but they also make the prospect of 
abandoning the relationship in order to collaborate with others much 
less attractive.114 
The governance of these commercial collaborations shares several 
common elements. The first element is a commitment to an ongoing 
mutual exchange of private information designed to determine if a pro- 
ject is feasible and, if so, how best to implement the parties' joint objec- 
tives. The second component is a procedure for resolving disputes. Its 
key feature is a requirement that the collaborators reach unanimous 
agreement on crucial decisions, with persistent disagreement resolved by 
111. See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Emisphere Techs., Inc., 408 F. Supp. 2d 668, 696-97 
(S.D. Ind. 2006) (holding remedy for breach of parties' research agreement is limited to 
right to terminate and retain accrued scientific information). 
112. See Gilson, Sabei & Scott, Contracting for Innovation, supra note 102, at 455-56 
(noting when uncertainty arises in performance of collaborative contract, parties may 
safely abandon); see also Gilson, Sabei 8c Scott, Braiding, supra note 14, at 1422 ("A 
refusal to proceed further ifa party determines that a project has negative present value 
should not be grounds for declaring the contract in breach."). 
113. See Gilson, Sabei 8c Scott, Braiding, supra note 14, at 1405-15 (offering examples 
of collaborative contract and describing operation of such contracts and relative shortcom- 
ings of traditional contracts) ; ee also Iva Bozovic 8c Gillian EL Hadfield, Scaffolding: Using 
Formal Contracts o Build Informal Relations in Support of Innovation 7-10 (Univ. of S. 
Cal., Law 8c Econ. Research Paper No. C12-3, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract= 19849 15 (on file with the Columbia L w Review) (finding empirical support for 
institutional structure ofcollaborative contracting in study conducted through interviews 
with group of innovative firms) . 
114. See Gilson, Sabei 8c Scott, Contracting for Innovation, supra note 102, at 481-84 
(noting costs of working with new collaborator, identified as "switching costs," increase 
over duration of existing collaboration) . 
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unanimous agreement at higher levels of management from each firm.115 
Together, these two mechanisms make each party's character traits and 
substantive capabilities observable and forestall misunderstandings. 
Working under conditions of uncertainty, the parties can expect to en- 
counter unanticipated problems that can only be solved jointly and that 
may generate occasions of disagreement. Their increasing knowledge of 
each other's capacities and their willingness to share private information 
in service of their collective goals facilitate the resolution of problems 
and constrain opportunistic behavior.116 
This arrangement is distinctively limited in its goals, functioning 
only to allow the parties to learn about each other's skills and capabilities 
for collaborative innovation and to develop jointly the routines necessary 
to pursue a desired objective. But, importantly, the collaborative agree- 
ment does not commit either party to develop, supply, or purchase any 
product or service. Rather, the object is to discover two things about the 
counterparty: How well does the counterparty cooperate, and how capa- 
ble are they at working jointly toward the ultimate goal? In this way, the 
governance structure provides the environment in which trust and confi- 
dence can grow: In effect, collaborative contracting endogenizes trust by 
formalizing a process that builds parties' confidence in one another and 
thereafter supports investments in their joint objectives based on the 
trust created. The evidence indicates that, if the collaborative process is 
successful, the uncertainties that existed at the outset of their dealings 
are resolved through accrued experience, giving rise to traditional 
contractual statements of obligation and remedy.117 
115. See, for example, the Warner-Lambert/Ligand Agreement, supra note 110, 
§§ 3.1.4, 3.2, which provides that all decisions are by unanimous vote and disagreements 
are resolved by the CEO of Ligand and the President of Warner-Lambert's Pharmaceutical 
Research Division (or their designees) . Requiring unanimity for project decisions makes it 
easy for reasonable skeptics to require more information from enthusiasts; bumping disa- 
greements up to impatient superiors discourages obstinacy. See Gilson, Sabei & Scott, 
Contracting for Innovation, supra note 102, at 479-81 (describing "'contract referee' 
mechanism" and detailing advantages) . 
116. The information regime characteristic of these collaborative agreements is 
designed to make it easy for each party to request clarification from the other. Thus, the 
regime allows for the joint interpretation of ambiguity and makes observable to the parties 
actions that would be opaque in an unstructured, informal exchange. This heightened, 
mutual observability allows the parties to learn about their respective capabilities as well as 
their disposition to cooperate. Under these conditions, continuing cooperation builds 
trust and protects each party's reliance on that trust in its substantive performance by 
increasing the costs of finding an alternative partner capable of reliably doing, and learn- 
ing, as much as the current one. Gilson, Sabei & Scott, Contracting for Innovation, supra 
note 102, at 476-88. 
117. Gilson, Sabei & Scott, Braiding, supra note 14, at 1382-84. Repetition results in a 
learning process that reduces uncertainty, permitting a shift from a collaborative regime to 
a fully specified contract. Michael D. Ryall 8c Rachelle C. Sampson, Do Prior Alliances 
Influence Alliance Contract Structure?, inStrategic Alliances: Governance and Contracts 
206, 206-07 (Africa Arino 8c Jeffrey J. Reuer eds., 2006) (finding contracts are more com- 
plete or detailed when firms have prior alliances, whether with same firm or other firms) . 
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c. Collaborative Contracting in the Family Context. - The collaborative 
contracting mechanism is ideal for experimentation (1) in an effort to 
achieve a goal that none of the parties can accomplish on his or her own 
and (2) where the parties are unwilling, owing to uncertainty about the 
viability of the collaboration, to commit in advance to a sustained invest- 
ment in the relationship. These two conditions characterize the chal- 
lenge facing parties desiring to establish novel family relationships. Con- 
sider again a hypothetical polygamous family. As in the commercial con- 
text, these parties face uncertainty about the viability of the venture they 
aim to undertake: It is unclear whether this (or any other) polygamous 
family represents a stable and enduring model for fulfilling family func- 
tions satisfactorily. Moreover, novel relationships such as this are not sup- 
ported by strong social norms defining behavioral expectations and 
encouraging long-term commitment. 
Under those conditions, the goals of this aspiring family can be fur- 
thered through processes that are analogous to the kind of collaborative 
agreements that have proved useful in commercial contexts. To be sure, 
the sources of relational uncertainty are somewhat different, and the 
form of the agreement among individuals in a novel family group is likely 
to differ from the commercial counterparts. A major difference between 
commercial collaborative contracts and their nascent familial counter- 
parts, for example, is the form of the governance arrangement that cre- 
ates the environment within which trust and confidence can grow.118 In 
commercial settings, these structures are specified in formal written 
documents, while in the familial context the governance commitments 
typically arise out of mutual understandings often based on the parties' 
conduct over time. But this distinction does not diminish the significance 
or utility of the commitment to collaborate by an aspiring family unit.119 
118. See supra text accompanying notes 113-116 (describing how trust and confi- 
dence motivate parties to invest in collaborative relationships). 
119. The Restatement ofContracts provides, "A promise may be stated in words either 
oral or written, ormay be inferred wholly or pardy from conduct." Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts § 4 (1981). A majority of states recognizes the validity of claims based on con- 
tracts implied in fact between unmarried cohabitants. Marsha Garrison, NonMarital 
Cohabitation: Social Revolution and Legal Regulation, 42 Fam. L.Q. 309, 315-16 (2008) 
(noting at least twenty-six states have approved some form of contract-implied-in-fact 
claims between cohabitants); ee, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 110 (Cal. 1976) ("In 
the absence of an express contract [between unmarried cohabitants], the courts hould 
inquire into the conduct of the parties to determine whether that conduct demonstrates 
an implied contract . . . between the parties."); Doe v. Burkland, 808 A.2d 1090, 1094 & n.4 
(R.I. 2002) (pointing to large number of states "that recognize both express and implied 
contracts between unmarried cohabitants"); Goode v. Goode, 396 S.E.2d 430, 438 (W. Va. 
1990) ("[A] court may order a division of property acquired by . . . unmarried cohabit- 
ants . . . who have considered themselves and held themselves out to be husband and wife. 
Such order may be based upon principles of contract, either express or implied ...."). 
Conduct-based agreements sometimes raise difficult problems of proof, but if the 
conduct among members of a novel relational group is clear, this form of contracting car- 
ries the same degree of legal significance. S e, e.g., Bailey v. West, 249 A.2d 414, 416 (R.I. 
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In both the commercial and familial cases, however, the enforceable 
commitment is limited at the outset to the obligation to collaborate on 
efforts to pursue the parties' mutual goals.120 A polygamous family com- 
mits to pursue an objective - long-term mutual care and support of each 
other and other dependents in their household - under circumstances 
where they are uncertain about the ultimate success of the relationship 
(or even the specific form that it may take). As noted above, the resulting 
agreement forms the basis for building trust as the foundation of a 
committed family. These collaborative agreements do not impose obliga- 
tions to share property upon the dissolution of the relationship; the par- 
ties' uncertainty about the success of the collaboration makes such 
precise commitments infeasible. What then are the enforceable obliga- 
tions of the family aspirants who do commit to collaborate? By analogy to 
the commercial context, each party is free to abandon the relationship at 
any time without facing any legal consequences. However, the initial 
commitment implies an enforceable obligation of family fidelity and 
loyalty during the period of ongoing collaboration.121 On this basis, 
evidence that one of the parties was pursuing another familial relation- 
ship during the collaboration or selfishly appropriating shared resources 
gives rise to an enforceable claim for the value of any investments that 
injured parties have made in reliance on the commitment.122 
1969) (finding no conduct-based agreement where parties' conduct did not clearly indi- 
cate mutual agreement); see also, e.g., Cont'l Forest Prods., Inc. v. Chandler Supply Co., 
518 P.2d 1201, 1205 (Idaho 1974) (finding binding quasi-contractual ob igation though 
declining to find implied-in-fact contract). For discussion, see Robert E. Scott & Jody S. 
Kraus, Contract Law and Theory 9 (5th ed. 2013). Some courts and legislatures have 
required that contracts between cohabitants bewritten. Ellman et al., supra note 52, at 943 
(describing writing requirement in some states). 
120. The unique feature of collaborative contracts i that they combine both legal and 
normative elements. The formal contract islimited to enforcement ofthe reliance invest- 
ments that parties have made in the commitment to collaborate. See Gilson, Sabei & Scott, 
Braiding, supra note 14, at 1379-82 (discussing enforcement offormal and informal con- 
tracts); infra note 121 (citing example of breach of collaborative contract resulting in 
liability) . 
121. These contracts rely on low-powered enforcement techniques that cover only the 
commitment to collaborate, without controlling the course or the outcome of collabora- 
tion. This means that defection from the commitment - say, by cheating on the exclusive 
commitment to care for each other - would only entitle the injured party to recover her 
reliance costs as measured by investments to date in the collaboration a d any opportuni- 
ties foregone. For a commercial example of the kind of cheating on the commitment that 
creates liability and a discussion of the limited remedies available, see Medinol Ltd. v. 
Boston Scientific Corp., 346 F. Supp. 2d 575, 591-600, 625-27 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
122. This limited enforcement may be more available to some novel families than 
others. Courts have ordered equitable remedies such as restitution a d constructive trust 
in cases involving financial c aims by cohabitants. See Salzman v. Bachrach, 996 P.2d 1263, 
1265-66 (Colo. 2000) (finding unjust-enrichment claim valid where one cohabitant, with- 
out paying, kept house that had been constructed at substantial expense to other cohabit- 
ant); Harman v. Rogers, 510 A.2d 161, 165 (Vt. 1986) (awarding plaintiff damages in 
restitution for services in operating defendant's store until cohabitation relationship 
deteriorated); Ellman et al., supra note 52, at 943-44 (discussing how courts can find 
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Family collaborations have both disadvantages and advantages rela- 
tive to their commercial counterparts. Family relationships do not lend 
themselves to the kind of hierarchical structure that motivates consensus 
in the business setting, where higher levels of management review dis- 
putes. On the other hand, the coresidency of aspiring family members 
and their ability to monitor one another closely push the parties toward 
consensus and reinforce the collaboration in ways that establish trust. 
Moreover, the personal nature of the information shared by each party 
creates the potential for reputational harm if that information is later 
disclosed, making abandonment costly.123 
Not all collaborative contracts creating familial obligations will be 
successful; some parties' relationships, and perhaps some relationship 
forms, may simply not develop into stable interdependent family groups. 
But in those relationships that do mature, understandings among the 
members of the polygamous family will become more complete through 
accrued experience as time goes on.124 In this way, the polygamous family 
will move beyond collaborative agreements to enforceable understand- 
ings about their performance obligations.125 Thus, just as parties in the 
pharmaceutical industry undertake formal agreements for drug develop- 
ment on the basis of information attained during the collaborative- 
contract phase, so too may a polygamous family in a collaborative family 
relationship reach formal understandings about property sharing, finan- 
cial support, and obligations for child care. Again, as in the collaborative- 
contract phase, these agreements may be understandings implied from 
conduct based on duration, shared duties, and other objective proxies 
that arise over time in cohabitation relationships.126 
implied agreement or equitable principles when parties do not have express agreement) . 
But if aspiring families are deemed immoral (as may be the case with polygamous fami- 
lies) ,courts may decline to enforce collaborative agreements. 
123. Personal information shared in the family setting may be embarrassing if later 
disclosed, creating a situation analogous to hostage xchange. Scott 8c Scott, Relational 
Contract, supra note 76, at 1290-91. 
124. See Kyle J. Mayer & Nicholas S. Argyres, Learning to Contract: Evidence from the 
Personal Computer Industry, 15 Org. Sci. 394, 396 (2004) (finding successive contracts 
between same two contracting partners become more complex over time as partners learn 
how to address contracting hazards) . 
125. See infra Part III.C.l (discussing commitment ceremonies among polygamous 
groups that aspire to legal-family status) . 
126. As Part III.B explains, this evolution to enforceable contracts together with 
default rules based on relationship duration can resolve the difficult problem of sorting 
nonmarital cohabitation relationships. One response is for the state to freely enforce con- 
tracts implied in fact that provide for mutual support and shared property rights in long- 
term unions unless parties opt out. See Elizabeth S. Scott, Domestic Partnerships, Implied 
Contracts, and Law Reform, in Reconceiving the Family 331, 331 (Robin Fretwell Wilson 
ed., 2006) [hereinafter Scott, Implied Contracts] ("Domestic partnership status can pro- 
vide greater financial security to dependent partners in informal unions than they have 
under current law, avoiding the harsh inequity that can result when one partner seeks to 
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In this first stage of collaboration, the evolutionary process can 
result in an aspiring polygamous family bound by (usually implied) con- 
tract to provide each member mutual support and care, with provisions 
for the assignment of responsibilities and for the distribution of property 
rights upon termination. Over time, one would expect to find a number 
of aspiring polygamous families living in committed, contractually based 
relationships. 
3. Moving from Isolated Collaborations to a Socially Integrated Collaborative 
Network. - Even as a number of polygamous families establish stable 
family relationships based on contract, other challenges remain. How do 
isolated polygamous families coordinate to overcome collective-action 
impediments and ultimately become integrated into the larger social 
community? The process that leads first to association among polyga- 
mous families and then to integration serves two functions. At a prag- 
matic level, coordination is necessary for the novel family to begin the 
process of pursuing its political goals. Isolated polygamous families are 
unlikely to attract public attention, gain acceptance, or effectively com- 
municate their identity as successful families. The formation of associa- 
tions among aspiring novel families also facilitates the development of 
shared social norms and enables these polygamous families and their 
agents to signal collectively their identity with the larger social commu- 
nity.127 Integration into the broader normative community further 
reinforces socially approved behavior and the stability of evolving 
relationships.128 
a. Normative Integration in Common-Purpose Communities : The Case of 
Collaborative Networks. - Again we turn to the commercial context to 
provide an analogue for how family aspirants can resolve the problem of 
social isolation and form a coherent community with collective goals and 
shared norms. Commercial parties in particular industries form networks 
(or informal alliances) in order to enhance mutual collaboration in an 
environment where multilateral cooperation produces gains for all mem- 
exploit the other by enjoying the benefits of an intimate union without incurring financial 
obligations."). 
127. See infra text accompanying otes 155-161 (discussing scholarship on symbolic 
behaviors employed by outsider groups to facilitate cultural ssimilation) . To some extent, 
of course, even isolated polygamous families may internalize norms of established families. 
For a general discussion of the role of informal norms in regulating behavior through 
anticipation of external sanctions uch as shaming or shunning, see Jon Elster, The 
Cement of Society 101-07 (1989); Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex 
Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 1643, 1656 (1996); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation 
of Norms, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 338, 350-51 (1997); see also Scott & Scott, Relational Contract, 
supra note 76, at 1288-93 (discussing role of norms in reinforcing marital commitment). 
128. See Karen S. Cook & Russell Hardin, Norms of Cooperativeness and Networks of
Trust, in Social Norms 327, 328-30 (Michael Hechter & Karl-Dieter Opp eds., 2001) (not- 
ing parties have strong interest in abiding by their community's norms o as to avoid 
exclusion). 
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bers in pursuit of their individual business ventures.129 These networks 
are not aided by formal association (although individual members may 
execute bilateral contracts) but are linked informally by cooperative 
norms. Research by organizational sociologists shows how shared norms 
evolve and successfully control opportunism and other noncooperative 
behaviors in these networks even as new members join the network and 
others drop away.130 
A business network consists of a number of independent firms that 
enter a pattern of collaboration designed to achieve the benefits of co- 
operation without formal integration.131 Of particular interest for our 
example are networks consisting of a cluster of firms whose membership 
shifts over time. A useful exemplar is the tech transfer network consisting 
of a university/ research entity (inventor), a number of biotechnology 
companies, large pharmaceutical firms, and venture capital firms joined 
by their common interest in the development of therapeutic compounds 
to cure disease.132 These diverse entities share a desire to resolve uncer- 
tainty over the challenges they face collectively. To a large extent, net- 
work enforcement of these interparty understandings is purely relational, 
129. See Walter W. Powell, Kenneth W. Koput & Laurel Smith-Doerr, Interorganiza- 
tional Collaboration a d the Locus of Innovation: Networks ofLearning in Biotechnology, 
41 Admin. Sci. Q. 116, 116, 119 (1996) (arguing "locus of innovation will be found in net- 
works of learning, rather than in individual firms"); Powell, Market nor Hierarchy, supra 
note 15, at 295 (describing networks a representative of "viable pattern of economic 
organization"); infra text accompanying notes 131-133 (defining network). Networks 
stimulate he development of norms, creating behavioral expectations that are internal- 
ized by network members and enforced informally b others. See Walter W. Powell, Inter- 
Organizational Collaboration i  the Biotechnology Industry, 152 J. Inst. 8c Theoretical 
Econ. 197, 209 (1996) [hereinafter Powell, Biotechnology Industry] (describing networks 
in biotechnology industry as "a kind of macro-level mutualism" that is "both self-maintain- 
ing and self-enforcing"); infra text accompanying notes 135-138 (noting cooperation 
within etworks does not depend on formal rights and obligations) . 
130. See Cook 8c Hardin, supra note 128, at 328-35 (noting sanctions against violation 
of community norms operate "spontaneously"); see also Michael Hechter 8c Karl-Dieter 
Opp, What Have We Learned About the Emergence of Social Norms, in Social Norms, 
supra note 128, at 394, 399-400 (reviewing the literature). 
131. Hugh Collins, Introduction toGunther Teubner, Networks a Connected Con- 
tracts 1 (Hugh Collins ed., Michelle Everson trans., 2011). Network forms of organization 
share some common elements. Parties engage in reciprocal, preferential, mutually 
supportive actions. The basic assumption of network relationships is that one party is 
dependent on actions or behaviors of the other and that there are gains to be had from 
pooling resources to achieve common purposes. As networks evolve, it becomes more 
efficient for parties to exercise voice rather than exit. See Powell, Market nor Hierarchy, 
supra note 15, at 303-04 (explaining relationships between individual units in network 
forms of resource allocation). 
132. These high-tech networks have been studied extensively b organizational sociolo- 
gists. See, e.g., Powell, Biotechnology Industry, supra note 129, at 197 (exploring network- 
driven innovation i biotechnology); Powell, Koput & Smith-Doerr, supra note 129, at 116 
(same); supra text accompanying notes 105-112 (describing collaborative agreements). 
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relying on a combination of reputation, repeated dealings, and tit-for-tat 
reciprocity.133 
What are the factors that cause these biotechnology networks to 
form and then sustain themselves? In the context of rapid technological 
development, research breakthroughs are so broadly distributed that no 
single firm has all the capabilities necessary for success. Research to pro- 
duce further technological advances requires collective collaboration 
designed to pool the broadly dispersed information of a large number of 
firms.134 Thus, periods of rapid change stimulate a variety of collaborative 
behaviors aimed at reducing the inherent uncertainties associated with 
novel products or markets through the sharing of private information 
that benefits each firm in its own pursuits.135 Despite the absence of for- 
mal rights and obligations internal to members of the network, the evi- 
dence suggests that the forces that govern cooperation are durable, with 
trust and cooperation increasing with participation in the network. When 
there is recognition of common interests and a high probability of future 
association, parties are more likely to cooperate and willing to punish 
defectors.136 Cooperation is a continuing strategy rather than a one-shot 
calculation; networks use a reputation for cooperation and trustworthi- 
ness as a guide to future interaction.137 At the level of the network 
community, there is a kind of mutualism or normative integration. This 
community-level mutualism is both self-maintaining and self-enforcing.138 
b. Network Collaboration and Normative Integration of Novel Families. - 
The research on collaborative business networks offers lessons about how 
novel polygamous families can overcome their initial isolation, affiliate 
with similar groups with compatible norms, and over time develop and 
signal their identity with the larger community. The key elements in suc- 
cessful network collaborations are (1) the pursuit of a shared purpose 
through exchange of private information, (2) the collective recognition 
of the value of individual collaborators' performance, (3) the adherence 
to norms of cooperation that advance the collective purpose, and (4) the 
133. See Collins, supra note 131, at 21-25 (discussing evolution of norms of trust and 
cooperation that are enforced informally) . 
134. See Walter W. Powell, Networks ofLearning in Biotechnology: Opportunities and 
Constraints Associated with Relational Contracting in a Knowledge-Intensive F eld, in 
Expanding the Boundaries of Intellectual Property: Innovation Policy for the Knowledge 
Society 251, 252-53 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001) (discussing increase in 
relational contracting in biotechnology). 
135. See id. at 265-66 (discussing advantages of collaboration i rapidly advancing 
fields). 
136. For discussion of ways in which routines of cooperation develop, see Robert 
Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation 55-69 (1984). 
137. See Powell, Biotechnology Industry, supra note 129, at 207-08 (observing firms 
develop more external ties as they gain reputation for competent cooperation). 
138. See Ranjay Gulati, Does Familiarity Breed Trust? The Implications of Repeated 
Ties for Contractual Choice in Alliances, 38 Acad. Mgmt. J. 85, 93-94 (1995) (discussing 
how reputational considerations impact firms' potential for future alliances). 
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capacity of outsiders to gain membership in the network by developing a 
prosocial reputation.139 The presence of these elements in successful net- 
work collaborations supports the prediction that as polygamous families 
evolve, they will form social networks around their common interests to 
advance their purpose of attaining social and legal recognition. 
In the case of novel families, these network communities predictably 
emerge in response to the uncertainties associated with their shared vul- 
nerability as social and legal "outsiders."140 Consider how a community of 
polygamous families might evolve from the collaborative-contracting 
stage discussed above. As the number of families increases, they become 
aware of similar aspiring families with common interests and relational 
patterns as well as a common purpose of obtaining social acceptance and 
legal recognition. They also understand that informal affiliation (and 
ultimately formal organizations) can provide social support and rein- 
forcement of their own relationship goals and assist them in attaining 
their social and political goals.141 Today, this process likely can be facili- 
tated by the Internet, which provides a low-cost means to connect and 
interact with other polygamous families.142 The emerging community is 
reinforced by interactions and information sharing that are more exten- 
sive and frequent than relations with others outside the community, to 
whom polygamous families remain outsiders.143 
Theory and evidence from other settings predict that as a network of 
polygamous families forms and mobilizes in pursuit of their common 
interests and goals, collective family-commitment norms will emerge, in- 
cluding norms of cooperation, reciprocity, and trustworthiness.144 The 
emergence of shared norms, enforced by the network community, 
strengthens each polygamous family's commitment to fulfilling family 
functions, creating a feedback effect that reinforces the norms that iso- 
139. See Powell, Koput & Smith-Doerr, supra note 129, at 119-24 (exploring optimal 
characteristics of networks needed to drive innovation i biotechnology); Powell, Market 
nor Hierarchy, supra note 15, at 303-06 (discussing common characteristics of uccessful 
resource-allocation networks) . 
140. See infra Part III A (describing how gay and lesbian support groups developed in 
struggle for legal protection of family relationships) . 
141. The literature on social movements is also informative here. See infra notes 148- 
149 and accompanying text (discussing insights offered regarding normative integration 
of novel polygamous families into social community) . 
142. See, for example, Polygamy Lifestyle, http://www.polygamylifestyle.com (last 
visited Feb. 4, 2015), which invites polygamist groups to find others in their locality. Web- 
sites uch as this avoid the risk of public exposure in the search for similar groups. 
143. See Samuel Bowles 8c Herbert Gintis, The Moral Economy of Communities: 
Structured Populations and the Evolution of Pro-Social Norms, 19 Evolution 8c Hum. 
Behav. 3, 7 (1998) (discussing how pro-social norms develop generally in groups). Mem- 
bers of polygamous groups may interact with others but are less likely to share information 
about their family relationships, for fear of social and legal sanctions. See infra Part III.C.l 
(discussing obstacles polygamous families face with respect to normative integration). 
144. See Scott, Social Norms, supra note 75, at 1908-12 (describing norms of reciproc- 
ity, loyalty, and fidelity in marriage as commitment orms). 
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lated polygamous families sought to establish through collaborative con- 
tracting.145 The normative structure of the network thus serves the dual 
functions of stimulating the emergence of norms of cooperation in rela- 
tion to one another as well as reinforcing commitment norms in individ- 
ual families. These norms of family fidelity are powerful behavioral 
regulators, reinforced through expressions of approval and informal 
sanctions such as gossip, shaming, and exclusion.146 They are also dura- 
ble because they enhance the willingness of members of the community 
to collaborate to achieve their common purpose.147 
The final step - the normative integration of novel polygamous fami- 
lies into the larger social community and their acceptance as fully 
functioning families - is one that is less well understood. Among the 
theories that have been offered, the literature on social movements offers 
insights about this process, at least as applied to some aspiring family 
categories.148 Prominent legal scholars have analyzed identity-based social 
movements, in which individuals in legally disadvantaged groups have 
organized in pursuit of public acceptance, political recognition, and civil 
rights.149 The marriage-equality movement, for example, is part of a 
145. Richard McAdams has developed the most comprehensive theory to explain the 
origin and regulation of norms. He explains that, for norm creation to occur, there must 
be a consensus within the community on the esteem worthiness ofa target behavior. See 
McAdams, upra note 127, at 358-60 (outlining how consensus may arise). If there is also a 
risk of detection for deviation from the consensus and a capacity to publicize the devia- 
tion - through gossip or other informal or formal means - a norm can arise. Id. at 361-64. 
Considerable empirical evidence supports the notion that peer disapproval is an effective 
sanction against disfavored behavior. See, e.g., Donna M. Bishop, Legal and Extralegal 
Barriers to Delinquency: A Panel Analysis, 22 Criminology 403, 412 (1984) ("Those who 
have strongly internalized conventional norms tend ... to fear that valued peer relation- 
ships would be jeopardized by violations of the law ...."); Herbert Jacob, Deterrent Effects 
of Formal and Informal Sanctions, 2 L . & Pol'y Q. 61, 72 (1980) ("The relationship 
between peer disapproval of violating the law and compliance with it is substantial nd 
consistent."). 
146. See Scott & Scott, Relational Contract, supra note 76, at 1288-92 (discussing 
enforcement of social norms, as well as effects of these norms on marital conduct) . 
147. See Gulati, supra note 138, at 93-94 (discussing influence of "mechanisms of
social control" on "formation a d maintenance ofalliances"). 
148. Sociologists have long studied how citizens organize themselves topursue often 
transformative social and legal goals through social movements incontexts as varied as 
environmental justice, access to knowledge, civil rights, and animal rights. In recent years, 
many scholars have focused on the relationship between law and social movements. See 
infra notes 151, 154 (discussing process of norm evolution and lawyers' role in advancing 
social movements) ; ee also Michael McCann, Law and Social Movements: Contemporary 
Perspectives, 2 Ann. Rev. L. 8c Soc. Sci. 17, 24-35 (2006) (examining historical interaction 
of law and social movements). For an early article in the legal literature, see Edward 
Rubin, Passing Through the Door: Social Movement Literature and Legal Scholarship, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (2001). 
149. Scholars have analyzed the impact of social movements on constitutional and 
public-law reform. See, e.g., Eskridge, Channeling, supra note 93, at 491-525 (analyzing 
dynamic interaction between identity-based movements and law). Reva Siegel has probed the impact of social movements on constitutional culture. See Reva B. Siegel, Lecture, 
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larger social movement by gays and lesbians to attain equal citizenship. 
As William Eskridge explains, collective action was stimulated by the 
designation of sexual orientation as a legally salient trait and source of 
discrimination . 150 
Although collective action by aspiring families is the foundation of 
their normative integration into the larger society, theory suggests that 
committed leaders, or norm entrepreneurs, will play a key role in 
mobilization to attain public acceptance.151 These network leaders facili- 
tate normative integration by creating organizational contexts for coordi- 
nating people and resources and by developing strategies to utilize the 
media and other outlets to spread information about the successful func- 
tioning of polygamous families.152 Given that the ultimate goal of the 
Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of 
the De Facto ERA, 94 Calif. L. Rev. 1323, 1339-66 (2006) (analyzing how constitutional 
culture nables ocial movements opropose alternative understandings of constitutional 
tradition); see also Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Principles, Practices and Social Move- 
ments, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 927, 931-33, 943-50 (2006) (explaining how social movements 
can result in challenges to legitimacy of customary practices as inconsistent with long- 
standing principles). For discussion of the impact of social movements on statutory and 
constitutional civil-rights reform, see Lani Guinier 8c Gerald Torres, Changing the World: 
Notes Toward a Demosprudence of Law and Social Movements, 123 Yale L.J. 2740, 2796- 
2804 (2014). 
150. Eskridge, Channeling, supra note 93, at 434-35. Eskridge explains how urbaniza- 
tion promoted consciousness raising among gays, reducing the costs of collective action. 
Id. at 461-62. 
151. Both the social movement and other sociological literatures make this point. See 
Rubin, supra note 148, at 28-32 (describing key role of movement leaders in mobilization 
and information dissemination); see also Malcolm Gladwell, The Tipping Point 60-62 
(2000) (describing "mavens," norm entrepreneurs who learn a great deal about emerging 
norms and then share that knowledge with others, thus serving to spread information 
widely at low cost); Robert C. Ellickson, The Market for Social Norms, 3Am. L. 8c Econ. 
Rev. 1, 10 (2001) (describing influential opinion leaders as "moral entrepreneurs"). 
Gladwell argues that mavens play a key role in spreading fads, fashions, and (by implica- 
tion) norms. Gladwell, supra, at 60-62. These leaders can organize mobilization. See infra 
note 152 (outlining resources leveraged by leaders in mobilization efforts). They can also 
generate norm cascades, a process of rapid norm change. See Randal C. Picker, Simple 
Games in a Complex World: A Generative Approach to the Adoption of Norms, 64 U. Chi. 
L. Rev. 1225, 1282-88 (1997) (concluding imposition of superior norm by actor can 
destabilize existing norms and trigger norm cascade); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive 
Function of Law, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2021, 2035-36 (1996) [hereinafter Sunstein, Expres- 
sive Function] (observing potential of newly disseminated information toinduce rapid 
shifts in norms); see also Lawrence Lessig, Social Meaning and Social Norms, 144 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 2181, 2185-86 (1996) (explaining "snowball" effect in evolution of norms and argu- 
ing rate of norm change accelerates as meaning and costs of obeying norm are altered); 
Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 903, 909 (1996) 
[hereinafter Sunstein, Social Norms] (arguing existing social conditions can be altered by 
changing background norms) . 
152. See Rubin, supra note 148, at 28-34 8c n.61 (describing role of committed leaders 
in mobilizing resources and people to create a social movement). Rubin describes 
resources useful in mobilization expansively to include salient events (the Stonewall riots), 
court cases, and media coverage, as well as money and funds. Id. The use of media to dis- 
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polygamous-family group is legal recognition, and that some level of pub- 
lic acceptance is a predicate to attaining that goal,153 it seems likely that 
norm entrepreneurs in this context will organize formal interest groups 
and use legal tools in pursuit of the community's goals. Predictably, law- 
yers often will perform the function of norm entrepreneurs.154 
Scholars studying cultural change shed further light on the social- 
integration process, documenting how outsider groups, once affiliated, 
can signal their identity with and become assimilated into the larger cul- 
tural community.155 The theory of identity signaling developed by econo- 
mists studying changing social behaviors seems to fit the evolutionary 
process by which novel families become integrated into the larger soci- 
ety.156 Researchers have studied how cultural conventions and behaviors 
function as symbols of identity, communicating aspects of individuals or 
groups to others in the social world.157 Normative behaviors gain mean- 
pense information is a key strategy of social movements. See McCann, supra note 148, at 
24 (finding social movements are "far more prone to rely on communicative strategies of 
information disclosure and media campaigns"). Today the Internet isan important source 
of information dissemination. See supra notes 140-143 and accompanying text (describ- 
ing informational websites promoting polygamy and dispelling myths) . 
153. See Klarman, Jim Crow, supra note 97, at 367 (describing backlash to Brown v. 
Board of Education) . 
154. Cause lawyers have played a key role in pursuing and implementing le al change 
generated by social movements aimed at advancing racial and gender equality and gay and 
lesbian rights. See McCann, supra note 148, at 25-26 (discussing role of law and legal 
activism in advancing social movements); Austin Sarat 8c Stuart Scheingold, What Cause 
Lawyers Do For, and 7o, Social Movements: An Introduction, i  Cause Lawyers and Social 
Movements 1, 1 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 2006) (arguing cause lawyers 
played pivotal role in movements for social change over last half century) . 
155. See Jonah Berger, Identity Signaling, Social Influence, and Social Contagion, in 
Understanding Peer Influence in Children and Adolescents 181, 183 (Mitchell J. Prinstein 
8c Kenneth A. Dodge eds., 2008) [hereinafter Berger, Identity Signaling] ("[C]ultural 
tastes gain meaning, or signal value, through their association with groups, or similar types 
of individuals."). The recent history of changing public attitudes toward gay and lesbian 
relationships rovides an example of this process of norm evolution and corresponding 
social change. See infra Part III.A (outlining role of same-sex couples' affiliations with 
social, political, and religious networks inpropelling evolution of norms) . 
156. See, e.g., Berger, Identity Signaling, supra note 155, at 182-84 (describing 
identity-signaling theory as explaining divergence among social groups); see also Eric A. 
Posner, Law and Social Norms 18-22 (2000) (defining signals as actions intended to distin- 
guish "types" of people); Eric A. Posner, Symbols, Signals, and Social Norms in Politics and 
Law, 27 J. Legal Stud. 765, 797 (1998) ("[A]n important class of social norms arises from 
signaling ames in which people choose actions that signal oyalty to states and communi- 
ties."). These versions of signaling theory all draw on the work of Michael Spence. See 
generally A. Michael Spence, Market Signaling: Informational Transfer inHiring and Re- 
lated Screening Processes (1974) (discussing market signaling). 
157. See, e.g., Mary Douglas 8c Baron Isherwood, The World of Goods: Toward an 
Anthropology of Consumption 36-47 (1979) (discussing use of goods as cultural conven- 
tion); Michael R. Solomon, The Role of Products as Social Stimuli: ASymbolic Interaction- 
ism Perspective, 10 J. Consumer Res. 319, 319 (1983) (focusing on "consumers' relation- 
ships with the objects they produce and purchase" and arguing "significant portion of 
consumption behavior isactual social behavior - and vice versa"). 
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ing, or signal value, through their association with groups or similar types 
of individuals. The normative identity that polygamous families or other 
novel families signal is based on their family relationships of long-term 
commitment to mutual care and support; thus, the essential elements of 
this identity are similar to those of established families.158 The society at 
large associates successful commitment norms with established families 
and comes to recognize that polygamous families successfully perform 
familial functions, although their behaviors and identity may not mirror 
precisely those of marital families.159 This process of identity signaling is 
advanced in part by advocates (and perhaps litigation strategists) who, by 
serving as norm entrepreneurs, accelerate the process of social change. 
As the cohort of novel families grows, public awareness of their identity 
increases as well, and if the identity signaling is successful,160 a cascading 
process of changing social attitudes follows, culminating in public toler- 
ance or acceptance.161 
Research on the mechanisms that produce social change also aids in 
formulating predictions about this last phase of norm integration. Jonah 
Berger documents a process of change occurring when an idea, cultural 
view, or attitude spreads contagiously through continuous observation 
158. William Eskridge describes a politics of recognition through which an identity 
group signals to the majority that the legally stigmatized trait is simply a benign variation 
and should not be the basis of legal discrimination. SeeEskridge, Channeling, supra note 
93, at 467-78 (detailing life cycle of identity-based social movements). This equality-based 
claim (that novel families are similar to established families) is inherently integrative. See 
id. at 487-88 (" [T]he assurance game feature needed for a social movement totake off or 
the long haul was much easier to achieve when the goals were integrationist."). 
159. Once these outsiders adopt the family-behavior signal, the normative meaning of 
a family itself may evolve. In other words, as the social change occurs, the set of socially 
accepted family behavior expands to include the unique means of cementing commitment 
that he novel group has developed. See Berger, Identity Signaling, supra note 155, at 183- 
84 (arguing when outsiders use group's identity signal, signal's meaning can change). 
Thomas Stoddard argued that extending marriage rights to gays and lesbians would posi- 
tively influence the meaning of marriage. See Stoddard, supra note 59, at 13 (arguing 
extending marriage rights to gays can help divest marriage of its past sexist trappings) . 
160. Of course, it is possible that the signaling will not be effective, and public aware- 
ness of polygamous families will ead to alarm accompanied by public hostility. 
161. See Ellickson, supra note 151, at 26-27 (reviewing literature on norm cascades 
and tipping points); see also McAdams, upra note 127, at 365-72 (describing feedback 
cycle in which "[p]eople compet[e] to be 'well thought of' compared to others" and 
"lead[] the way to new and higher levels of norm compliance"); Sunstein, Social Norms, 
supra note 151, at 909 ("Norm bandwagons occur when small shifts lead to large ones, as 
people join the 'bandwagon'; norm cascades occur when there are rapid shifts in norms."). 
Economists have studied similar phenomena as well, focusing on bandwagon effects, herd 
behavior, and information cascades. See, e.g., Abhijit V. Banerjee, A Simple Model of Herd 
Behavior, 107 Q.J. Econ. 797, 798 (1992) (discussing herd behavior and defining it as 
"everyone doing what everyone else is doing, even when their private information suggests 
doing something quite different"); Sushil Bikchandani, David Hirshleifer 8cIvo Welch, A 
Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as Informational C scades, 100 J. 
Pol. Econ. 992, 994 (1992) (arguing informational c scades explain fads, fashions, booms, 
and crashes) . 
This content downloaded from 128.59.161.126 on Wed, 09 Dec 2015 15:06:51 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
2015] FROM CONTRACT TO STATUS 337 
and word of mouth.162 This happens typically when the idea is associated 
with images or narratives linked to "high-arousal emotions" such as 
anger or love163 and when the behavior is observable and public.164 Iden- 
tity signaling by novel families can have this effect. For example, consider 
the narratives of committed gay and lesbian couples, often with children, 
that became familiar during the campaign to extend marriage rights to 
these couples.165 Berger's research suggests that these positive images 
may have played a key role in generating relatively rapid changes in pub- 
lic attitudes. 
The process of identity signaling does not proceed seamlessly: It 
imposes costs on polygamous families, especially in the early period. Suc- 
cessful signaling and normative integration depends on families' willing- 
ness to sacrifice some privacy, as public familiarity and acceptance can 
only happen if polygamous families are open about their relationships. 
To varying degrees, identity signaling exposes the family to the risk of 
negative public reactions, ranging from curiosity and skepticism to hostil- 
ity and outrage. For some novel families (including polygamous fami- 
lies), the costs are likely to be high, including the risk of criminal 
sanctions for living together as families.166 Predictably, aspiring families 
will be reluctant to incur onerous costs. In this situation, some exoge- 
nous shock that increases costs on continuing their closeted lives may 
serve as a catalyst, motivating novel families to bear the initial costs of 
living openly.167 Over time, as the public becomes familiar with the 
nature of novel family relationships, the hope is that acceptance grows 
and hostility dissipates. 
* * * 
Although our model proceeds in three discrete stages for analytical 
purposes, the collaborative process through which polygamous families 
seek to gain public acceptance overlaps substantially with the group's 
effort to attain legal recognition. First, as discussed earlier, novel families 
162. See Jonah Berger, Contagious 21-25 (2013) ("These are the six principles of 
contagiousness: products or ideas that contain Social Currency and are Triggered, Emotional, 
Public, Practically Valuable , and wrapped into Stories"). 
163. See Jonah Berger & Katherine L. Milkman, What Makes Online Content Viral?, 
49 J. Marketing Res. 192, 197 (2012) (arguing content evoking high-arousal emotions is 
more viral than other content) . 
164. For a discussion of the role of social influence, see Nicholas A. Christakis & James 
Fowler, Connected: The Surprising Power of Our Social Networks and How They Shape 
Our Lives 3-15 (2009). 
165. See infra Part III.A (highlighting evolution of gay and lesbian family relationships from outsider status to full integration a d legal recognition). 
166. See infra Part III.A. 1 (discussing how antisodomy laws inhibited gay couples from 
living together pr e-Lawrence) . 
167. See infra Part III.A.2 (discussing how exogenous shock of AIDS crisis functioned 
as a catalyst for gays' coming out and advocating for legal protection of their family 
relationships) . 
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and their advocates pursue their legal goals in part by signaling their 
identity with established families, assuring the public about the quality of 
their relationships. Second, as discussed below, regulators are likely to 
extend legal protections through an incremental process that allows state 
actors to gain information about the aspiring family category. The incre- 
mental extension of legal rights has feedback effects that also contribute 
to public familiarity and acceptance, while at the same time minimizing 
backlash that might follow from full recognition of unfamiliar groups.168 
Moreover, legal recognition in itself powerfully signals legitimacy that, in 
turn, contributes to growing public acceptance of novel families.169 
4. Resolving the Verifiability Problem Through Collaborative Regulation. 
a. Legal Certification to Guard Against Uncertain Risks. - Even if the 
novel family category gains social tolerance or acceptance (and success is 
certainly not guaranteed), the state independently has an interest in 
verifying that these groups will function effectively for all members 
before it certifies the category as a legal family. But here the state faces a 
significant information problem: Family behavior is private and thus 
resists efforts to verify the quality of family functioning, especially when 
(as with polygamous families) there is little by way of historical experi- 
ence. Some types may appear to perform family functions satisfactorily; 
however, they may create latent risks that affect some members but are 
not immediately apparent. For example, polygamous-family groups may 
appear to provide care and support to members harmoniously, but ex- 
perience over time might reveal difficulties maintaining equality norms 
and avoiding exploitation.170 (Indeed, it is plausible that groups lacking 
the qualities of well-functioning families might organize to pursue social 
acceptance and legal recognition through fraudulent means, a stratagem 
168. See infra text accompanying notes 175-178 (discussing incremental approach); 
see also Klarman, Closet to Altar, supra note 96, at 145-55 (describing backlash to early 
cases extending marriage rights to gay couples) . 
169. This interaction has been widely studied by scholars examining the expressive 
function of the law. Larry Lessig has shown that he state, if sensitive to the social meaning 
of particular behaviors, can stimulate desired changes through legal expression. See 
Lessig, supra note 151, at 964-73. Cass Sunstein extended Lessig's analysis by analyzing 
how legal regulation can affect normative structures as well. See Sunstein, Expressive Func- 
tion, supra note 151, at 2026-35 (discussing interaction between expressive law and social 
norms). Sunstein suggested that antilittering statutes have such an expressive effect. See 
id. at 2030, 2032-33. These changes in preferences and values occur because the social 
meaning of these behaviors has been changed. See id. at 2031-33. Thereafter, a norm cas- 
cade can result through the stimulation findividual preferences being changed by the 
legal regulation. Id. at 2032-33; see also McAdams, upra note 127, at 355-66 (arguing law 
can change behavior by signaling consensus that is only dimly perceived by larger commu- 
nity); infra text accompanying note 249 (reemphasizing expressive function of law). For a 
review and critique of this literature, see Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theo- 
ries of Law and Social Norms, 86 Va. L. Rev. 1603, 1623-30 (2000). 
170. The risk of coercion and exploitation may be as great in dyadic relationships. 
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that time likely would reveal.171) Time might also reveal that conjugality 
serves a key bonding function for unrelated adults and, as a 
consequence, multigenerational and voluntary kin groups may turn out 
to be fragile, thereby jeopardizing dependent members.172 To be sure, 
these particular risks may not materialize, but the general point is that 
the state will demand sufficient information to mitigate latent risks as 
part of the process of determining whether a novel family category 
should receive family status and the societal benefits and resources that 
follow.173 The network of polygamous families, in turn, has an interest in 
providing information that assures the state that this category meets the 
state's expectations for family functioning. 
Several challenges may arise. Some aspiring groups may deserve 
legal recognition as fulfilling family functions but be difficult to evaluate 
because they are based on unconventional commitments or appear to be 
continuing the process of evolution. Other groups may face unusual 
political obstacles, despite their apparently effective functioning, that 
impede full recognition as families. Thus, the state must seek to under- 
stand the context in which the aspiring family group functions; in doing 
so, lawmakers are likely to proceed with caution, perceiving that once 
rights are extended, they will be difficult to withdraw. For some groups, 
an iterative process may be appropriate: one in which the legal rights and 
responsibilities are assigned incrementally, allowing the state to monitor 
family functioning over time in the process of certifying family status.174 
For other aspiring family categories, particularly those that are truly 
novel, a collaborative approach may also require joint efforts by the state 
and the group to establish a standard consisting of best practices that are 
policed informally by the network itself. 
b. An Iterative Approach. - The state can verify and certify the family 
status of an aspiring family type in several ways, including judicial 
recognition on constitutional grounds, state legislative enactments, and 
administrative regulation. For some family groups, such as cohabiting 
171. Several readers suggested this possibility as a component of the political-economy 
story. For example, fundamentalist polygamists could influence public opinion by masking 
their undesirable qualities and falsely signaling that heir relationships were reformed. 
172. Of course, nonconjugal unions avoid the destabilizing threat of infidelity. 
173. See infra Part III.C (discussing possible paths to recognition for polygamous and 
nonconjugal relationships) . 
174. Several scholars, often drawing on the experience in some European countries, 
have argued that the path to marriage equality for gay couples is a step-by-step process. William Eskridge has argued that an incremental approach to the extension of marriage 
rights for gay couples was important to increase public acceptance. See William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., Equality Practice: Civil Unions and the Future of Gay Rights 115-18 (2002) 
(arguing step-by-step legal process is means to changing public attitudes) . For a contrary 
view, see Erez Aloni, Incrementalism, Civil Unions, and the Possibility of Predicting Legal 
Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage, 18 Duke J. Gender L. & Pol'y 105, 106 (2010) (arguing incremental theory's predictions have not been borne out in practice and incremental 
theory overlooks significant differences between Europe and the United States). 
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couples or (perhaps) multigenerational groups, the risk of exploitation 
and instability may be relatively modest because the aspiring family is 
modeled on a familiar form. For these groups, full family status can be 
attained through a straightforward iterative process, with rights and 
obligations extended to the group incrementally.175 Through this 
collaborative process, state actors acquire information informally about 
the quality of the family commitments over time, allowing the state to 
verify that family functions are being performed satisfactorily.176 For 
example, if the state creates a family status with some relationship rights 
and privileges, it can acquire information comparing dissolution rates to 
divorce rates.177 Moreover, the iterative process may have a feedback 
effect, with the limited family status expediting public acceptance of the 
novel group as "real" families. Eventually, the state's monitoring function 
recedes as the new family category stabilizes and ultimately attains full 
legal recognition. This iterative process provides greater certainty for the 
parties and for third parties dealing with the new families and enhances 
the privacy and freedom of individual members of the recognized cate- 
gory to pursue their relationship goals without external monitoring.178 
c. Joint Mitigation of Risks Through 
u Best Practices" Collaboration . - For 
novel groups that pose substantial informational and/or political chal- 
lenges, the state may require a more formal collaborative process in con- 
junction with an iterative approach. For polygamous-family groups, for 
example, uncertainty is high because there are no models for family 
behavior or tested responses to the possible risks that may arise from 
certification of the group. In this case, the state may turn to a more 
interactive collaboration to enunciate and enforce "best practices" that 
mitigate those risks. Here, the goal is to encourage common efforts by 
the polygamous families themselves to create binding commitments that 
minimize the risk of perceived harm. 
Once again we invoke a commercial analogue - one that at first 
blush may seem quite remote from the realm of novel families. Leafy 
175. For a discussion of the key features of public-private collaborations, see Charles 
F. Sabel 8c William F. Simon, Contextualizing Regimes: Institutionalization as a Response 
to the Limits of Interpretation and Policy Engineering, 110 Mich. L. Rev. 1265 (2012). 
176. See infra Part III A for a discussion of how relationship rights have been 
extended incrementally to gay and lesbian couples, culminating in the right to marry. 
177. See infra Part III.A for a discussion of the iterative process through which gay 
couples obtained marriage-equality rights, first through limited omestic-partnership laws 
and then civil-union statutes. 
178. Mary Anne Case argues that the licensing of marriage protects couples' privacy 
from government intrusion i ways not available to couples in domestic partnerships. See 
Mary Anne Case, Marriage Licenses, 89 Minn. L. Rev. 1758, 1772 (2005) [hereinafter Case, 
Marriage Licenses] (arguing "marriage in many respects licenses greater flexibility and 
less state intrusion i to family life" than its alternatives). Once a couple marries, they can 
have separate bank accounts, live apart, etc., whereas domestic partners must provide evi- 
dence of marriage-like behavior to establish their status. Id. at 1772-76. Novel families 
would enjoy the same freedom once the new category is recognized. 
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green vegetables pose particular risks because they are often eaten raw 
and, today, often sold in "salad mixes" that mingle greens picked in 
different locations, thus expanding the possibilities for cross- 
contamination.179 Following an outbreak of illness, California designated 
an authority to establish safety standards or "best practices" for the farms 
from which member handlers buy.180 These standards require growers 
and processors to identify hazardous control points and report the 
measures undertaken to mitigate the hazard.181 Inspectors from the 
California Department of Food and Agriculture monitor compliance,182 
but the ultimate sanction for noncompliance is suspension or withdrawal 
of a recalcitrant member's right to use a service mark, and thus tempo- 
rary or permanent exclusion from the industry is enforced informally.183 
The success of this "best practices" approach offers a regulatory pro- 
totype for the mitigation of harms from legal recognition of some cate- 
gories of novel families where a more formal process of information 
sharing and monitoring is warranted. Such a collaboration has four key 
elements: (1) creation of a formal association of aspiring families in the 
high-risk group, (2) information exchange between the group (or its 
representatives) and the state to establish best practices, (3) monitoring 
by the state to ensure that the group complies with those practices, and 
(4) informal enforcement by the association through shaming or exclu- 
179. Gilson, Sabei & Scott, Contract and Innovation, supra note 16, at 211-12. All 
actors in the food supply chain have an interest in protecting their market by developing a 
regime of practices that reduce the chances for contamination a d limit its effect. The 
state, as the protector of public health, has complementary interests. Id. at 212-13. 
180. The authority was delegated to a Board established by the Leafy Green Product 
Handlers Agreement (LGMA). State of Cal. Dep't of Food & Agrie., California Leafy 
Green Products Handler Marketing Agreement 7-8 (effective as amended from Mar. 5, 
2008) [hereinafter California Marketing Agreement] , available at http://www.cdfa.ca.gov/ 
mkt/mkt/ pdf/CA%20Leafy%20Green%20Products%20Handler%20Agreement.pdf (on file 
with the Columbia L w Review) . LGMA is governed by a thirteen-member boa d, chosen by 
the state Secretary of Agriculture from nominations by the membership. Twelve must be 
representatives of the handler members of the organization; the thirteenth is supposed to 
represent "the public." Id. at 3. 
181. The LGMA additionally requires each handler to maintain records that permit 
identification of the farm and field from which all components of its products originate in 
case contamination is later discovered. Id. at 6; see Cal. Leafy Green Prods. Handler Mktg. 
Bd., Commodity Specific Food Safety Guidelines for the Production and Harvest of Let- 
tuce and Leafy Greens 13 (Aug. 2, 2013), available at http://www.lgma.ca.gov/wp-con 
tent/uploads/2014/09/California-LGMA-metrics-08-26-13-Final.pdf (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review) (including provision imposing recordkeeping requirements on 
signatory handlers) . 
182. California Marketing Agreement, supra note 180, at 9. 
183. The handler members, inturn, commit o deal only with farms that comply with 
the standards. Id. There are other private standard-setting a d certification regimes, such 
as GlobalGAP (for "good agricultural practices"), an organization formed by major Euro- 
pean retailers, and the Global Food Safety Initiative, a private international organization that assesses certification regimes in accordance with a set of meta-standards. Sabel & 
Simon, supra note 175, at 1284. 
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sion.184 In the case of polygamous families, risks that might attend the 
recognition of multiple-party family types include the exploitation of 
minors and other "minority" interests or harms caused by instability of 
the family relationships. Problems such as these can be addressed 
through a collaborative process in which the aspiring families provide 
information to the state about the context in which they fulfill their fam- 
ily functions, the families and the state collectively establish benchmarks 
that embody their expectations for the support and care of all family 
members, and the families collectively seek to promote compliance with 
the benchmarks.185 Through mechanisms such as this, the state, as it in- 
crementally extends rights, can certify well-functioning family categories 
subject to a regulatory scheme tailored to their needs but serving the 
general goals of facilitating well-functioning family relationships. Ther- 
eafter, as with marriage, deference to family privacy will translate into 
minimal state involvement for any individual family that is licensed, so 
long as the family is intact. 
d. The Licensing of Individual Families . - Once a novel family type is 
certified, a registration or licensing system, analogous to marriage licens- 
ing, would provide a means by which individual families in the novel type 
can obtain formal status. A set of simple, clear rules can be used to 
authorize licensing of all families that qualify under the certified 
category. A registration process has a number of benefits: It provides 
public acknowledgment of qualifying family categories, signaling that 
recognized relationships fulfill important social functions. Further, 
registration embodies commitment in a concrete form, reinforcing 
family-commitment norms.186 Licensing is also a means by which the 
legal obligations and rights that attend the status are clearly defined and 
assigned, providing security and certainty to family members through 
postdissolution enforcement with modest administrative and judicial 
costs.187 For example, if formal family status confers on polygamous fami- 
lies a right to share property with other family members, registration per- 
mits individual families to avoid difficult proof problems that are likely to 
accompany contractual enforcement.188 Registration reduces the risk that 
184. See Gilson, Sabei & Scott, Contract and Innovation, supra note 16, at 210-13 
(illustrating four elements in context of California LGMA) . 
185. Part III.C.l discusses how polygamous groups can adopt a best-practices r gula- 
tory framework. 
186. The public signal of family status reinforces social norms by resolving any uncer- 
tainty the community may have had about the nature of the relationship. 
187. Licensing avoids error and administrative costs that regulators face when they 
seek to evaluate individually the claims of informal aspiring families. Italso protects family 
privacy. See infra note 188 (discussing issues aspiring families face in securing rights). 
188. See Scott, Implied Contracts, upra note 126, at 332-37 (describing difficult 
proof problems faced by partners in informal unions seeking to enforce contractual 
understandings) ; see also Ira Mark Ellman, "Contract Thinking" Was Marvin1 s Fatal Flaw, 
76 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1365, 1367-73 (2001) [hereinafter Ellman, Contract Thinking] 
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exploitative individuals will succeed in enjoying the benefits of family 
relationships while avoiding reciprocal obligations (as sometimes hap- 
pens in informal unions).189 Finally, and importantly, a formal licensing 
process protects family privacy by avoiding intrusive inquiries to deter- 
mine whether an individual family embodies the qualities that justify fam- 
ily status, another cost that informal families must bear.190 
* * * 
One challenge to the proposed iterative approach is that the evolu- 
tionary process toward full legal protection could have the effect of limit- 
ing the options for family formation if fully licensed families supplant 
other less comprehensive forms. In this vein, marriage critics have 
expressed concern that same-sex couples will be channeled into marriage 
as an exclusive status that crowds out other forms of legal protection.191 
This risk must be acknowledged, but, as suggested below, the iterative 
approach is not necessarily incompatible with policies of recognizing 
more limited family relationships.192 
(arguing contract analysis nappropriate to decide issues related to intimate relationships, 
including division of property) . 
189. Ellman, Contract Thinking, supra note 188, at 1370-73. The American Law Insti- 
tute (ALI) domestic-partnership status creates marriage-like obligations between longtime 
cohabitants. Am. Law Inst., supra note 21, at §§ 6.04-.06. However, American states have 
not adopted either the Principles or the domestic-partnership status. See Michael R. 
Clisham & Robin Fretwell Wilson, American Law Institute's Principles ofthe Law of Family 
Dissolution, Eight Years After Adoption: Guiding Principle or Obligatory Footnote?, 42 
Fam. L.Q. 573, 589-95 (2008) (describing failure of states to adopt ALI Domestic Partner- 
ship Principles) . Some European countries, aswell as Canada, Australia, nd New Zealand, 
have sought to mitigate these problems by expanding legal protection to cohabitants and 
their children. See Polikoff, Beyond Marriage, supra note 1, at 111-20 (describing cohabit- 
ants' legal rights in these countries). 
190. When parties in nonmarital families seek legal recognition of their family status, 
an individualized inquiry often requires parties to provide decisionmakers with intimate 
information about their relationship, living arrangements, and intentions. See, e.g., 
Braschi v. Stahl Assoes. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 55 (N.Y. 1989) (supporting judgment with 
evidence of parties' living arrangements over time, daily schedules, joint bank accounts, 
and life-insurance-policy beneficiaries, in addition to other typically private information). 
In contrast, he acquisition of a marriage license automatically confers the rights and 
obligations of family status and allows the group freedom to arrange their lives as they wish 
without oversight and monitoring by the state. See Case, Marriage Licenses, supra note 
178, at 1765, 1771-73 (discussing freedom enjoyed by married couples). Marital obliga- 
tions are not formally enforced in intact relationships, but they provide the basis for 
property division and support after divorce. See Dukeminier tal., supra note 48, at 393- 
95 (discussing property allocation and alimony following divorce). Presumably the same 
approach would be applied to other registered families. 
191. See, e.g., Katherine M. Franke, Op-Ed., Marriage Is a Mixed Blessing, N.Y. Times 
(June 23, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/24/opinion/24franke.html (on file 
with the Columbia L w Review) (arguing New York's recognition of same-sex marriage may 
lead to abolition of domestic-partnership status) . 
192. For a discussion of options for limited family status, such as "designated benefi- 
ciary" agreements under Colorado law, see infra Part III.C.2.b. 
This content downloaded from 128.59.161.126 on Wed, 09 Dec 2015 15:06:51 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
344 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 1 15:293 
III. From Theory to Practice: The Way Forward for New Families 
The model developed in Part II describes in stylized terms the dis- 
crete stages of an evolutionary process by which novel family groups can 
use collaborative techniques to overcome the uncertainty that otherwise 
impedes legal recognition. This Part turns to real-world contexts in which 
the stages of relational novelty, isolation, and nonverifiability are largely 
overlapping and thus less sharply delineated. Part III.A shows how the 
movement toward recognition of marriage rights for gay and lesbian cou- 
ples has successfully deployed collaborative strategies in an evolutionary 
process that is broadly consistent with the model described in Part II.193 
Part III.B examines, in contrast, the somewhat puzzling failure of families 
based on informal cohabitation to attain legal recognition. We suggest 
that the complexity and variety of these relationships pose daunting 
information problems that have inhibited collaborative affiliation, 
normative integration, and legal recognition. Part III.C focuses on 
relationships not involving dyadic intimate pairs, including polyamorous, 
multigenerational, and voluntary kin groups. These aspiring family 
groups cannot be measured as readily against the template provided by 
marriage. Thus, they pose more complex governance issues than does 
the standard two-party union, and that may create challenges for the 
state in evaluating family functioning. The collaborative framework devel- 
oped in Part II highlights both the challenges and the opportunities that 
these truly novel family forms face in achieving a legal status. 
A. Same-Sex Family Relationships : From Outlaw to Mainstream 
The modern history of gay and lesbian family relationships conforms 
roughly to our account of how a novel family category evolves from out- 
sider status to full integration and legal recognition.194 Through the 
193. Of course, there are many possible accounts of the marriage-equality movement. 
Constitutional law scholars have focused on the impact of the LGBT social movement on 
constitutional cu ture. See, e.g., Balkin 8c Siegel, supra note 149, at 948 (explaining how 
LGBT social movement challenged settled constitutional practices as violating antidiscrim- 
ination principle) ; Eskridge, Channeling, supra note 93, at 423-25 (describing politics of 
recognition through which gays and lesbians (and other identity groups) employ equal- 
protection principle to gain majority rights). 
194. To be sure, the path to recognition of marriage rights for LGBT couples does not 
precisely follow the stylized three-stage process described in this Article. But the overall 
pattern largely tracks this course. Two landmark Supreme Court decisions dramatically 
mark the change in status we describe. In 1986, the Supreme Court in Bowers v.Hardwick 
upheld the constitutionality of a state antisodomy statute as applied to sexual intimacy 
between gay men. 478 U.S. 186, 189-90 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 
558 (2003). Twenty-seven years later, in United States v. Windsor , the Court struck down 
section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act on the ground that excluding same-sex couples 
married under state law from the federal definition of marriage offended the dignity of 
their relationships. 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2683-84, 2695-96 (2013). 
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1980s and well beyond, many (perhaps most) gays were closeted,195 hid- 
ing their sexual orientation and intimate relationships from family, 
friends, and colleagues to avoid harsh social and legal sanctions.196 But 
even in this hostile environment, couples cohabited in long-term 
unions197 and developed clear understandings of their mutual obliga- 
tions.198 Same-sex couples in committed relationships began to execute 
contracts to formalize their understandings regarding property sharing, 
support, inheritance, and related issues.199 Over time these couples and 
their advocates, motivated by a common goal of attaining respect and 
legal protection for their relationships, increasingly formed networks 
through their social, political, and religious affiliations.200 This movement 
contributed to greater openness about sexual orientation, stimulated 
media interest, and increased public familiarity with - and acceptance 
of - same-sex family relationships. In recent years, advocates have sought 
and won legal recognition of these unions through an incremental pro- 
195. See Glenn Chapman, Being Gay in America: A 50-Year Love Story, Raw Story 
(May 8, 2013, 7:20 AM), http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2013/05/being-gay-in-america-a-50- 
year-love-story/ (on file with the Columbia L w Review) (providing two gay interviewees' 
description of socially stigmatized lifestyle in 1950s and 1960s). 
196. See, e.g., Lawrence , 539 U.S. at 562 (describing one state's "statute [that made] it 
a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate s xual conduct" but 
that remained in force as late as 2003); Bowers, 478 U.S. at 193-94 (noting as of 1986 "24 
States and the District of Columbia continue to provide criminal penalties for sodomy 
performed in private and between consenting adults"). 
197. Mary Mendola, The Mendola Report: A New Look at Gay Couples 9-10 (1980) 
(recounting results of 1970s survey in which sixty-seven percent of same-sex-couple 
respondents defined their marital status as " [permanently committed" and eleven per- 
cent as " [1] iving with someone"); see, e.g., Anne Hull, Just Married, After 51 Years 
Together: Activist Gay Couple Accepts Leading Role, Wash. Post, Feb. 29, 2004, at Al 
(describing life of gay couple who had been together for over fifty years); Chapman, supra note 195 (same). 
198. For instance, George Chauncey's history of the movement describes gay partners 
exchanging vows in marriage ceremonies performed in the Metropolitan Community 
Church in the 1970s and 1980s. See Chauncey, supra note 19, at 91-92. 
199. See, e.g., Whorton v. Dillingham, 248 Cal. Rptr. 405, 406 (Ct. App. 1988) 
(upholding oral contract between same-sex partners in which one promised to provide 
financial support in exchange for emotional support and household services); Posik v. 
Layton, 695 So. 2d 759, 760 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (upholding written support 
agreement between same-sex partners) ; Anonymous v. Anonymous, No. 121930-2002, 2004 
WL 396492, at *8-* 10 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 9, 2004) (upholding written agreement between same-sex partners that decided division of property upon termination f relationship). 
200. The movement from isolation to broad societal acceptance is generally seen as 
starting in the 1950s with the Mattachine Society, a group of gay men in Los Angeles who wanted to create social acceptance for LGBT people. See C. Todd White, Pre-Gay L.A. 16- 18 (2009) (tracing founding of Mattachine); see also James T. Sears, Behind the Mask of 
the Mattachine 147-50 (2006) (including early Mattachine members' accounts of found- 
ing). The modern LGBT-rights movement is then seen as having started with the 
Stonewall riots in 1969. See Sam Deaderick 8c Tamara Turner, Gay Resistance: The Hidden 
History 39-40 (1997) ("Stonewall marked the beginning of saying 'NO' to all forms of gay 
oppression."). 
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cess, culminating in the largely successful (and ongoing) effort to obtain 
marriage rights. 
1. Contract and Commitment. - Throughout the twentieth century, 
gays and lesbians faced intense public animus. Until quite recently, polls 
showed that most Americans thought same-sex intimacy was immoral;201 
social and religious conservatives in the 1980s even suggested that AIDS 
was God's punishment for sinful behavior.202 Some states had criminal 
antisodomy statutes aimed at gays, until these laws were ruled unconstitu- 
tional in 2003.203 Discrimination in employment, housing, and education 
was rampant, and gays and lesbians received little protection under 
antidiscrimination laws.204 Unsurprisingly, in this environment many 
LGBT individuals chose not to publicize their sexual orientation or their 
intimate relationships, a stance that in many settings prevailed into the 
twenty-first century. 
Despite this hostile climate, many gays and lesbians found partners 
and cohabited in stable unions in the last decades of the twentieth cen- 
tury.205 Functioning in isolation from the larger society, and often from 
201. From the 1970s to the early 1990s, polls showed that between two-thirds and 
three-quarters of Americans thought gay sexual relations were "always wrong." Tom W. 
Smith, Nat'l Opinion Res. Ctr., Public Attitudes Toward Homosexuality 2 (Sept. 2011), 
available at http://www.norc.org/PDFs/201 l%20GSS%20Reports/GSS_Public%20Attitud 
es%20Toward%20Homosexuality_Sept2011.pdf (on file with the Columbia L w Review). That 
percentage dropped to forty-four pe cent by 2010. Id.; cf. Jeffrey M. Jones, Americans' 
Opposition to Gay Marriage Eases Slightly, Gallup (May 24, 2010), http://www.gallup. 
com/poll/ 1 28291 /americans-opposition-gay-marriage-eases-slightly.aspx (on file with the 
Columbia L w Review ) (noting, since 1996, support for same-sex marriage has increased 
among major political and ideological subgroups). 
202. See, e.g., Hans Johnson & William Eskridge, The Legacy of Falwell's Bully 
Pulpit - A Commentary by William Eskridge '78, Yale Law Sch. (May 19, 2007), 
http://www.law.yale.edu/news/5131.htm (on file with the Columbia L w Review) (recount- 
ing Reverend Jerry Falwell's polarizing statements concerning homosexuality). 
203. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573, 578-79 (2003) (striking down Texas sodomy 
ban as unconstitutional). Some states till have these laws in their criminal codes, but they 
do not enforce them against consenting adults. See Lauren Langlois, 12 States Still Have 
Anti-Sodomy Laws a Decade After They Were Ruled Unconstitutional, Huffington Post 
(Apr. 21, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/04/21/anti-sodomy-laws_n_51878 
95.html (on file with the Columbia L w Review) (reporting Alabama, Florida, Idaho, Kansas, 
Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, and 
Utah still have antisodomy laws "on the books"). 
204. The first nondiscrimination lawfor LGBT people was passed in Wisconsin in 
1981; the next was passed eight years later in Massachusetts. David E. Newton, Same-Sex 
Marriage: A Reference Handbook 21 (2010). These laws generated strong opposition and 
efforts orepeal. Ultimately the Supreme Court intervened inRomer v. Evans to prevent 
repeal of these laws. 517 U.S. 620, 623-24 (1996). 
205. Many relationships have become familiar through litigation, the media, historical 
accounts, and cases. See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695-96 (2013) 
(holding multidecade l sbian relationship must be recognized under federal law); Braschi 
v. Stahl Assoes. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 51, 55-56 (N.Y. 1989) (relying on evidence of same-sex 
couple's ten-year relationship to conclude they qualified as a "family"); William N. 
Eskridge, Jr. & Darren R. Spedale, Gay Marriage: For Better or for Worse? 251 (2006) 
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family, friends, and colleagues, same-sex couples constructed their rela- 
tionships in a highly uncertain environment in which they lacked legal 
protection and often social support. The evidence suggests that many 
same-sex couples had clear understandings of their mutual obligations to 
care for and support one another and to share income and property. 
Despite stresses unfamiliar to straight couples, these couples were able to 
sustain stable relationships on the basis of these understandings.206 Some 
couples in supportive communities signaled their marriage-like com- 
mitment to one another through wedding ceremonies207 even though 
neither regulators nor (often) family recognized their commitments.208 
The understandings of same-sex couples in committed relationships 
during this period can be seen as analogous to collaborative agreements 
in the business setting. These early cohabitation agreements were experi- 
mental endeavors worked out under conditions of high uncertainty. In 
this environment, collaborative commitments served to guide normative 
behavior and to build the trust and confidence that reinforces commit- 
ted relationships. But even couples who exchanged marriage vows well 
understood that their commitments were not legally enforceable. By the 
1990s, however, courts began to apply equitable remedies in cases where 
one partner had exploited the other in a grossly unfair manner. Thus, for 
example, some courts imposed constructive trusts on property held in 
legal title by one cohabitant where the other had invested large amounts 
on improvements in reliance on the relational understanding.209 These 
judicial responses resemble the limited enforcement of collaborative con- 
tracts by courts seeking to deter blatant cheating on the commitment to 
collaborate. 
Over time, as the collaborative model predicts,210 some cohabiting 
couples began to execute formal agreements creating mutually enforce- 
able property rights. Although courts first enforced agreements between 
(describing forty-year relationship of Jack Baker and Mike McConnell); Chapman, supra 
note 195 (describing fifty-year relationship). 
206. See Braschi, 543 N.E.2d at 55 (describing same-sex couple's interwoven social ives 
and shared financial commitments). See generally Mendola, supra note 197, at 41-95, 
118-35 (providing in-depth qualitative interviews ith same-sex couples). 
207. See supra note 198 (describing ceremonies). 
208. See Chauncey, supra note 19, at 98-99 (discussing pattern during AIDS crisis of 
hospitals and regulators favoring biological family of LGBT patient over partners without 
legal relationship); see also, e.g., In re Guardianship of Kowalski, 478 N.W.2d 790, 791 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1991). Karen Thompson's partner, Sharon Kowalski, was injured in a 
severe car accident. Id. Kowalski's family prevented Thompson from seeing her partner for 
several years. Id. A Minnesota appeals court ultimately ruled that Thompson was 
Kowalski's lawful guardian. Id. at 797. 
209. See, e.g., Cannisi v. Walsh, No. 6435/2005, 2006 WL 3069291, at *4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
Oct. 30, 2006) (holding lesbian partner "articulated a colorable claim for a constructive 
trust on the proceeds of the sale of the subject property"). 
210. See supra Part II. B (describing collaborative model). 
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cohabitants in the 1970s,211 few early cases involved same-sex couples. But 
by the 1990s, courts began to enforce contracts between gay and lesbian 
partners that specified mutual financial obligations and understand- 
ings.212 Indeed, cohabiting same-sex couples probably were (and are) 
more likely to execute formal contracts than their straight counterparts 
because contracting provided the only means by which same-sex couples 
could secure some of the rights and obligations that automatically follow 
from marital status.213 
2. Political Action , Public Acceptance , and Normative Integration . - By 
the 1980s and 1990s, the number of lesbian and gay families increased, 
and the need for legal protection and political advocacy became more 
pressing. Scholars agree that two developments during this period - the 
AIDS epidemic and the lesbian baby boom - motivated social and politi- 
cal actions that had far-reaching consequences.214 A critically important 
element of this process was the formation of networks by couples and 
advocates aiming to promote the rights of couples in same-sex relation- 
211. See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 122 (Cal. 1976) (holding express or 
implied agreements between cohabitants are enforceable) . 
212. See, e.g., Doe v. Burkland, 808 A.2d 1090, 1094 (R.I. 2002) ("[I]t is not illegal for 
two men to live together, much less to contract and to enter into partnerships with each 
other while doing so."); see also supra note 199 (citing cases upholding contracts between 
same-sex couples) . 
213. Couples who are not able to marry or enter civil unions frequently execute con- 
tracts regarding support, property sharing, inheritance, custody rights, guardianship, and 
other matters. Although estimating the number of such agreements is speculative, in 1995, 
it was estimated that en percent of same-sex couples had written relationship agreements. 
Margaret F. Brinig, Domestic Partnership and Default Rules, in Reconceiving the Family, 
supra note 126, at 269, 277 (reporting study). Some websites and legal documents encour- 
age same-sex couples to execute written agreements, especially in states where they lack 
other means of legal formalization. See, e.g., Model Cohabitation Agreement for Domestic 
Partners, LexisNexis Legal Newsroom: Estate and Elder Law (Oct. 5, 2010, 10:31 AM), 
http://www.lexisnexis.eom/legalnewsroom/estate-elder/b/estate-elder-blog/archive/201 
0/ 10/05/model-cohabitation-agreement-for-domestic-partners.aspx [he einafter Model 
Cohabitation Agreement] (on file with the Columbia Law Review ); Sample Domestic 
Partnership Agreement, Human Rights Campaign, www.hrc.org/files/assets/resources/ 
Domestic_Partner_Agreement.pdf (o  file with the Columbia L w Review) (last visited Feb. 
4, 2015). Even where gay couples marry or enter civil unions, they may execute contracts 
out of concern that other states will not recognize their status. Cf. Karel Raba, Note, 
Recognition a d Enforcement of Out-of-State Adoption Decrees Under the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause: The Case of Supplemental Birth Certificates, 15 Scholar 293, 303-04 (2013) 
(describing struggle of same-sex parents who adopt out of state to get revised birth 
certificates in tates where same-sex joint adoption is prohibited). 
214. See Chauncey, supra note 19, at 95-111 (identifying AIDS epidemic and lesbian 
baby boom as key catalysts stimulating marriage movement); see also Nejaime, supra note 
80, at 102 ("The HIV/AIDS epidemic brought countless gay men out of the closet, united 
lesbians and gay men behind a common cause, and profoundly shaped the organization of 
the LGBT movement."). 
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ships, in part through strategies that increased acceptance of gay and 
lesbian family life in the larger society.215 
The AIDS epidemic was a traumatic, exogenous shock that played a 
powerful role in triggering the process of social and legal reform because 
it provided stark evidence of the vulnerability of committed same-sex 
relationships when partners were required to engage with society's 
institutions. First, AIDS patients who lost their health insurance because 
they were too ill to work were not eligible for family coverage on their 
partners' plans.216 Moreover, when gay and lesbian individuals contracted 
AIDS (or, indeed, any serious illness or disability217), their partners fre- 
quently were prevented from participating in treatment decisions, acting 
as proxy medical decisionmakers, or even from planning funerals and 
memorial services, often despite decedents' express wishes.218 Surviving 
gay partners had no inheritance rights; in the absence of a will (and 
sometimes even with one), parents, siblings, and even more remote rela- 
tives acquired the deceased partner's property.219 In response to the 
plight of patients and their partners, the gay and lesbian community ral- 
lied, uniting in ways that reinforced its cohesiveness, and an energized 
corps of legal advocates mobilized to assert same-sex couples' rights.220 
The AIDS crisis effectively motivated collective action and provided a 
foundation for a powerful interest group aimed at gaining protection of 
same-sex couples' family rights. Despite the onerous cost of living openly, 
the stakes had become sufficiently high that more couples were willing to 
take the risk. 
215. See Chauncey, supra note 19, at 41-42, 47 (describing mobilization fgays, with 
large numbers coming out to friends, workmates, and families in late 1980s and 1990s); 
Newton, supra note 204, at 22-23 (describing LGBT mobilization i response to AIDS 
crisis, followed by efforts ogain rights for same-sex couples) . 
216. See Chauncey, supra note 19, at 96 (describing loss of insurance). 
217. The case of Sharon Kowalski discussed above, see supra note 208, also had a 
galvanizing impact, as it made clear how little protection gay partnerships had. See 
Chauncey, supra note 19, at 111-16 (recounting impact of Kowalski case on LGBT move- 
ment and suggesting marriage could have offered the couple legal security) . 
218. See Chauncey, supra note 19, at 99-100 (discussing difficulties same-sex partners 
have encountered in planning funerals and memorial services); William B. Rubenstein, 
We Are Family: A Reflection o  the Search for Legal Recognition of Lesbian and Gay Rela- 
tionships, 8 J.L. & Pol'y 89, 91 (1991) ("AIDS has made the lack of a legal relationship 
crushingly apparent to lesbian and gay couples: a gay man whose partner is dying of AIDS 
may have difficulty inquiring about his condition or visiting him in the hospital because 
the couple has no legal relationship to one another."). 
219. See, e.g., In re Cooper, 592 N.Y.S.2d 797, 801 (App. Div. 1993) (rejecting same-sex 
partner's claim to "surviving spouse" designation for purpose of inheritance). 
220. See Chauncey, supra note 19, at 41-42 ("AIDS also led to an unprecedented 
mobilization ofgay men and [a] . . . degree of cooperation between them and the large 
number of lesbians who played leading roles in the response to AIDS."); see also Tina 
Fetner, How the Religious Right Shaped Lesbian and Gay Activism 55-56 (2008) ("Lesbi- 
ans, though not afflicted by AIDS in large numbers, were on the front lines of [AIDS 
response] .... In dealing with this tragedy, the lesbian and gay community . . . established 
close networks oforganizations working toward common causes."). 
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In the last decades of the twentieth century, this drive for legal 
protection gained momentum from another source as well. Lesbian (and 
some gay) couples began to form families and to have and raise children, 
usually biologically related to one partner and often produced through 
sperm donation (or surrogacy arrangements).221 This trend in itself indi- 
cated the growing desire of same-sex couples to live together in commit- 
ted family relationships that, of necessity, could not function in complete 
privacy. But these families faced daunting legal challenges unknown to 
different-sex couples. The partner who lacked a biological connection 
with the child enjoyed no parental rights.222 If the legal parent died or 
became incapacitated, her parents or other relatives were likely to gain 
custody; despite having lived for years in a parent-child relationship, the 
partner became a legal stranger to the child.223 Further, if the parents 
separated, the nonbiological parent's relationship with her children con- 
tinued only with the consent of her former partner.224 Even biological 
parents lacked secure parental rights as courts in some states were pre- 
pared to find lesbians to be unfit parents on the basis of their sexual 
orientation.225 
The growing interest among gays and lesbians in forming family 
relationships, together with increased awareness of how vulnerable these 
relationships were, became a catalyst for collective action, conforming 
roughly to the collaborative processes described in Part II. During the 
last decades of the twentieth century, same-sex couples increasingly affili- 
ated through social, political, and religious networks, strengthening 
bonds within the gay community.226 Commitment ceremonies grew in po- 
221. See Melanie B. Jacobs, Micah Has One Mommy and One Legal Stranger: 
Adjudicating Maternity for Nonbiological Lesbian Coparents, 50 Buff. L. Rev. 341, 342 n.2 
(2002) (reporting as many as ten million U.S. children live in families with same-sex 
parents) . 
222. See id. at 342 ("Even though . . . lesbian couples jointly make the decision to have 
children, the party who is artificially inseminated is a legal parent because of her biological 
tie, while the other party has no legal parental role because of her lack of biological 
connection to the child."). 
223. See, e.g., T.F. v. B.L., 813 N.E.2d 1244, 1254 (Mass. 2004) (rejecting custodial 
claim of biological mother's former female partner, who had no biological relationship to 
child); Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 320 n.8 (Mass. 1993) (observing that, despite 
mother's designating her partner as child's guardian in her will, partner's custodial claim 
was vulnerable ifmother died) . 
224. See, e.g., Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 28 (N.Y. 1991) (rejecting visita- 
tion petition by lesbian de facto parent) . 
225. Divorced or unmarried custodial mothers were vulnerable to challenges by 
fathers or other relatives claiming that lesbian mothers were unfit. In a much publicized 
Virginia case, Sharon Bottoms, a lesbian mother, lost custody to her mother. Bottoms v. 
Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102, 108 (Va. 1995) (awarding custody to grandmother in part 
because "[c]onduct inherent in [mother's] lesbianism ispunishable as a Class 6 felony in 
the Commonwealth"). 
226. See supra notes 214-225 and accompanying text (discussing role of AIDS crisis 
and lesbian baby boom in promoting network formation among ays). 
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pularity, and religious couples underwent nonlegal marriage ceremonies 
before friends and family in supportive churches.227 Committed same-sex 
couples, together with their children, formed the basis of a normative 
community of families that provided social support to one another.228 
Particularly with the abolition of antisodomy laws criminalizing same-sex 
intimacy,229 these families also began to live more openly in their 
communities and had more interaction with straight neighbors, teachers, 
and others, who thus could observe their conventional character.230 
The common goal of securing legal protection for gay and lesbian 
family relationships was critically important at several levels. First, it 
served to reinforce cohesiveness within the gay community, with a grow- 
ing network of same-sex couples and their legal and political advocates 
collaborating on a common set of political and social objectives.231 As 
with the formation of collaborative business networks, this network was 
supported by the shared goals and common purposes of its members. A 
norm of cooperation and open exchange of information among network 
members was essential to the effective pursuit of legal reform. But the 
evidence suggests that the reform movement served as well to solidify 
family-commitment norms. Beginning in the 1980s with the effort to per- 
suade localities to pass domestic-partnership ordinances offering limited 
protection to gay couples, the clear strategy of the advocates who 
227. See Chauncey, supra note 19, at 91-92 (discussing how "[performing [same-sex] 
marriages was a central mission of the Metropolitan Community Church"); James N. 
Birkitt, MCC and Marriage Equality, Metro. Cmty. Churches (2013), http://mccchurch. 
org/overview/history-of-mcc/mcc-and-marriage-equality/ (on file with the Columbia L w 
Review) (describing early Metropolitan Community Church marriage ceremonies). 
228. See Amanda K. Baumle et al., Same-Sex Partners 84-91 (2009) (discussing rea- 
sons LOBT people interact and may choose to live in predominantly LGBT neighbor- 
hoods) . The formation ofa social community began even before the catalyst of the AIDS 
crisis triggered a more activist approach. See, e.g., Katherine Turk, "Our Militancy Is in 
Our Openness": Gay Employment Rights Activism inCalifornia and the Question of Sex- 
ual Orientation i Sex Equality Law, 31 Law & Hist. Rev. 423, 432-33 (2013) (describing 
early formation of social networks among gays and lesbians, together with organizations 
like Mattachine Society and Daughters of Bili tis in 1950s). 
229. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577-78 (2003) (finding criminal statute 
prohibiting sodomy unconstitutional). 
230. Much evidence supports the contention that positive attitudes follow when 
straights have personal association with gays. See infra note 237 (citing polling data and 
scholarship supporting this contention). Surveys show that the percentage of the popula- 
tion that has personal relationships with gays has increased dramatically in the last twenty 
years. See, k.g., Pew Research Ctr., In Gay Marriage Debate, Both Supporters and Oppo- 
nents See Legal Recognition as Inevitable 14 (2013) [hereinafter Pew Research Ctr., Gay 
Marriage Debate], available at http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/06-06-13%20 
LGBT%20General%20Public%20Release.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) 
(reporting eighty-seven percent of Americans know a gay individual, compared to sixty- 
one percent wenty years ago) . 
231. See Fetner, supra note 220, at 46 (discussing change resulting in "[t]he most 
influential organizations in the movement [being] entrenched in a battle for equal 
rights"). 
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emerged to lead the political and legal movement (the norm entrepre- 
neurs) was to define the relationships of same-sex couples as being like 
marriage and not like those of different-sex couples who chose not to 
marry:232 Advocates described same-sex couples seeking relationship 
recognition as being in committed, financially dependent unions like 
their married counterparts. Thus, the state's decision to exclude these 
couples from benefits that married couples enjoyed was unfair 
discrimination.233 This strategy, in effect, both defined the norms for 
same-sex family relationships and encouraged conformity to those norms 
as the means to attain the community's legal goals.234 
The movement to gain legal protection of same-sex family relation- 
ships also contributed importantly to the transformation of public atti- 
tudes about these relationships and ultimately about same-sex marriage. 
To be sure, changes were not immediate. Although the AIDS epidemic 
awakened in the gay community a realization of the importance of legal 
reform, public anxiety about AIDS in the 1980s seemed to intensify 
hostility toward gay and lesbian relationships.235 But, in our view, 
collaboration within the community on political and legal goals and 
consensus about the means to achieve them contributed both indirectly 
and directly to public acceptance of same-sex relationships.236 The suc- 
232. Douglas Nejaime makes this point in describing the strategy of advocates seeking 
to acquire domestic-partnership status for same-sex couples in Los Angeles and San 
Francisco in the 1990s: 
[T]o achieve nonmarital recognition, advocates appealed to marriage's 
conventions, pointed to the unique exclusion of same-sex couples from 
marriage, and stressed same-sex couples' commonality with married cou- 
ples. In building domestic partnership, they emphasized marital 
norms - such as adult romantic affiliation, mutual emotional commit- 
ment, and economic interdependence - capable of including same-sex 
couples. By challenging marriage's primacy while arguing for recogni- 
tion in terms defined by marital norms, advocates contested, accepted, 
and ultimately shaped the institution fmarriage while simultaneously 
portraying same-sex relationships as marriage-like. 
Nejaime, supra note 80, at 113. 
233. Id. 
234. As William Eskridge explains, the constitutional equal-protection framework de- 
ployed by legal advocates intrinsically has propelled gay-rights activists oward an integra- 
tive approach, since it is based on a claim that same-sex couples were similarly situated to 
opposite sex couples but denied equal treatment. See Eskridge, Channeling, supra note 
93, at 480 ("[(Constitutional doctrine not only channels the energies of these social move- 
ments . . . but also channels their hetoric and perhaps even their ideologies into the fur- 
rows plowed by judges and law professors."). 
235. Gallup polls during the peak of the AIDS crisis from 1986 to 1988 consistently 
found that over fifty percent of respondents hought that sex between same-sex partners 
should be illegal, a marked rise from previous years. See Gay and Lesbian Rights, Gallup, 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/1651/gay-lesbian-rights.aspx (on file with the Columbia L w 
Review) (last visited Feb. 4, 2015). 
236. To be sure, many advocates in the gay community regret the priority given to 
attaining marriage rights as well as the assimilative strategy adopted to shift public opin- 
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cess of the marriage-equality movement required effective engagement 
with mainstream society. In part, this happened informally as more les- 
bian and gay couples came out, signaling the quality of their relation- 
ships to the straight community; in turn, that community became 
familiar with same-sex couples living together (often with their children) 
in conventional family relationships. Research studies clearly indicate 
that personal association with gay and lesbian individuals as friends, fam- 
ily members, colleagues, and neighbors is strongly correlated with posi- 
tive attitudes and support for marriage equality.237 Gays and lesbians 
coming out dispelled fears held by many straights: Two adults raising 
their children in a loving and supportive family was hardly a threatening 
image. The softening of public attitudes, in turn, made it easier for les- 
bian and gay families to live more openly, further reinforcing the trend 
toward public acceptance.238 
The strategies of legal and political advocates and the behavior of 
gay and lesbian couples who became the public face of the marriage- 
equality movement also were critical to the process of changing public 
attitudes. Advocates understood their role as norm entrepreneurs and 
chose their clients carefully;239 most petitioners had compelling histories 
of long-term, committed relationships.240 In various ways, advocates, peti- 
tioners, and other couples highlighted by the media signaled to the 
ion. See Franke, Marriage Politics, supra note 71, at 237-42 (challenging movement's 
focus on marriage); Nancy D. Polikoff, Commentary, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why 
Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Marriage Will Not "Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender 
in Every Marriage," 79 Va. L. Rev. 1535, 1549 (1993) (opposing strategy emphasizing 
similarities between "our relationships and heterosexual marriages"); William B. 
Rubenstein, Divided We Litigate: Addressing Disputes Among Group Members and Law- 
yers in Civil Rights Campaigns, 106 Yale L.J. 1623, 1635 (1997) (arguing advocating 
marriage is "contrary to . . . 'the affirmation f gay identity and culture"' (quoting 
Ettelbrick, supra note 71, at 14)); see also Ettelbrick, supra note 71, at 16 (arguing same- 
sex marriage "would undermine our movement to recognize many different kinds of 
relationships"). 
237. See Pew Research Ctr., Gay Marriage Debate, supra note 230, at 16 ("68% of 
those who know a lot of gays and lesbians . . . say they support same-sex marriage."); see 
also Public Opinion and Constitutional Controversy 201 (Nathaniel Persily, Jack Citrin & 
Patrick J. Egan eds., 2008) ("As more Americans have come to realize that they do know 
gay people, they have also become more comfortable with them."). 
238. Pew Research Ctr., A Survey of LGBT Americans: Attitudes, Experiences, and 
Values in Changing Times 32, 34 (2013), available at http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/ 
files/2013/06/SDT_LGBT-Americans_06-2013.pdf (on file with the Columbia L w Review) 
(reporting ninety-two percent of LGBT individuals say society is more accepting of them 
than a decade ago, and attributing change to individuals knowing and interacting with 
LGBT persons, to the efforts ofadvocates, and to LGBT couples raising families) . 
239. See Nejaime, supra note 80, at 123 (describing strategy of emphasizing marriage- like quality of gay relationships as contrasted with unmarried straight couples) . 
240. See, e.g., Robert Barnes, Gay Marriage at the Supreme Court: A 'Real Couple' Behind Prop 8 Challenge, Wash. Post (Mar. 9, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
politics/gay-marriage-at-the-supreme-court-a-real-couple-behind-prop-8-challenge/2013/0 
3/09/ 39ddl2f0-869e-lle2-98a3-b3db6b9ac586_story.html ( n file with the Columbia Law 
Review ) (discussing relationship of couple challenging California's Proposition 8). 
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larger community the marriage-like quality of same-sex relationships.241 
The clear message was that if gays and lesbians were actually allowed to 
marry, couples that chose this option could be expected to conform to 
stabilizing family norms embraced by the larger community. Media 
reports confirmed that the desire of gay and lesbian partners to under- 
take formal commitment through marriage was motivated by the same 
sentiments and goals as those of straight couples. As Edie Windsor, who 
successfully challenged the constitutionality of DOMA's exclusion of 
same-sex spouses from federal benefits,242 famously remarked, 
"[M]arriage is this magic thing .... [It] symbolizes commitment and love 
like nothing else in the world."243 Eighty-four-year old Windsor and the 
story of her decades-long relationship with Thea Spyer became world 
famous; TIME magazine named her a runner-up as the 2013 Person of 
the Year.244 In our view, the success of the marriage-equality movement 
owes a great deal to the impact on public and lawmakers' opinion of the 
stories of petitioners such as Windsor. Without these stories, it is unclear 
whether the powerful legal arguments made on the petitioners' behalf 
would have succeeded.245 
This account of the gay and lesbian movement to attain marriage 
rights tracks the evolutionary process from isolation to integration 
described in Part II. Couples and their advocates collaborated in forming 
normative communities with the common aim of gaining social recogni- 
tion and legal protection of gay and lesbian families, and these networks 
reinforced and supported their family relationships. Partly through the 
strategies of advocates, same-sex couples signaled effectively to the larger 
241. See id. (describing "remarkably normal" couple involved in Proposition 8 chal- 
lenge) . Attractive and nonthreatening couples petitioning for legal equality, registering for 
civil unions, and applying for marriage licenses came to represent all lesbian and gay 
families subject to legal discrimination. Cf.Franke, Marriage Politics, supra note 71, at 
239-40 (raising objections to prioritization of same-sex marriage recognition in marriage- 
equality movement) . 
242. In United States v. Windsor , the Court struck down DOMA's section 3, which lim- 
ited the applications of provisions under federal law relating to marriages of different-sex 
couples. 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695-96 (2013). 
243. Nina Totenberg, Meet the 83-Year-Old Taking On the U.S. over Same-Sex Mar- 
riage, NPR (Mar. 21, 2013, 4:36 PM), http://www.npr.org/2013/03/21/174944430/meet- 
the-83-year-old-taking-on-the-u-s-over-same-sex-marriage (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review) . 
244. Eliza Gray, Edith Windsor, the Unlikely Activist, TIME (Dec. 11, 2013), http:// 
poy.time.com/2013/12/ll/runner-up-edith-windsor-the-unlikely-activist (on file with the 
Columbia L w Review ); see also Adam Gabbatt, Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer: 'A Love 
Affair that Just Kept On and On and On,' Guardian (June 26, 2013), http://www.theguar 
dian.com/world/2013/jun/26/edith-windsor-thea-spyer-doma (on file with the Columbia 
Law Review) (describing relationship). 
245. Roberta Kaplan, attorney for Edie Windsor, described the importance of 
Windsor's personal story to the success of the constitutional litigation. Roberta A. Kaplan, 
"It's All About Edie, Stupid": Lessons from Litigating United States v. Windsor (Feb. 28, 
2014) (transcript on file with the Columbia L w Review). 
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community that they lived in conventional, marriage-like relationships, 
caring for each other and for their children. This process has led to a 
dramatic shift in public attitudes; by 2013, a majority of Americans 
approved of marriage rights for same-sex couples.246 In many parts of the 
country, the social status of committed same-sex couples has evolved in a 
generation from that of isolated outsiders or even outlaws to families who 
are integrated into the broader normative community. 
3. Incremental Progress Toward Legal Recognition. - Although the 
stages of the collaborative process described in Part II are usefully sepa- 
rated for analytic purposes, one would expect the networking-social- 
acceptance stage and the legal-recognition stage to overlap substantially; 
this overlap has certainly characterized the marriage-equality movement. 
As explained above, the realization that same-sex unions were legally vul- 
nerable directly led to the creation and strengthening of LGBT net- 
works.247 Moreover, signaling the marriage-like qualities of same-sex fam- 
ily relationships, which contributed to social acceptance, was partly a 
legal strategy; the evidence suggests that this signaling furthered legal 
claims, reassured lawmakers, and influenced public opinion.248 Finally, 
the extension of legal protections has had a powerful expressive effect, 
legitimating gay relationships and reinforcing positive public attitudes.249 
In the past decade, of course, the dynamic synergy between evolving pub- 
lic attitudes and legal reform has been extraordinary.250 
Incremental progress toward full legal recognition of same-sex cou- 
ples' family relationships began in the late 1980s and continues today. In 
the early period, LGBT legal advocates enjoyed limited successes; a few 
courts recognized gay or lesbian couples as de facto families for particu- 
246. See Lydia Saad, In U.S., 52% Back Law to Legalize Gay Marriage in 50 States, 
Gallup (July 29, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/163730/back-law-legalize-marriage- 
states.aspx (on file with the Columbia Law Review ) (providing polling showing majority 
support for same-sex-marriage ri hts) . 
247. See supra notes 214-230 and accompanying text (discussing this trend). 
248. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013) (discussing "aspects of 
married and family life" embodied in many same-sex relationships); supra Part II.A.2 (dis- 
cussing positive effects of social acceptance of same-sex family relationships) . 
249. See supra note 169 and accompanying text (discussing expressive function of 
law). 
250. The views of lawmakers changed in response to public opinion, of course, but 
also sometimes a a result of personal experience. See Richard Socarides, Rob Portman 
and His Brave, Gay Son, New Yorker (Mar. 15, 2013), http:// www.newyorker.com/online/ 
blogs/ newsdesk/ 201 3/03/ rob-portman-and-his-brave-gay-son (on file with the Columbia 
Law Review) (noting Senator Rob Portman changed his mind in favor of same-sex 
marriage after his son came out); Robin Toner, Cheney Stakes Out His Own Position on 
Gay Marriage, N.Y. Times (Aug. 25, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/25/pol 
itics/campaign/25cheney.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing Dick 
Cheney's shift in opinion on marriage equality after acknowledging sexuality of his lesbian 
daughter) . 
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lar purposes,251 and cities such as New York and San Francisco allowed 
gay and lesbian couples (and sometimes others) to register as domestic 
partners, a status that carried symbolic meaning but few benefits.252 In 
the mid and late 1990s, a handful of state legislatures enacted laws creat- 
ing registration systems that conferred a somewhat broader array of 
rights and benefits.253 Following the Vermont Supreme Court opinion in 
Baker v. State in 1999, 254 several states enacted civil-union statutes allowing 
same-sex couples to register for a status that closely mirrored marriage in 
its tangible benefits and obligations but lacked its respected status.255 In 
2003, the Supreme Court held antisodomy laws unconstitutional in 
Lawrence v. Texas ,256 removing a major obstacle to safe family formation 
for same-sex couples. Thereafter, beginning in 2003 with the 
Massachusetts case of Goodridge v. Department of Public Health , courts and 
legislatures have extended the right to marry to same-sex couples.257 To- 
day, thirty-six states and the District of Columbia recognize this right.258 
251. See E.N.O. v. 711 N.E.2d 886, 893-94 (Mass. 1999) (holding lesbian part- 
ner to be de facto parent); Braschi v. Stahl Assoes. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 55 (N.Y. 1989) 
(holding ay couple to be de facto family) . 
252. See Nejaime, supra note 80, at 142-46 (describing efforts o enact domestic- 
partnership ordinances in Los Angeles and San Francisco); see also Raymond C. O'Brien, 
Domestic Partnership: Recognition and Responsibility, 32 San Diego L. Rev. 163, 184 
(1995) (describing New York City ordinance extending "health benefits o both homosex- 
ual and heterosexual domestic partners"). Different-sex couples were allowed to register 
under some domestic-partnership ordinances, but the purpose was to extend some 
recognition to gay and lesbian couples. See, e.g., id. (noting in New York City, benefits 
were originally "contemplated only for homosexual couples" but were eventually also 
extended to heterosexual domestic partners). 
253. Hawaii and California were two such states. Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 572C-1, 572C- 
6 (LexisNexis 2010) (creating reciprocal beneficiary status); see In re Marriage Cases, 183 
P.3d 384, 413 (Cal. 2008) (describing 1999 California legislation creating statewide 
domestic-partnership status) . 
254. 744 A.2d 864, 886, 889 (Vt. 1999) (holding ban on same-sex marriage violated 
Common Benefits Clause of state constitution). 
255. Vermont responded to Baker by enacting a comprehensive civil-union statute, as 
did several other states over the next decade. Misha Isaak, Comment, "What's in a 
Name?": Civil Unions and the Constitutional Significance of "Marriage," 10 U. Pa. J. 
Const. L. 607, 640-42 (2008) (describing states' enactment of civil unions and domestic 
partnerships, with many, but not all, rights of marriage). 
256. 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
257. 798 N.E.2d 941, 957 (Mass. 2003) (finding right to marriage for same-sex couples 
in state). 
258. 36 States with Legal Gay Marriage and 14 States with Same-Sex Marriage Bans, 
ProCon.org, http://gaymarriage.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=004857 (on 
file with the Columbia L w Review) (last updated Jan. 13, 2015, 8:14 AM). This number con- 
tinues to change; for an updated list, see National Status Maps, Marriage Equality USA, 
http://www.marriageequality.org/national_maps (  file with the Columbia Law Review) 
(last visited Feb. 4, 2015). Prior to October 6, 2014, nineteen states and the District of 
Columbia recognized same-sex marriage. Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Delivers Tacit Win 
to Gay Marriage, N.Y. Times (Oct. 6, 2014), http://nytimes.com/2014/10/07/us/denying- 
review-justices-clear-way-for-gay-marriage-in-5-states.html (o  file with the Columbia Law 
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This account is familiar and need not be repeated in detail. For the 
purposes of this Article, three aspects of the regulatory history are 
important. First, as predicted in the model set out in Part II, the process 
was iterative, allowing lawmakers to gain information incrementally 
about the functioning of same-sex unions to determine whether these 
groups provided the stability and capacity to fulfill family functions. In 
this way, lawmakers were able to meet the challenge of verifying that an 
aspiring family group that had been the target of hostility and disparage- 
ment deserved legal protection. Courts and legislatures evaluated the 
claim by marriage opponents that children raised by gay and lesbian par- 
ents faced harms not experienced by children raised by married par- 
ents - and that therefore, these couples lacked the qualities to function 
adequately as families.259 Evidence of same-sex couples raising their chil- 
dren satisfactorily accumulated over time, along with scientific studies 
indicating that the opponents' claim was groundless.260 This information 
greatly weakened the argument against extending the right to marry to 
gay and lesbian couples since few disputed that, in the absence of 
particular harm, children benefited if their parents were able to enjoy 
the benefits of marriage.261 
The second key feature of the process by which legal rights were 
extended to gay couples suggests another way in which regulators and 
advocates collaborated to produce the information necessary to evaluate 
this group of aspiring families. From the beginning, even when the rights 
sought and conferred were meager, marriage has provided the template 
of best practices against which both advocates and regulators have mea- 
sured same-sex relationships. As Douglas Nejaime demonstrates in his 
Review) (describing Supreme Court's October 6th ruling). On October 6, 2014, the 
Supreme Court let stand five federal circuit court opinions holding state bans of same-sex 
marriage unconstitutional. Id. Other states in these federal circuits are bound by these 
holdings, increasing the number of states allowing same-sex couples to marry. Id. 
259. This ubiquitous claim was made recently in the briefs of the state of Utah appeal- 
ing a district ourt's holding that its statute restricting marriage to different sex couples is 
unconstitutional. See State Defendants' Reply in Support of Motion for Stay Pending 
Appeal at 9, Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (D. Utah 2013) (No. 2:13-cv-217), 
2013 WL 7175328 ("[M]an-woman marriage promotes the State's compelling interest in 
the care and well-being of children (and society) by facilitating responsible procreation 
and the ideal mode of child-rearing."). 
260. See, e.g., Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 948 (N.D. Cal. 2010) 
(evaluating and rejecting claims by plaintiffs that "children raised by their married, 
biological parents do better on average than children raised in other environments"), 
aff'd sub nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded sub 
nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013); see also Goodridge , 798 N.E.2d at 962- 
64 (rejecting state's claim that children raised by gay parents suffered harm). 
261. For example, David Blankenhorn, the advocate who argued in Perry v. 
Schwarzenegger that children were harmed by same-sex parents, abandoned his position in 
2012 (on the ground that children benefited from the stability of marriage). Ethan 
Bronner, Gay Marriage Gains Backer as Major Foe Revises Views, N.Y. Times (June 22, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/23/us/david-blankenhorn-drops-opposition-to-ga 
y-marriage.html (on file with the Columbia L w Review). 
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interesting study of LGBT-rights advocacy in California in the 1980s and 
1990s, advocates and couples argued consistently in different legal set- 
tings that same-sex unions were marriage-equivalent and different from 
the casual affiliations of heterosexual couples who chose not to marry.262 
Moreover, lawmakers required, as a condition of even limited legal 
recognition, that qualifying relationships be marriage-like. Under 
California domestic-partnership ordinances and statutes, for example, 
domestic partners were defined as two individuals, not related by blood 
or marriage, who '"share the common necessaries of life"'263 and 
'"declare that they are each other's principal domestic partner."'264 As 
Nejaime points out, the language reflected an effort to define the 
responsibilities and commitment of domestic partners as equivalent to 
those of married couples.265 
Two important purposes were served by defining domestic partner- 
ships as marriage-equivalent. First, domestic-partnership status provided 
same-sex couples with another and clearer means of signaling the quality 
of their relationships, expediting the process of public acceptance. Regis- 
tration as domestic partners may have carried few tangible benefits, but 
the act announced to the world that couples were in a committed 
interdependent relationship. Second, domestic-partnership and civil- 
union registration has some similarity to the collaborative "best prac- 
tices" process described in Part II: The aspiring couples provided infor- 
mation to the state about how they planned to fulfill their family 
functions, the parties collectively established benchmarks that embodied 
their expectations for the support and care of family members, and law- 
makers could use domestic-partnership registration by same-sex couples 
to monitor compliance with advocates' claims that many gay couples 
lived in marriage-like unions.266 
The third aspect of the process of legal reform that merits attention 
is the extent to which lawmakers have conferred legal protection of same- 
sex relationships through registration and licensing, rather than through 
judicial recognition of informal unions. Although de facto parents have 
had some success in obtaining visitation rights in custody disputes, only 
262. See Nejaime, supra note 80, at 114-21 (describing approaches of domestic- 
partnership advocates in Northern a d Southern California) . 
263. Id. at 119 (quoting Memorandum from Human Relations &Welfare Comm'n to 
Hon. Mayor & Members of the City Council 20 (July 17, 1984)). This language was based 
on California c se law defining marital obligations. Id. at 117. 
264. Id. at 115 (quoting An Ordinance to Create a Record of Domestic Partnerships 
(Draft) (1982)). 
265. Id. 
266. Thus, for example, if most domestic partnerships failed, advocates' claims about 
the nature of these unions would have been weakened. Of course, not all aspiring families 
are modeled on marriage. This suggests that some novel family groups may face different 
challenges as they seek legal recognition and that regulators may also need to adopt 
different verification strategies to evaluate these groups. This issue is addressed below in 
Part III.C. 
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rarely in the past decade have courts and legislatures conferred rights 
and obligations on same-sex couples living in informal unions. The ALI 
Domestic Partnership Principles, under which couples living in informal 
unions are subject to the inter se rights and duties of marriage, have 
gained little traction.267 Given the momentum toward greater legal 
protection of same-sex relationships, this may seem surprising. But as 
suggested in Part II, a licensing approach has many advantages. Registra- 
tion is an efficient and privacy-protective mechanism for resolving the 
daunting verifiability problems faced by lawmakers aiming to offer family 
benefits only to those groups that fulfill family functions. By allowing cou- 
ples to signal that their relationship is based on mutual commitment and 
responsibility, registration assists regulators in distinguishing unions that 
warrant legal protection from more casual affiliations without costly 
probing inquiries. 
B. The Incomplete Recognition of Cohabitation Relationships 
Although LGBT-rights advocates have enjoyed considerable success 
in attaining legal recognition of same-sex family relationships, informally 
cohabiting couples in this country have received few legal protections.268 
Public hostility or ignorance about cohabitation cannot explain lawmak- 
ers' failure to confer legal protection on cohabitants; surveys indicate 
substantial tolerance of informal unions.269 Yet many couples live to- 
gether in marriage-like relationships with few of the state benefits associ- 
ated with marriage and without the obligations to one another that pro- 
tect spouses on divorce. The analysis in Part I suggests that a liberal 
society should confer legal protection on all groups that fulfill family 
functions satisfactorily. Why then have same-sex couples been so success- 
ful in attaining the legal benefits awarded to families while cohabitants 
have largely been left unprotected? 
267. See Clisham & Wilson, supra note 189, at 610 (reporting no state has adopted ALI domestic-partnership status); supra note 189 (discussing ALI domestic partners' rights and obligations). 
268. For a discussion of the very limited legal protections enjoyed by unmarried cou- 
ples, see Ellman et al., supra note 52, at 967-73. Some have criticized the limited availabil- 
ity of legal protections and have proposed reform. See Polikoff, Beyond Marriage, supra note 1, at 3-4 (describing and critiquing lack of legal protection of unmarried couples); 
Cherlin, supra note 69, at 292-94 (proposing reater legal protection for cohabiting par- 
ents); Ann Laquer Estin, Ordinary Cohabitation, 76Notre Dame L. Rev. 1381, 1383-84 
(2001) (describing absence of rights and obligations between cohabitants); Weiner, supra note 58, at 160 (arguing for increased rights and obligations between unmarried parents). 
As Polikoff has noted, unmarried couples in Canada and other countries have 
been more successful inattaining legal protections. Polikoff, Beyond Marriage, supra note 
1, at 111-20. 
269. See Pew Research Ctr., The Decline of Marriage, supra note 7, at 7-8 (finding 
majority of public is either neutral or positive about cohabitation (including unmarried 
couples raising children)). 
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Our analysis of the impediments facing aspiring families and the 
means of overcoming these obstacles through collaboration sheds light 
on this puzzle. Two interrelated features of cohabitation have impeded 
progress toward legal recognition and left cohabitants with few of the 
legal rights and duties conferred on protected families. First, the cate- 
gory of cohabitants includes a broad range of couples with varying inten- 
tions for their relationships. Some cohabiting relationships are based on 
enduring commitment and interdependence; for psychological or 
ideological reasons, these couples have chosen not to enter legal mar- 
riage.270 Other couples are experimental and tentative in their commit- 
ment; they may or may not develop into long-term family relationships. 
Still other cohabitants affirmatively reject commitment and financial 
interdependence: Indeed, this is a significant reason not to marry.271 Of 
course, this variability might describe gay and lesbian unions as well. But 
the difference, emphasized by LGBT-rights advocates, is the second 
feature of cohabitation that has complicated the path to family recogni- 
tion. The decision not to marry when marriage is an option sends a 
confusing signal about the nature of cohabitants' relationships and the 
extent to which they are defined by family-commitment norms. This 
uncertainty impedes the sorting of those informal unions that serve fam- 
ily functions adequately from more casual relationships that do not. The 
uncertain signal created by the choice not to marry, together with the 
variability among cohabiting couples, has hindered network formation 
and normative integration; it also poses challenging verifiability problems 
for regulators. In short, the defining features of cohabitation as a cate- 
gory create the uncertainty that has inhibited progress toward legal 
recognition. 
1. Cohabitation and Norm Creation : Networking and Integration. - 
Researchers have found that cohabitants have lower levels of commit- 
ment to their relationships than do married couples;272 perhaps for this 
reason, informal unions typically are far less stable than marriages. This 
is partly due, of course, to the diversity among cohabiting couples 
described above. For many couples, cohabitation is experimental, a way 
for each cohabitant to evaluate whether the relationship is viable and the 
other party a trustworthy and compatible life partner. Thus, within three 
270. Contractual claims for property and support are often brought by parties whose 
informal union was marriage-like. See Friedman v.Friedman, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 892, 901 (Ct. 
App. 1993) (rejecting support claim by partner at dissolution of twenty-five-year relation- 
ship with two children). 
271. See Judith Seltzer, Families Formed Outside of Marriage, 62 J. Marriage 8c Fam. 
1247, 1250 (2000) (noting relationship between couples' economic goals and attitudes to- 
ward marriage) . 
272. See supra notes 73-74 (discussing relationship outcomes of cohabiting couples); 
see also Stephen L. Nock, A Comparison of Marriages and Cohabiting Relationships, 16 J. 
Fam. Issues 53, 56-58 (1995) (noting lower levels of commitment i  cohabiting couples). 
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years, many informal unions either end or transition to marriage.273 Like 
same-sex couples, some different-sex couples may deal with the uncer- 
tainty of their relationships by entering into collaborative contracts in the 
early experimental phase. But as other scholars have noted, cohabiting 
couples infrequently execute formal contracts regarding property shar- 
ing and future support: Plausibly this is because many couples who 
collaborate successfully see marriage as a superior option to formal 
contracting.274 
Unlike the pattern observed among same-sex couples, there is little 
evidence that cohabiting couples generally affiliate in normative 
communities that support and reinforce their family relationships. This 
also is likely due to the variations among cohabitant relationships. Cou- 
ples who eschew commitment likely have little in common with those in 
long-term, marriage-like unions (who indeed may present to the commu- 
nity as married couples).275 Moreover, social class plays a role in cohabita- 
tion patterns, with poor and less educated couples being more likely to 
dissolve their relationships and less likely to marry before having chil- 
dren than those who are more educated.276 This diversity likely deters the 
development of collaborative networks that reinforce behavioral expecta- 
tions promoting care and interdependence. Stephen Nock has argued 
that, in contrast to marriage, cohabitation is "under-institutionalized," 
lacking a strong set of stabilizing social norms.277 Consistent expectations 
273. The National Survey of Family Growth found that forty percent of first cohabita- 
tion transitioned to marriage by three years. Copen, Daniels 8c Mosher, supra note 73, at 5. 
Many of these cohabiting couples likely are determining whether they want o undertake a 
more serious commitment to one another. Almost half of the relationships that did not 
transition tomarriage (twenty-seven p rcent of the total group) dissolved in three years; 
thirty-two percent were intact at three years. Id. 
274. See Ellman, Contract Thinking, supra note 188, at 1375 (describing successful 
marriages as not "based upon parties' compliance with any agreement explicit enough in 
its terms for the law sensibly to treat it as a contract"). Same-sex couples who cannot marry 
are often advised to execute contracts oafford legal protection to their relationships. See, 
e.g., Model Cohabitation Agreement, supra note 213. Different-sex couples have the 
option of formalizing their commitment through marriage, which many do. Cf. Ellman, 
Contract Thinking, supra note 188, at 1380 (noting same-sex couples' greater interest in 
contract due to unavailability of marriage). 
275. See Friedman, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 894 (describing situation in which associates 
thought couple in twenty-one-year rel tionship were married) . 
276. See Carbone 8c Cahn, supra note 68, at 13-20 (providing general discussion of 
role of social class in cohabitation patterns); see also Edin 8c Kefalas, supra note 69, at 
104-37 (discussing attitudes toward marriage among poor women); cf. Vivian E. 
Hamilton, Family Structure, Children, and Law, 24 Wash. U. J.L. 8c Pol'y 9, 14 n.22 (2007) 
("[Cļhildren in . . . cohabiting families are almost hree times as likely to be poor as chil- 
dren in married-parent families." (quoting Adam Thomas 8c Isabel Sawhill, For Love and 
Money? The Impact of Family Structure on Family Income, Future Child., Fall 2005, at 57, 
63)). 
277. See Nock, supra note 272, at 55 (describing cohabitation as underinstitution- 
alized) . 
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for cohabitants' behavior or goals would fit poorly with the broad range 
of relationships in the category. 
Nor do we find evidence that groups of cohabitants or their advo- 
cates collaborate to further their common interest in attaining legal 
protection. Cohabitants experience most of the legal disadvantages that 
same-sex couples have suffered: They are excluded from government 
benefits conferred on married couples and other legal protections; 
moreover, absent contract, the parties have few obligations to one 
another.278 Yet the response to these exclusions has been relatively pas- 
sive. To be sure, advocates for poor families, which include many 
cohabitants and their children, seek generally to better lives strained by 
poverty. But these efforts focus largely on improving child welfare and 
not directly on extending legal recognition to cohabitants.279 There 
appears to be no evidence of network formation aimed at extending legal 
protection to cohabitation as a family category. Perhaps this is because 
the vulnerability of nonmarital unions can easily be remedied by mar- 
riage. Straight couples likely sometimes marry to avoid the frustration 
and harms of nonmarital status, even if their preference might be to con- 
tinue to cohabitate. Those cohabitants who do not marry must solve a 
difficult collective-action problem if they are to pursue legal recognition 
and protection of their nonmarital families. 
The process of normative integration into the larger community also 
has not proceeded in a way that would position cohabitants to attain legal 
protection. The LGBT drive to attain family rights was instrumental in 
fostering normative integration of same-sex couples into the broader 
community and in shaping public attitudes about the character of their 
family relationships. Cohabitants are not subject to the hostility that 
same-sex couples endured; thus, in some sense, informal families already 
enjoy public acceptance. But this does not translate into public support 
for elevating cohabitants to the status of fully protected legal families. 
This is not surprising since cohabitants have not signaled their commit- 
ment to family-functioning norms. Instead, the wide range of cohabiting 
relationships means that the signals are noisy: Couples in casual or tenta- 
tive relationships do not signal long-term commitment while many cou- 
ples in durable and committed unions often do not announce their 
unmarried status at all.280 
2. Cohabitation and the Verifiability Problem. - Even if cohabitants 
formed networks to advocate for legal recognition of their families, 
278. See Ellman et al., supra note 52, at 967-73 (describing cohabitants' lack of legal 
protections enjoyed by spouses); supra text accompanying otes 48-58 (discussing legal 
rights, obligations, and benefits of marriage not conferred on cohabitants) . 
279. See McLanahan 8c Garfinkel, supra note 27, at 149, 154-57 (presenting evidence 
of poorer outcomes in child development and health in children born to unmarried par- 
ents and arguing for various reforms) . 
280. See Friedman , 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 894-95 (describing situation in which associates 
assumed long-term cohabitants were married) . 
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regulators would face difficulty in verifying cohabitation as a family cate- 
gory. The broad range of cohabitants includes many couples who lack 
the qualities of well-functioning families but who may seek family status 
with its benefits and privileges. Coresidency in an intimate union is 
unlikely by itself to serve as an adequate basis for designating informal 
dyads as families, and sorting couples in committed relationships from 
less deserving types poses a challenge for regulators. Because informal 
unions lack the clear commitment signal provided by registration,281 
accurate determination of family status requires a costly factual inquiry 
that threatens privacy282 and is prone to error. Courts have occasionally 
been willing to make these determinations, but typically it has been in 
situations where simpler mechanisms for signaling family status are 
unavailable.283 As the lukewarm response to the ALI Domestic Partner- 
ship Principles demonstrates, state actors resort only reluctantly to this ex 
post approach to determining family status.284 
Some cohabiting couples are clearly in family relationships, and 
regulators may be able to employ a few straightforward proxies to mini- 
mize verifiability problems. For example, biological parenthood could 
serve as a basis for creating family bonds between cohabiting parents. 
Currently, unmarried parents living together have no financial or other 
duties to one another, although both parents have substantial obligations 
to their children. The combination of shared parenthood and cohabita- 
tion could function as a verifiable proxy subjecting the couple to family 
obligations and entitling them to the benefits that legal families enjoy.285 
Cohabitants can also be classified on the basis of the duration of their 
unions. Most cohabiting couples separate or marry in a few years: A cou- 
ple who live together for five years or more can be assumed to be in a 
marriage-like relationship, with the attendant rights and duties, unless 
they opt out contractually from family obligations.286 Well-designed prox- 
ies such as these would allow regulators to sort cohabitants in family 
281. For example, marriage licensing is the mechanism for imposing binding obliga- 
tions of mutual care and interdependence, which cohabitants only undertake through 
contract. 
282. See Case, Marriage Licenses, supra note 178, at 1772-73 (showing how licensing 
of marriage protects against intrusive government inquiry) . 
283. See supra note 81 and accompanying text (discussing judicial recognition of 
functional family relationships); see also supra notes 209-212 and accompanying text 
(discussing cases in which courts enforced agreements between cohabitants) . 
284. See Clisham 8c Wilson, supra note 189, at 576 (finding little impact of ALI 
Domestic Partnership Principles on state legislatures) . 
285. See Weiner, supra note 58, at 135-36 (arguing family rights and obligations toward one another should be assigned to cohabitants who have a common child); see also 
Cynthia Grant Bowman, Social Science and Legal Policy: The Case of Heterosexual 
Cohabitation, 9J.L. 8c Fam. Stud. 1, 45-48 (2007) (presenting similar argument). 
286. See Elizabeth S. Scott, Marriage, Cohabitation and Collective Responsibility for 
Dependency, 2004 U. Chi. Legal F. 225, 259 (arguing couples who have cohabited for five 
years typically are in marriage-like relationships and should be subject to default rules 
regulating property sharing and support on divorce). 
This content downloaded from 128.59.161.126 on Wed, 09 Dec 2015 15:06:51 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
364 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 1 15:293 
relationships from those whose commitment (and social value) is less 
compelling. 
C. Non-dyadic Novel Families : Navigating New Territory 
Both same- and different-sex cohabiting couples are in intimate 
dyadic relationships and have been measured against a template based 
on marriage. For same-sex relationships, this familiar model has simpli- 
fied and facilitated normative integration and, ultimately, verification by 
regulators of the qualities of couples aspiring to gain legal protection. 
Other aspiring families, however, may lack ready models of family behav- 
ior to provide them with normative guidelines or to assist others in 
evaluating their functioning. Polygamous, multigenerational, and volun- 
tary kin groups may all function as viable families, but to some extent 
they are pioneers adapting behavior and structuring family obligations to 
suit their unique forms. To be sure, some such families - such as 
multigenerational relationships - are familiar, but they have thus far 
functioned informally without the goal of full legal protection.287 In gen- 
eral, these novel families face the initial task of structuring their family 
relationships through experimentation and adaptation without the tem- 
plate that marriage provides. 
These groups are characterized by one of two features - some by 
both - that distinguish them from families modeled on marriage. The 
first is that they often include more than two adult parties.288 A group 
that includes multiple adults is more complex than a dyad in ways that 
generate uncertainty about its functioning. Avoiding exploitation, impos- 
ing obligations fairly and efficiently, and protecting the interests of adult 
members who dissent from decisions by the majority require more com- 
plex mechanisms than are needed to regulate an equalitarian dyad.289 
Second, while polygamous relationships involve sexual intimacy, other 
aspiring unions are not based on conjugal bonds among the adults. The 
combination of multiple parties and asexual relationships creates uncer- 
tainties about the stability and functioning of these novel families that 
are different from, and possibly greater than, those families based on the 
model of marriage. For multigenerational groups, of course, this uncer- 
tainty may be offset by genetic ties and by historical tradition. But other 
287. Grandparents in the 1980s and 1990s did lobby successfully for the enactment of 
grandparent-visitation statutes. See Ellman et al., supra note 52, at 732-33 (discussing 
grandparents' visitation rights). But see Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63 (2000) (hold- 
ing application of Washington grandparent-visitation statute violated parents' constitu- 
tional rights); Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499-500 (1977) (rejecting 
zoning ordinance that effectively excluded grandparent raising her grandchild from 
definition f"family" ) . 
288. A multigenerational or voluntary kin family could include just two adults, but 
many will include more. For simplicity, this Article does not deal specifically with dyads. 
289. See Davis, supra note 8, at 1958-61 (explaining overnance challenges facing 
polygamous groups and offering partnership model in response). 
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non-dyadic groups may face greater challenges in demonstrating their 
viability as stable families. 
1. Polygamous Groups. - In the current climate, it may seem fanciful 
to discuss the path to legal recognition for polygamous family aspirants. 
In contemporary American society, polygamy is largely associated with 
fundamentalist Mormon communities and other notorious cultlike 
groups that are generally viewed with hostility for posing a severe risk to 
teenage girls who reportedly are coerced into sexual relationships with 
older men.290 On this ground, fundamentalist Mormons have been sub- 
ject to child-protection interventions, and their leaders have faced crimi- 
nal prosecution.291 These groups are deeply hierarchical, with women 
occupying subservient positions in a male-dominated oligarchy - a family 
structure that is discordant with contemporary norms of gender equal- 
ity.292 Finally, because outlaw polygamous groups include a small number 
of (usually older) men with many wives, young men are often expelled 
from their communities.293 It is fair to say that polygamous families are 
unlikely to attain public acceptance or legal recognition so long as funda- 
mentalist religious polygamists represent the archetypical model. 
But attitudes toward polygamy appear to be softening somewhat, as 
evidenced by the popularity of the television series Big Love and the real- 
290. The Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (FLDS) is led by 
Warren Jeffs, who has been convicted in several states of criminal offenses related to the 
coercion of minor girls to "marry" adult men. See Mark Shurtleff, Religion and Non-State 
Governance: Warren Jeffs and the FLDS, 2010 Utah L. Rev. 115, 118-21 (transcribing 
then-sitting Utah Attorney General's speech discussing Warren Jeffs and his criminal 
history with minors). A polygamous cult, the Branch Davidians, attracted worldwide 
notoriety when it engaged in a shootout with federal agents resulting in dozens of deaths 
at its compound near Waco, Texas in 1993. Branch leader, David Koresh, had multiple 
"spiritual" wives, including reportedly underage minors. See Malcolm Gladwell, Sacred 
and Profane: How Not to Negotiate with Believers, New Yorker (Mar. 31, 2014), http:// 
www.newyorker.com/magazine/201 4/03/31 /sacred-and-profane-4 (on file with the Columbia 
Law Review) (discussing David Koresh and detailing events at Waco) . 
291. In a notorious Texas case, allegations of sexual abuse of underage girls led to the 
removal of 468 children by the Texas Department of Family and Protective S rvices from 
the Yearning for Zion Ranch, a FLDS community. In re Tex. Dep't of Family & Protective 
Servs., 255 S.W.3d 613, 613-14 (Tex. 2008). The Texas Supreme Court upheld an 
appellate court's order vacating state custody, finding that, despite evidence of a pattern of 
sexual abuse of pubescent girls on the ranch, children ot at risk were removed and those 
at risk could have been protected without removing them from their parents' custody. See 
id. at 615 (noting Family Code did not give courts authority to remove children from 
home, though other means - such as protective orders - could be employed). 
292. See Jon Krakauer, Under the Banner of Heaven: A Story of Violent Faith 11-15 
(2004) (describing fundamentalist polygamous family in which women are taught to 
strictly follow " [p]erfect obedience"). 
293. See Julian Borger, The Lost Boys, Thrown Out of US Sect so that Older Men Can 
Marry More Wives, Guardian (June 13, 2005, 7:02 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/ 
world/2005/jun/14/usa.julianborger (on file with the Columbia L w Review) (noting there 
are over 1000 "lost boys" who have been "separated from their parents and thrown out of 
their communities by a polygamous sect to make more young women available for older 
men"). 
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ity show Sister Wives , both depicting rather conventional polygamous 
families.294 Further, the legal basis for prohibiting polygamous families 
may be eroding. In 2013, in a case involving the family depicted in Sister 
Wives , a Utah federal district court held unconstitutional a state criminal 
ban on polygamy.295 Fundamentalist Mormon men practicing polygamy 
typically enter multiple religious marriages but have only one legal wife. 
On this basis, the court applied Lawrence v . Texas to hold that the prong 
of the Utah bigamy statute prohibiting cohabitation by a legally married 
person violated the individuals' right of privacy protected under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.296 Further, the court found that the Utah law 
interfered with the free exercise of religion in targeting a particular 
group.297 None of this indicates that polygamy has gained public 
acceptance, but it does suggest some change in public attitudes and a 
movement toward decriminalization, an essential step in the process 
leading to legal recognition.298 
Although some polyamorous groups may value the fluidity and lib- 
erty that parties in unregulated relationships enjoy,299 others (such as the 
hypothetical polygamous family described in Part II) might aspire to rela- 
tionships based on commitment and interdependence.300 For those in 
294. See generally Kaitlin R. McGinnis, Casenote, Sister Wives: ANew Beginning for 
United States Polygamist Families on the Eve of Polygamy Prosecution?, 19Vili. Sports & 
Ent. L.J. 249, 257-60 (2012) (discussing impact of Sister Wives and Big Love on public 
perception of polygamous relationships) . The website of Sister Wives describes the purpose 
of the show as showing viewers how the polygamous Brown family "navigate [s] life as a 
'normal' family in a society that shuns their lifestyle." What's New with the Sister Wives, 
TLC, http://www.tlc.com/tv-shows/sister-wives/about-the-show/about-sister-wives/ (on file 
with the Columbia L w Review) (last visited Feb. 4, 2015). 
295. Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1234 (D. Utah 2013). Brown rejected the 
authority of Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879), a nineteenth-century S preme 
Court opinion upholding the constitutionality of such a ban. See Brown , 947 F. Supp. 2d at 
1189 ("[T]he court believes that Reynolds is not, or should no longer be considered, good 
law, but also acknowledges its ambiguous status  "). 
296. See Brown , 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1222-25 ("The cohabitation prong of the Statute 
does not survive rational basis review and must be stricken asa violation of substantive due 
process under Lawrence"). Other courts have disagreed. See, e.g., State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 
726, 743 (Utah 2006) (holding polygamy implicates marriage and thus is outside privacy 
protection of Lawrence) . 
297. See Brown , 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1209-21 (noting cohabitation prong of law was not 
"operationally neutral"). 
298. Of course, Lawrence v. Texas provided this step in the marriage-equality 
movement. 
299. See Emens, Monogamy's Law, supra note 35, at 309-30 (discussing commitment 
to free sexual expression among many polyamorists) . Some advocates for polyamory may 
respond similarly to critics arguing that the marriage-equality movement has limited the 
freedom of gays to live their intimate lives free of the constraint ofmarriage. See Franke, 
Longing, supra note 59, at 2689 ("The challenge of this moment is to conceptualize a 
legal strategy that akes on the exclusivity of marriage by repudiating the homophobia that 
underwrites he exclusive, while not ratifying the normative priority of marriage."). 
300. One polyamory website reports polyamorous groups in committed partnerships 
and undergoing commitment ceremonies. Loving More Polyamory Frequently Asked 
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the latter category, family status may be a desirable goal, made more 
plausible by the success of the LGBT marriage-equality movement.301 
Aspiring polygamous families confront two challenges, one common to 
multiparty adult relationships generally and the other familiar from the 
LGBT experience. Like other families with multiple adults, polygamous 
groups aiming for recognition must create governance structures that 
promote stability, while ensuring a fair distribution of rights and obliga- 
tions, without the guidance provided by the dyadic model of marriage. In 
addition, like same-sex couples, polygamous groups face the formidable 
challenge of moving from outlaw status to integration into the broader 
normative community. Moreover, aspiring polygamous families must 
overcome a challenge not confronted by gays and lesbians - the reputa- 
tional harm created by the actual practices of fundamentalist 
polygamists.302 
The first challenge for aspiring polygamous families is to create a 
collaborative agreement sufficient o overcome high levels of uncertainty 
about the viability of this relationship form. Multiparty contracting 
requires more complex governance structures than does bilateral 
agreement.303 In addition to the challenge of specifying mutual obliga- 
tions and responsibilities, parties must structure their relationships and 
performance to avoid exploitation of all members and also address the 
key question of how to resolve disagreements.304 Adrienne Davis has sug- 
gested that this challenge can be met by adapting the default rules 
governing partnership relationships.305 These rules protect dissenting 
members from exploitation by the majority and permit exit from the 
partnership by dissenting minorities under specified conditions.306 In 
addition, the parties can contract for a unanimity rule governing all fam- 
Questions or FAQ, Loving More, http://www.lovemore.com/faq [hereinafter Loving More 
FAQ] (on file with the Columbia L w Review) (last visited Feb. 4, 2015). 
301. See Davis, supra note 8, at 1957 (describing how both supporters and detractors 
of polygamous-marriage ights view goal as more plausible in wake of marriage equality for 
gays). 
302. See supra notes 290-293 and accompanying text (describing association of FLDS 
with sexual abuse and other harms to children). In contrast, no evidence supports allega- 
tions that children of gay parents suffer harm by virtue of their parents' sexual orientation. 
See supra notes 259-261 and accompanying text (discussing cases that have rejected such 
allegations as groundless) . 
303. Fabrizio Cafaggi, Introduction toContractual Networks, Inter-Firm Cooperation 
and Economic Growth 9 (Fabrizio Cafaggi ed., 2011) (discussing complexity of multiparty 
contracts incommercial context) . 
304. As our colleague Liz Emens points out, the risk of coercion may be as great in 
dyadic relationships. 
305. Davis, supra note 8, at 2003-04. 
306. Some polygamists favor a structure inwhich the entity endures, but individual 
members are free to withdraw. See Davis, supra note 8, at 2011-12 (likening plural mar- 
riages to commercial ssociations, asmembers in both may desire to remain associated 
upon another member's exit) . A partnership model of governance would incorporate the 
fiduciary duties of care and loyalty. 
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ily decisionmaking. Here, the threat of dissolution of the relationship 
should the parties fail to agree on a course of action deters frivolous disa- 
greements and encourages compromise. Under this regime, parties are 
able to learn rather quickly whether their partners are capable of ade- 
quate family functioning and whether they have the capacity for 
collaborative decisionmaking. Such an environment has been shown to 
create bonds of trust in commercial relationships based on similar collab- 
orative structures. The success of multiparty professional partnerships 
and other commercial collaborations suggests that there are available 
models to solve the contracting problems facing polygamous groups who 
wish to test the durability of their relationship through contract. 
But even if individual polygamous relationships can be sustained 
through collaborative and formal contracting, these groups face a daunt- 
ing task seeking to move from outlaw status to integration with the larger 
normative community. Just as same-sex intimacy weis criminalized in the 
pre-Lawrence ra, (at least some) polygamous unions are often prohibited 
under criminal law.307 For this reason, polygamous groups are likely to be 
secretive; as with same-sex couples, this inhibits the formation of norma- 
tive networks and, ultimately, acceptance by the broader social commu- 
nity. Moreover, a powerful strategy deployed by LGBT-rights advocates 
for gaining public acceptance and legal reform, the identification of 
same-sex unions with marriage, is likely not available to polygamous 
groups. Further, stable commitment may seem to be incompatible with 
the simultaneous maintenance of multiple intimate relationships; if so, 
polygamous relationships may be perceived as offending the strong social 
norm against adultery. 
But polygamists have been heartened by the LGBT movement, the 
success of which may function as a catalyst that emboldens polygamist 
groups to live more openly and to pursue legal recognition of their fam- 
ily relationships. If these groups function as stable, caring units in which 
adult members relate to one another on the basis of equality and minors 
are not exploited, polygamous families plausibly can signal to the larger 
community that they are committed to family-functioning norms. As with 
the LGBT marriage-equality movement, a key element of this process is 
the formation of networks of aspiring families and their advocates. Effec- 
tive legal and social advocacy by norm entrepreneurs on behalf of 
contemporary polygamous groups might gradually supplant religious 
polygamists in the public imagination. Indeed, the process of network 
formation has begun, facilitated by the Internet, with the emergence of 
interest groups whose goals are to promote interaction among polyga- 
mists, disseminate information to correct negative impressions, and ulti- 
307. See, e.g., The Family Support Ctr., The Primer: AGuidebook for Law Enforce- 
ment and Human Services Agencies Who Offer Assistance to Fundamentalist Mormon 
Families 53-59 (2011), available at http://www.familysupportcenter.org/Primer.pdf (on 
file with the Columbia L w Review) (cataloguing laws that can be used against polygamists 
in various states) . 
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mately acquire plural-marriage rights. The website of one such group 
announces that "[f]reely-consenting, adult, non-abusive, marriage- 
committed polygamy is the next civil rights battle."308 
Polygamists face particularly daunting challenges in attaining state 
certification. Because the form is not modeled on the familiar marital 
dyad and because of the sordid and familiar recent history of polygamy, 
the state will require extraordinary assurances that these new families are 
different from fundamentalist cults. Because of these unique obstacles, 
transparency and cooperation with regulators will likely be essential. The 
model developed in Part II predicts that an iterative process of collabora- 
tion to develop and enforce best practices offers the most plausible path 
for polygamists to attain family status. To be sure, the goal of attaining 
marriage rights for polygamists may currently seem unlikely, but Buhman 
and other recent developments hint that the legal prohibition of and 
moral distaste for multiparty intimate unions is beginning to erode. If so, 
polygamous groups may well be in the early stages of the evolutionary 
process that leads to legal recognition.309 
2. Nonconjugal Aspiring Families. - Aspiring nonconjugal families 
include groups that are truly contemporary and those that are quite 
familiar; both confront unique challenges in attaining legal recognition. 
Some aspiring families, such as voluntary kin groups, have only recently 
attracted public interest and attention.310 Others, such as multigenera- 
tional families, have deep roots in American society and have been recog- 
nized by the Supreme Court as having constitutionally protected family 
status for some purposes.311 Nonconjugal groups have some advantages 
as aspiring families. They avoid the destabilizing risk of infidelity and, 
because their nonsexual bonds do not incite moral disapproval, they are 
unlikely to stir public opprobrium. In this regard, the process toward 
legal recognition may be smoother than that of same-sex couples or poly- 
gamous groups. But paradoxically, the absence of conjugal ties may 
generate skepticism about the durability and stability of some 
nonconjugal affiliations. Because the legal family has long been modeled 
308. Pro-Polygamy.com, http://www.Pro-Polygamy.com (on file with the Columbia L w 
Review) (last visited Feb. 4, 2015). Websites have been very important in the movement to
create networks and gain public acceptance of polygamy. See, e.g., Loving More FAQ, 
supra note 300 (providing information about and dismissing myths related to polyamory) . 
Pro-Polygamy.com ai s to provide information to media outlets on contemporary poly- 
amory and to dispel myths about polygamous relationships as abusive. Id. Network for- 
mation is also promoted by www.polygamylifestyle.com, which allows polygamist groups to 
find others in their locality. See Polygamy Lifestyle, supra note 142. 
309. Cf. Goldfeder, supra note 1 (noting public opinion remains in favor of banning 
polygamy but conceding public cannot "continue ignoring the polygamists' clamor for 
acceptance"). 
310. See, e.g., Angier, supra note 29 (examining recent rends in family composition 
and discussing voluntary kin relationships) . 
311. See, e.g., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 498-500 (1977) (recogniz- 
ing right of grandparent to live with grandchild). 
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on marriage, nonconjugal groups may need to overcome an implicit 
assumption that a sexual bond reinforces family commitment between 
unrelated adults. Moreover, like polygamous groups, multimember non- 
conjugal family aspirants need to create governance structures that pro- 
mote commitment and avoid exploitation. Finally, some nonconjugal 
relationships (particularly voluntary kin) fill important family functions, 
but the parties themselves do not expect the group to satisfy the full 
range of dependency needs.312 In short, the evolutionary process whereby 
these groups might acquire legal protection remains unclear. 
a. Multigenerational Groups . - These obstacles may be least likely to 
impede legal recognition of multigenerational families. Extended fami- 
lies have the benefit of both deep historical roots and genetic bonds, ties 
that are assumed to form a solid basis of family commitment. Indeed, 
until the twentieth century, when the two-parent nuclear family became 
the norm, multigenerational families were very common. The Supreme 
Court, in an opinion rejecting the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance 
that prohibited a grandson from living in his grandmother's home, 
famously noted that extended families have played an important role in 
American society for centuries.313 But despite the fact that multigenera- 
tional families are recognized for some limited legal purposes,314 and 
generally are regarded favorably in the public imagination,315 for the 
most part these families function informally and do not receive the legal 
protection of marital families. 
In part, this may be due to the complexity of extended families and 
uncertainty about which genetic family members are, or should be, 
recognized as a legal family. A family with multiple adults of different 
generations may include some who are eager to assume durable family 
obligations in an extended family unit and others whose affiliations are 
more attenuated, and who may prefer to form smaller units with nonfam- 
ily partners. Some members may reside with the group for a period and 
312. See infra notes 323-324 and accompanying text (discussing limited functions of 
some voluntary kin groups). 
313. See Moore , 431 U.S. at 504 ("Ours is by no means a tradition limited to respect for 
the bonds ... of the nuclear family. The tradition of uncles, aunts, cousins, and especially 
grandparents sharing a household along with parents and children has roots equally 
venerable and equally deserving of constitutional recognition."). 
314. Examples include statutes imposing obligations on adult children to care for 
parents, grandparent-visitation statutes, and intestate-succession tatutes. See, e.g., 23 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. § 4603(a)(1) (West 2010) (imposing care obligations on adult children); 
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 72-73 (2000) (declining to strike down grandparent- 
visitation statute but finding it violated parental rights as applied); Kristine S. Knaplund, 
Grandparents Raising Grandchildren a d the Implications for Inheritance, 48Ariz. L. Rev. 
1, 22 (2006) (discussing intestate-succession statutes). 
315. See, e.g., Constance Rosenblum, Together Again: Multigenerational Households 
on the Upswing, N.Y. Times (Dec. 13, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/15/real 
estate/multigenerational-households~on-the-upswing.html?pagewanted=all (on file with the 
Columbia L w Review) . 
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then depart. If legal recognition is justified for multigenerational groups 
with stable long-term commitments to provide mutual care, the state will 
require a sorting mechanism - beyond genetic ties - to separate those 
members that fulfill family-functioning needs from those that lack either 
the willingness or the capability (or both) to fulfill the familial role. 
Probably the strongest candidate for full family status is the linear 
family group composed of grandparent (s), parent(s), and child(ren). It 
is clear that this familiar type of extended family can function satisfacto- 
rily to fulfill family functions. Further, the genetic bond among the mem- 
bers, together with well-defined family roles, reinforces already existing 
norms of commitment and caring. The primary challenge for these 
extended families may be the creation of networks with other similar 
families to pursue their goals of increasing public support and attaining 
official family status.316 More complex multigenerational groups pose a 
greater challenge because they are less familiar to the public and less 
likely to be bound by family-commitment norms than are linear family 
groups. Partly for this reason, regulators may find it more difficult o ver- 
ify the family functioning of these unconventional multigenerational 
groups. 
b. Voluntary Kin Groups . - Voluntary kin groups have recently 
received media attention,317 but generally they are relatively unfamiliar to 
the public and to regulators. In part, their emergence can be explained 
as a product of deficits in the functioning of more traditional family 
forms with the increase in divorce and decline of extended families in 
recent decades. Thus, some groups of voluntary kin function as substi- 
tutes for marriage or other family relationships. Lacking genetic or legal 
ties, members assume certain family roles and insist that their relation- 
ships are not simply friendships.318 These groups can take many forms: 
Variations include two or more divorced or widowed adults, sometimes 
with their minor children; a parent who has lost an adult child and a 
younger adult who has assumed that role;319 and adult friends who 
decide to live together, share resources, and care for one another in a 
316. An established group such as the AARP might be enlisted to assist in this project. The AARP effectively advocated for laws allowing randparent visitation i  the 1980s, 
mobilizing grandparents across the country. See Natalie Reed, Note, Third-Party Visitation 
Statutes: Why Are Some Families More Equal than Others?, 78 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1529, 1536- 
37 (2005) (describing role of AARP in lobbying successfully in fifty states for statutes). 
317. See, e.g., Angier, supra note 29 (reporting on voluntary kin families). 
318. See Braithwaite et al., supra note 4, at 396-402 (describing types of voluntary kin 
relationships); Marieke Voorpostel, Just like Family: Fictive Kin Relationships in the 
Netherlands, 68J. Gerontology: Series B: Psychol. Sci. & Soc. Sci. 816, 816 (2013) (noting fictive kin relations "come into play to fill family-like roles and functions"). 
319. See, e.g., Angier, supra note 29 (detailing voluntary kin relationship between 
orphaned friend of deceased man and deceased's mother). 
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nonconjugal group.320 The latter affiliation may include retired seniors 
who decide to live together for mutual companionship and support.321 
In one sense, the path to legal recognition might be less difficult for 
these aspiring families than for gay couples or polygamous groups 
because voluntary kin are less likely to face public enmity. Moreover, in 
contrast to some relationships based on sexual intimacy, these nonconju- 
gal groups are formed specifically (and solely) for the purpose of ful- 
filling family functions.322 But voluntary kin groups have many varying 
goals and expectations about their family roles. While some live as 
committed interdependent families, researchers report that in many 
relationships the voluntary kin do not purport (or aspire) to satisfy the 
full range of family functions.323 Sometimes the relationship is viewed as a 
supplement to other primary family relationships. For example, lesbian 
parents may have a relationship with their child's biological father who 
plays an important role in the child's life but does not assume other fam- 
ily obligations.324 As with cohabiting couples, this variety predictably can 
impede the formation of networks based on common interests and 
complicate the ability to signal the family-like nature of the category. Of 
course, unlike cohabitants, committed voluntary kin cannot marry and 
thus groups that do function fully as families predictably can signal their 
nature more effectively than can cohabitants. 
One issue raised by the possibility of assigning family status to volun- 
tary kin and other multi-adult family groups is whether the size of these 
groups is self-limiting. As suggested above, increasing the number of 
adults adds complexity and costs to family relationships, along with the 
risk of exploitation, shirking, and other potential harms.325 These risks 
320. Asexual individuals who seek to form families would be voluntary kin groups. 
Asexual couples could "pass" as a married couple but this would deny their identity. For a 
discussion of asexual identity, see generally Elizabeth F. Emens, Compulsory Sexuality, 66 
Stan. L. Rev. 303 (2014). 
321. A Canadian study found that eight percent of widowed individuals include a 
friend in descriptions of family. Law Comm'n of Can., supra note 1, at 5. A variation isthe 
naturally occurring retirement community or NORC. See NORCs: An Aging in Place 
Initiative, www.norcs.org (last visited Feb. 4, 2015) (promoting communities of"older 
adults who were living in market rate apartment buildings . . . where older adults were the 
predominant residents"). 
322. Our colleague Bert Huang made this point. 
323. See Braithwaite et al., supra note 4, at 396-402 (listing functions of kin groups); 
see also Angier, supra note 29 (discussing Dr. Braithwaite 's research on voluntary kin 
relationships). 
324. More broadly, de facto parents represent a category of voluntary kin that may 
sometimes bein limited family roles. Older adults may assist one another in realizing their 
healthcare and other caregiving needs but not be financially interdependent, and mem- 
bers may have allegiance to their primary biological families. See Braithwaite et al., supra 
note 4, at 396-402 (describing various types of voluntary kin family relationships) . 
325. See supra notes 303-306 and accompanying text (discussing these problems in 
polygamous groups); see also Robert Ellickson, The Household: Informal Order Around 
the Hearth 76-85 (2008) (discussing costs and benefits of increased household size). 
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may tend to increase as members are added, with the result that only 
multiparty groups with relatively few members are likely to function effec- 
tively in fulfilling family functions. Limitations on the size of aspiring 
families that are able to qualify for legal recognition forestall the possibil- 
ity that communes or cult groups might register as a voluntary kinship 
family. 
A final important question that we note but do not fully address is 
raised by the heterogeneity of voluntary kin groups (and some 
multigenerational families) , with many fulfilling a limited range of family 
functions. Here the question is whether these limited purpose relation- 
ships are likely to acquire legal recognition through the evolutionary pro- 
cess described above. To be sure, many individuals in voluntary kin rela- 
tionships, like some cohabitants, prefer to maintain informal ties. But 
others may desire legal enforcement of the particular rights and obliga- 
tions that they have assumed and seek protection of those family 
bonds.326 Suggestive evidence of groups attaining limited family rights 
supports the plausibility of this outcome through some variation of the 
process we describe. For example, grandparents have lobbied successfully 
(with the assistance of the AARP, a powerful interest group) to enact stat- 
utes that give them standing to seek visitation with their grandchildren.327 
Moreover, at least one state has enacted a statute that allows couples to 
customize their family relationships by executing "designated benefi- 
ciary" agreements in which each party chooses to extend particular rights 
and protections to the other from a menu of options.328 It may be that 
the path to legal protection of more limited family relationships raises 
fewer or different challenges than those faced by groups who aim to gain 
social and legal recognition as fully functioning families. But, in any 
event, that analysis is beyond the scope of this Article. 
326. The involved biological father of a child raised by lesbian parents is one example. 
327. See Ellman et al., supra note 52, at 732-33 (describing enactment of grandparent 
statutes across the country) . Grandparent websites provide information about grandparent 
rights. E.g., Am. Grandparents A soc., www.grandparents.com (on file with the Columbia 
Law Review) (last visited Feb. 4, 2015). Moreover, some states authorize visitation by de 
facto parents based on the fulfillment of parental obligations for an extended period of 
time with the consent of the legal parent. See, e.g., V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 555 (N.J. 
2000) (authorizing custody or visitation by de facto parent and describing factors). These 
factors effectively require substantial evidence of commitment to the parental role and a 
contractual understanding between the de facto and legal parent. But we have not found 
evidence of networking or advocacy to foster public acceptance. See supra notes 276-278 
and accompanying text (describing cohabitation patterns and cohabitants' advocacy 
strategies) . 
328. See Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 15-22-101 to -112 (West 2011). The parties to the 
designated beneficiary agreement (DBA) may select any of the sixteen rights and protec- 
tions on the state-provided form. Id. § 15-22-106. These rights include joint ownership of 
property, hospital-visitation r ghts, medical-decisionmaking r ghts, and the ability to sue 
for wrongful death and to benefit from workers' compensation. Id. § 15-22-105. DBA par- 
ties cannot be married to another person. Id. § 15-22-104. See generally Erez Aloni, 
Registering Relationships, 87 Tulane L. Rev. 573, 593-609 (2013) (discussing DBAs). 
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Conclusion 
The past decade has witnessed a dramatic change in public attitudes 
and legal status for same-sex couples who wish to marry. These events 
demonstrate that the legal conception of the family is no longer limited 
to traditional marriage. At the same time, the lack of substantial move- 
ment toward granting legal benefits to unmarried cohabitants is evidence 
that the state remains committed to a welfarist criterion for granting 
legal status, one that embodies a commitment to family-functioning 
norms; as a category, cohabitants are too diverse to satisfy this criterion. 
Viewed together, both of these developments suggest that other groups 
aspiring to legal recognition as families must overcome substantial uncer- 
tainties if they are to achieve their ultimate objectives. At the core, over- 
coming these uncertainties requires establishing trust at every level - 
among the individual members of the aspiring family group, among the 
individual group and other similar aspirants, and among the network of 
aspiring families, the larger social community, and the state. Collabora- 
tive processes have been shown in other settings to offer a means for 
creating trust endogenously and thus appear to offer a way forward in 
the evolution of other novel families. Moreover, collaboration was a cru- 
cial element in the successful movement to achieve marriage rights for 
LGBT couples, and the absence of meaningful collaboration is one factor 
in explaining the stasis that characterizes the status of unmarried coha- 
bitants. This, then, is the evidence supporting the prediction that the 
future progress of other aspiring family groups toward legal status will 
depend in large part on how well they are able to engage the collabora- 
tive mechanisms that smooth the path from contract to status. 
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